Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

3.6. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I have argued that modulation of pro-social sentiments is not 
sufficient for moral enhancement understood as making better moral agents. After 

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briefly introducing the debate I have considered the proposals according to which 
increasing empathetic ability should be pursued as a solution to great global ills 
(Persson and Savulescu, 2008; Savulescu and Persson, 2012b, Rifkin, Baran-
Cohen, 2011, Rifkin, 2010a). I have argued that increasing pro-social sentiments is 
not sufficient for assuring oral outcomes, and increasing empathy or a 
predisposition to help might also lead to adverse outcomes morally speaking. 
Conversely, inclinations and emotions considered anti-social such as anger, might 
result in morally good outcomes. Thus, the identification of the moral and the pro-
social is not justified. Moreover, increasing empathy has serious limitations in the 
extent to which it is likely to translate into the kind of moral behaviour that would 
lead to solving great social ills.
In section 3.4.2 I argued that the population perspective on the modification of pro-
social sentiments for the purposes of increasing doing good is faced with problems 
due to lack of selectivity and individual differences (see also s. 2.3.1) and 
concluded that an individual approach to MB that embedded in and taking 
advantage of the guidance function of reason and moral beliefs is more likely to be 
conducive to good moral outcomes. I have further considered the importance of 
moral reasons in section 3.5., arguing that engagement in moral reasons is 
necessary if MB is to result in enhanced moral agency. I have argued against a 
position according to which modulation of affect is not a desirable way of 
enhancing moral agency, and instead argued that MB via direct emotion 
modulation, provided it is done in the context of moral reflection and deliberation, 
is a prima facie useful tool when pursuing bettering of moral agency.

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