societies force it upon us more obviously than others and at a different
time of life. The limit decision to have no plan at all, to let things come as
they may, is still theoretically a plan that may or may not be rational.
Accepting the idea of a long-term plan, then, it seems clear that such a
scheme is to be assessed by what it will probably lead to in each future
period of time. The principle of inclusiveness in this case, therefore, runs
as follows: one long-term plan is better than another for any given period
(or number of periods) if it allows for the encouragement
and satisfaction
of all the aims and interests of the other plan and for the encouragement
and satisfaction of some further aim or interest in addition. The more
inclusive plan, if there is one, is to be preferred: it comprehends all the
ends of the first plan and at least one other end as well. If this principle is
combined with that of effective means, then together they define rational-
ity as preferring, other things equal, the greater means for realizing our
aims, and the development of wider and more varied interests assuming
that these aspirations can be carried through. The principle of greater
likelihood supports this preference even in situations when we cannot be
sure that the
larger aims can be executed, provided that the chances of
execution are as great as with the less comprehensive plan.
The application of the principles of effective means and the greater
likelihood to the long-term case seems sound enough. But the use of the
principle of inclusiveness may seem problematical. With a fixed system
of ends in the short run, we assume that we already have our desires and
given this fact we consider how best to satisfy them. But in long-term
choice, although we do not yet have the desires which various plans will
encourage, we are nevertheless directed to adopt that plan which will
develop the more comprehensive interests on the assumption that these
further aims can be realized. Now a person may say that since he does not
have
the more inclusive interests, he is not missing anything in not decid-
ing to encourage and to satisfy them. He may hold that the possible
satisfaction of desires that he can arrange never to have is an irrelevant
consideration. Of course, he might also contend that the more inclusive
system of interests subjects him to a greater risk of dissatisfaction; but
this objection is excluded since the principle assumes that the larger
pattern of ends is equally likely to be attained.
There are two considerations that seem to favor the principle of inclu-
siveness in the long-term case. First of all,
assuming that how happy
a person is depends in part upon the proportion of his aims that are
achieved, the extent to which his plans are carried through, it follows that
pursuing the principle of inclusiveness tends to raise this proportion and
363
63. Definition of Good for Life Plans
thereby enhance a person’s happiness. This effect is absent only in the
case where all of the aims of the less inclusive plan are already safely
provided for. The other consideration is that, in accordance with the
Aristotelian Principle (explained below in §65), I assume that human
beings have a higher-order desire to follow the principle of inclusiveness.
They prefer the more comprehensive long-term
plan because its execu-
tion presumably involves a more complex combination of abilities. The
Aristotelian Principle states that, other things equal, human beings enjoy
the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities),
and that this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the
greater its complexity. A person takes pleasure in doing something as he
becomes more proficient at it, and of two activities which he performs
equally well, he prefers the one that calls upon the greater number of
more subtle and intricate discriminations. Thus the desire to carry out the
larger pattern of ends which brings into play the more finely developed
talents is an aspect of the Aristotelian Principle.
And this desire, along
with the higher-order desires to act upon other principles of rational
choice, is one of the regulative ends that moves us to engage in rational
deliberation and to follow its outcome.
Many things in these remarks call for further explanation. It is clear,
for example, that these three principles are not in general sufficient to
rank the plans open to us. Means may not be neutral, inclusive plans may
not exist, the aims achieved may not be sufficiently similar, and so on. To
apply these principles we view our aims as we are inclined to describe
them, and more or less count the number realized by this or that plan, or
estimate the likelihood of success. For this reason I shall refer to these
criteria as counting principles. They do not require a further analysis or
alteration of our desires, nor a judgment concerning
the relative intensity
of our wants. These matters I put aside for the discussion of deliberative
rationality. It seems best to conclude this preliminary account by noting
what seems to be reasonably clear: namely that we can choose between
rational plans of life. And this means that we can choose now which
desires we shall have at a later time.
One might suppose at first that this is not possible. We sometimes think
that our major desires at least are fixed and that we deliberate solely about
the means to satisfy them. Of course, it is obvious that deliberation leads
us to have some desires that we did not have before, for example, the
desire to avail ourselves of certain means that we have on reflection come
to see as useful for our purposes. Furthermore, it is clear that taking
thought may lead us to make a general desire more specific, as when a
364
Goodness as Rationality
desire for music becomes a desire to hear a particular work. But let us
suppose that, except for these sorts of exceptions, we do not choose now
what to desire now. Nevertheless, we can certainly decide now to do
something that we know will affect the desires that we shall have in the
future. At any given time rational persons decide between plans of action
in view of their situation and beliefs, all in conjunction with their present
major desires and the principles of rational choice. Thus we choose be-
tween future desires in the light of our existing desires,
including among
these the desire to act on rational principles. When an individual decides
what to be, what occupation or profession to enter, say, he adopts a
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