Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

3.4. 
Moral and pro-social behaviour 
3.4.1. Is pro-social always good? 
Some commentators (e.g. Persson and Savulescu, 2008) have proposed that moral 
enhancement could be achieved via modulation of pro-social behaviour or its 
underpinnings, such as empathy and trust, as well as the reduction of emotions (e.g. 
anger) that commonly underlie socially harmful (e.g. violent) behaviour.
Providing a clear-cut and exact definition of what is moral as opposed to the pro-
social is a daunting task. But are they the same? We might value pro-sociality: we 
generally like people that are kind, empathetic, altruistic and helping. They are nice 
people. Those characteristics might also usually be conducive to all-things-
considered good outcomes. However, we could come up with scenarios where some 
manifestations of those traits will lead to morally undesirable outcomes. To give a 
trivial example, shying away from harshly criticizing a plan that is likely to have 
9
My understanding of Hume is that he does not mean that passions are 
sufficient 
for 
morality but rather the they are 
necessary
.

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disastrous consequences might be kind and pro-social, but lead to overall morally 
bad outcomes and therefore be hard to justify morally. A consideration about what 
is conducive to the good seems to be the distinguishing feature of morality. Yet 
several scientists and philosophers keep identifying the moral with the pro-social.
In her book 
Braintrust, 
Churchland (2011) proposed that morality or ethics is a 
scheme for social behaviour. She proposed that it is rooted in four systems: 
involved in caring behaviour, theory of mind, problem-solving in social contexts 
and social learning. There is nothing troubling in those claims as they stand. 
Morality can indeed be seen as one of the normativities that regulate social conduct, 
and if we are interested in the description of what neural circuits are involved in 
moral decision making, and in the evolutionary roots of the capabilities necessary 
for morality, a view like this is promising.
However, the trouble begins if the pro-social is identified with the moral without 
acknowledging that an additional argument is needed to justify this, and the terms 
‘moral’ and ‘pro-social’ are used interchangeably. Even if morality is rooted in or 
uses brain mechanisms involved in guiding social behaviour, it does not make 
morality and sociability or pro-sociality the same. Yet even Jotternad (2011), who 
criticizes the current approach to MB, seems at one point in his paper to equate 
sociability with morality (p.7). 
A more elaborate argument against equating the moral with the pro-social runs as 
follows. Enhancing pro-sociality, be it empathy or helping behaviour, is simply not 
enough for behaviour to be moral. Increasing general empathy might lead to a 
disproportionate increase in empathy for the suffering of the ingroup; if this is 
perceived to be inflicted by members of another group it might stimulate increased 
hatred towards the outgroup (Pacholczyk, 2011). Being pro-social might mean 
aiding in doing evil and, as Harris (2012) pointed out, we can help others to achieve 
different ends and end-states, including helping them into an early grave.
The opposite might be also the case. Emotions like anger may lead to violence, but 
may also modulate the perception of unfairness and be involved in actions that are 
motivated by moral concern (Mullen and Sitka, 2006). It is not anger itself that is 
morally problematic, but rather its violent expression. What is more, sometimes 

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violent behaviour can be justified morally and even lead to morally best outcomes 
(Harris, 2011).
The way anger is displayed is modulated by a set of cognitive processes, and this 
mediation is complex. That means that not only are there likely to be different 
moral consequences of behaviours heavily influenced by emotions such as anger, 
but also that pro-social and anti-social consequences are likely to be variable 
depending on the context. To illustrate this point let us consider some recent 
research on conflict resolution.
Halperin (2008) conducted a study at the eve of the Annapolis peace summit in 
2007 and found that above and beyond any other emotion, a construct branded as 
‘sentimental hatred’ increased the tendency of Israelis to support extreme military 
action toward Palestinians. Researchers suggest that the level of long-term hatred 
influences the behavioural manifestations of anger. Not surprisingly, anger that 
occurs in the presence of high levels of hatred will most likely bring about an 
extreme aggressive reaction. In contrast, anger that occurs in the presence of low 
levels of hatred may lead to more constructive approach tendencies (Fischer and 
Roseman, 2007). If one believes that the opponent group can change its behaviour 
and that its intentions are defensive or innocent (and such appraisal is connected to 
the low levels of hatred), the appraisal embedded in anger may create a tendency to 
engage in constructive problem solving and crisis management, instead of violent 
behaviour (Halperin, 2008; 2011). This illustrates the point that emotions such as 
anger have both pro-social and anti-social consequences.
To argue that reducing anger, increasing empathy (whichever aspect of it) and 
increasing trust will lead to pro-social consequences is therefore an 
oversimplification. Branding traits and emotions as pro-social is an 
oversimplification, because what makes them pro-social or not is the behaviour 
they are likely to elicit – and that might mean both pro- and antisocial behaviour. 
Moreover, whether or not the pro-social behaviours such as attempts at conflict 
resolution or helping are indeed the best morally speaking is a separate issue 
altogether. Some studies have found that participants influenced by empathy for an 
individual might act contrary to what is all-things-considered just. Batson et al. 
(1995) have shown that people who are induced to feel empathy for a terminally ill 

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child are more likely to unfairly allocate resources to this individual. They would, 
for example, move her off a waiting list and into immediate treatment even where 
that implies that others on the waiting list do not get the treatment they need.
Branding pro-social traits as moral is especially worrying given the real-world 
context of the philosophical debate on MB. In recent years the convergence of the 
criminal justice and mental health systems in the UK means that pharmacological 
and other psychiatric interventions are easier to deliver to offenders. With the recent 
focus on the management of so called dangerous individuals in the UK, as well as 
the history of the public health perspective on violence in the US, some might see 
the time to be ripening for biomedical interventions. It certainly sounds better to 
brand an intervention ‘moral enhancement’, while it would be more accurately 
called crime control or reducing anti-social behaviour.
This is not to say, however, that an ethical argument in favour of modifying 
emotions or traits underlying behaviour could not be made. If we could provide 
good reasons for the view that, other things being equal, modulation of a certain 
trait is likely to provide morally best outcomes overall, we would have the 
beginning of the ethical argument we need. Here I will not attempt to fully develop 
arguments of this kind, but let me provide an indication of how such an argument 
might go. One way is to argue that for a given individual it may be overall morally 
better (perhaps over a period of time) to have a given trait or level of emotional 
response. We therefore need an account of the good, and empirical evidence that 
systematically ties this certain level of trait or emotion to what is morally desirable. 
If we accept that behaviours are what matters here, we would have to demonstrate 
that direct emotional modulation is likely to have an effect on behaviours, and 
know enough about the situations that a person is likely to encounter to demonstrate 
that this modification will be better overall.
10
This kind of argument applies equally 
to the enhancement of cognitive abilities and to modifying morally-relevant 
behaviours.
Secondly, one could take a population perspective and argue that an increase or 
decrease in a certain trait or characteristic would have overall morally best 
10
Which might require responding to the situationist critique

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outcomes, even taking into consideration counterexamples.
11
We could focus on 
certain subpopulations (analogically to the targeting the high-risk populations in 
disease prevention) or adopt a population strategy which would focus on shifting 
the entire distribution of a trait (Rose, 1981; 2001).