other ends, or which undermine the capacity for other activities, are
weeded out; whereas those that are enjoyable in themselves and support
other aims as well are encouraged. A plan, then, is made up of subplans
suitably arranged in a hierarchy, the broad features of the plan allowing
for the more permanent aims and interests that complement one another.
Since only the outlines of these aims and interests can be foreseen, the
operative parts of the subplans that provide for them are finally
decided
upon independently as we go along. Revisions and changes at the lower
levels do not usually reverberate through the entire structure. If this con-
ception of plans is sound, we should expect that the good things in life
are, roughly speaking, those activities and relationships which have a ma-
jor place in rational plans. And primary goods should turn out to be those
things which are generally necessary for carrying out such plans success-
fully whatever the particular nature of the plan and of its final ends.
These remarks are unhappily too brief. But
they are intended only to
prevent the more obvious misunderstandings of the notion of a rational
plan, and to indicate the place of this notion in a theory of the good. I
must now try to convey what is meant by the principles of rational choice.
These principles are to be given by enumeration so that eventually they
replace the concept of rationality. The relevant features of a person’s
situation are identified by these principles and the general conditions of
human life to which plans must be adjusted. At this point I shall mention
those aspects of rationality that are most familiar and seem least in dis-
pute. And for the moment I shall assume that the choice situation relates
to the short term. The question is how to fill in the more or less final
details of a subplan to be executed over a relatively
brief period of time,
as when we make plans for a holiday. The larger system of desires may
not be significantly affected, although of course some desires will be
satisfied in this interval and others will not.
Now for short-term questions anyway, certain principles seem per-
fectly straightforward and not in dispute. The first of these is that of effec-
tive means. Suppose that there is a particular objective that is wanted, and
that all the alternatives
are means to achieve it, while they are in other
respects neutral. The principle holds that we are to adopt that alternative
which realizes the end in the best way. More fully: given the objective,
one is to achieve it with the least expenditure of means (whatever they
are); or given the means, one is to fulfill the objective to the fullest
possible extent. This principle is perhaps the most natural criterion of
rational choice. Indeed, as we shall note later, there is some tendency to
suppose that deliberation must
always take this form, being regulated
361
63. Definition of Good for Life Plans
ultimately by a single final end (§83). Otherwise it is thought that there is
no rational way to balance a plurality of aims against one another. But
this question I leave aside for the present.
The second principle of rational choice is that one (short-term) plan is
to be preferred to another if its execution would achieve all of the desired
aims of the other plan and one or more further aims in addition. Perry
refers to this criterion as the principle of inclusiveness and I shall do the
same.
13
Thus we are to follow the more inclusive plan if such a plan
exists. To illustrate, suppose that we are planning
a trip and we have to
decide whether to go to Rome or Paris. It seems impossible to visit both.
If on reflection it is clear that we can do everything in Paris that we want
to do in Rome, and some other things as well, then we should go to Paris.
Adopting this plan will realize a larger set of ends and nothing is left
undone that might have been realized by the other plan. Often, however,
neither plan is more inclusive than the other; each may achieve an aim
which the other does not. We must invoke some other principle to make
up
our minds, or else subject our aims to further analysis (§83).
A third principle we may call that of the greater likelihood. Suppose
that the aims which may be achieved by two plans are roughly the same.
Then it may happen that some objectives have a greater chance of being
realized by one plan than the other, yet at the same time none of the
remaining aims are less likely to be attained. For example, although one
can perhaps do everything one wants to do in both Rome and Paris, some
of the things one wishes to do seem more likely to meet with success in
Paris, and for the rest it is roughly the same. If so,
the principle holds that
one should go to Paris. A greater likelihood of success favors a plan just
as the more inclusive end does. When these principles work together the
choice is as obvious as can be. Suppose that we prefer a Titian to a
Tintoretto, and that the first of two lottery tickets gives the larger chance
to Titian while the second assigns it to the Tintoretto. Then one must
prefer the first ticket.
So far we have been considering the application of the principles of
rational choice to the short-term case. I now wish to examine the other
extreme in which one
has to adopt a long-term plan, even a plan of life, as
when we have to choose a profession or occupation. It may be thought
that having to make such a decision is a task imposed only by a particular
form of culture. In another society this choice might not arise. But in fact
the question of what to do with our life is always there, although some
13. See
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