.
Paulist Press, 1996), 251–265.
justice
(Arabic:
adl, qist, haqq, sidq, ihsan)
Justice is a fundamental principle concerned with
the fair allocation of rewards and punishments,
together with the rectification of wrongs. It is a
key concept in the Abrahamic religions, where
human beings are called to act in justice or righ-
teousness, and where God is seen as its ultimate
dispenser, especially on J
Udgment
d
ay
.
In Arabic one of the key words for justice is
adl, a noun based on the verb
adala, which means,
among other things, to straighten or modify; to
depart or deflect from one (presumably wrong)
path to the other (presumably right one); to
equalize; and to balance, weigh, or be in equilib-
rium. Among its numerous suggestive synonyms
are nasib and qist, share; haqq, truth or justice;
qistas and mizan, scale; and taqwim, straightening.
Other synonyms imply the classical Greek virtue
sophrosyne: temperance, harmony, self-mastery,
and with respect to action: balance, proportional-
ity, and judiciousness, or the Aristotelian principle
of the (Golden) Mean between extremes. The
semantically rich metaphorical image of the scale
(mizan) is used in the q
Uran
with reference to
divine justice on Judgment Day.
Justice is one of the foremost themes in the
Quran. Indeed, it is part of the metaphysical ratio-
nale for creation: “God created the heavens and
earth with what is true and just (haqq): to reward
each soul according to its deeds. They will not be
wronged” (Q 45:22). Humankind alone is respon-
sible for whatever justice—or injustice (zulm)—is
in the world (Q 10:44). Divine justice is more
than a quid pro quo exchange, at least with regard
to merit-based principles, for God “doubles any
good deed and gives a tremendous reward of his
own” (Q 4:40). The quranic concern for justice
reiterates one of the fundamental demands (as
“righteousness”) made by God upon humans in
revelations to the prophets of the Hebrew Bible.
This continuity with earlier revelations might be
inferred from the fact that “the Quran often refers
to terms such as adl (equitable, just), ihsan (benef-
icence) [and] maaruf (a generally accepted good)
without defining them, as if the Quran assumes
a pre-existing relationship to justice, equity and
morality—a relationship that precedes the text”
(quoted in Abou El Fadl 60).
Perhaps the best expression of the importance
of justice in the Quran is:
You who believe, uphold justice (qist) and be
witnesses to God, even if it is against your-
selves, your parents, or your close relatives.
Whether the person is rich or poor, God can
best take care of both. Do not follow your
selfish desire, so that you can act justly. If
you pervert or neglect justice, God is fully
aware of what you do. (Q 4:135)
The call to justice is complemented by numer-
ous admonitions against injustice (zulm) in the
Quran.
Divine justice is by definition perfect, eternal,
and ideal. People are urged to make every effort
to approximate and reflect this metaphysical fact
in their lives. Reward or punishment in the next
life is allotted in accordance with the sincerity
and strength of a person’s efforts to follow this
ideal, one reason for the association of justice with
ihsa¯n, beneficence or moral excellence, that is,
doing the utmost good. The imperative of justice
is both an individual and a collective obligation
for Muslims, so that while we may distinguish
between personal and social virtues, they are nec-
essarily tied together.
m
Uhammad
(ca. 570–632), like the biblical
prophets, was motivated by a strong sense of
justice and protested the widespread inequity and
oppression he found in Meccan society, where
he had grown up. He sought to replace it with a
new order and harmony within which the stan-
dards of justice would prevail. Whatever dimen-
sions of justice were part of the b
edoUin
ethic of
tribal manliness (
muruwwa) in the
jahiliyya (pre-
Islamic Arabia), they appear to have precipitously
declined in the time and place of Muhammad,
hence the Meccan revelations of the Quran regard-
K 416
justice
ing the treatment of orphans and the plight of the
poor. The Quran clearly evidences the urgency
of addressing issues that fall under the rubric of
socioeconomic or distributive justice, rebuking
those who have greedily consumed their inheri-
tance while having a greedy passion for wealth
(Q 89:19–20). Moreover, the enshrinement of
zakat (
almsgiving
) as the third pillar of practice
in Islam makes this duty integral to Muslim iden-
tity, effectively institutionalizing a “right” for the
needy and deprived to a share in the community’s
wealth. In addition to this compulsory obliga-
tion, Muslims of sufficient means are expected to
practice voluntary charitable giving (sadaqa). The
Quran’s ill-understood opposition to usury (riba)
further illustrates the attempt to deal with prob-
lems of distributive justice.
Historically, questions of political justice were
first broached in the Khariji opposition to the
U
mayyad
c
aliphate
(661–750). The k
haWariJ
invoked the doctrine of
qadar (power;
Free
Will
,
thus the corollary proposition that each indi-
vidual is responsible for his or her acts) against
the Umayyad rulers’ attempt to legitimize their
rule through the principles of
ijmaa
(consensus,
agreement) and bayaa (oath of allegiance), forti-
fied with the theological doctrine of jabr (lit.,
compulsion; predestination; here in the sense
that Umayyad rule was seen as ordained by God).
The absolute justice of God was one of the five
tenets of Mutazili kalam (
theology
), unremark-
able in itself until we learn that it was bound up
with debates over the nature of evil and injustice,
including the metaphysical and ethical scope of
man’s free agency. The Mutazila even took to refer-
ring to themselves as the People of Justice (adl)
and Unity (tawhid). The pursuit and realization
of justice for the Mutazila was determined and
constrained by the powers of reason (aql).
“The Father of Arab Philosophy” and Islam’s
first significant philosopher, Abu Yusuf Yaacub ibn
Ishaq al-Kindi (d. ca. 866) held justice to be the
central virtue owing to its balancing and coordi-
nating functions vis-à-vis other (principally clas-
sical Greek) virtues, thereby demonstrating the
integration of Peripatetic and Neoplatonic ideas
into a distinctively Islamic
philosophy
. Islam’s
first truly systematic philosopher, al-F
a
r
a
b
i (ca.
870–950), envisioned the ideal Islamic polity
portioning such goods as security, wealth, honor,
and dignity according to a desert principle of
distributive justice. Rational justice, formulated
in terms of a social contract theory beholden to
Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Ethics, as well as
the Islamic sciences generally, was the center
point of Ibn Sina’s (Avicenna, 979–1037) politi-
cal scheme to secure the common welfare from
a pool of basic resources. For Muhammad i
bn
r
Ushd
(Averroës, 1126–98), justice was the sum
and highest of all virtues of man as a citizen of the
polity. Furthermore, it inheres in the fulfillment
of responsibilities and duties in a social division
of labor structured according to the standards and
strictures of
philosophy
(falsafa). While some vir-
tues, such as wisdom and courage, are class-spe-
cific, justice was pertinent to all citizens, provided
they performed the vocation for which they were
fitted “by nature.”
Justice in jurisprudential terms entails, in
the first instance, equal treatment of all before
the law (
fiqh
). With the
sharia
as lodestar
(recalling, with Abou El Fadl, that the sharia “is
God’s will in an ideal and abstract fashion, but
the fiqh is the product of the human attempt to
understand God’s will” [Abou El Fadl 32]), both
ethics and law in Islam approach justice through
the doctrinal formula of “commanding right
and forbidding wrong” (al-amr bi’l-maaruf wa’l-
nahy an al-munkar). In short, fiqh is a system of
ethico-legal obligation formulated in imperative
(amr) and prohibitive (nahy) terms, with all
human actions exhaustively classified as manda-
tory (fard or wajib), encouraged (mustahabb or
mandub), permissible (
halal
or mubah), discour-
aged (makruh), or forbidden (
haram
). Procedural
justice in Islam tends toward personalism rather
than corporatism and administrative principles
insofar as trust is placed in the “just judge” or
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