A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

particular person are to be made and finally rendered consistent. Indeed,
with certain qualifications (§83) we can think of a person as being happy
when he is in the way of a successful execution (more or less) of a ra-
tional plan of life drawn up under (more or less) favorable conditions, and
he is reasonably confident that his plan can be carried through. Someone
is happy when his plans are going well, his more important aspirations
being fulfilled, and he feels sure that his good fortune will endure. Since
plans which it is rational to adopt vary from person to person depending
upon their endowments and circumstances, and the like, different indi-
viduals find their happiness in doing different things. The gloss concern-
ing favorable circumstances is necessary because even a rational arrange-
ment of one’s activities can be a matter of accepting the lesser evil if
natural conditions are harsh and the demands of other men oppressive.
11. For simplicity I assume that there is one and only one plan that would be chosen, and not
several (or many) between which the agent would be indifferent, or whatever. Thus I speak through-
out of the plan that would be adopted with deliberative rationality.
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63. Definition of Good for Life Plans

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The achievement of happiness in the larger sense of a happy life, or of a
happy period of one’s life, always presumes a degree of good fortune.
Several further points about long-term plans should be mentioned. The
first relates to their time structure. A plan will, to be sure, make some
provision for even the most distant future and for our death, but it be-
comes relatively less specific for later periods. Certain broad contingen-
cies are insured against and general means provided for, but the details
are filled in gradually as more information becomes available and our
wants and needs are known with greater accuracy. Indeed, one principle
of rational choice is that of postponement: if in the future we may want to
do one of several things but are unsure which, then, other things equal, we
are to plan now so that these alternatives are both kept open. We must not
imagine that a rational plan is a detailed blueprint for action stretching
over the whole course of life. It consists of a hierarchy of plans, the more
specific subplans being filled in at the appropriate time.
The second point is connected with the first. The structure of a plan not
only reflects the lack of specific information but it also mirrors a hierar-
chy of desires proceeding in similar fashion from the more to the less
general. The main features of a plan encourage and secure the fulfillment
of the more permanent and general aims. A rational plan must, for exam-
ple, allow for the primary goods, since otherwise no plan can succeed; but
the particular form that the corresponding desires will take is usually
unknown in advance and can wait for the occasion. Thus while we know
that over any extended period of time we shall always have desires for
food and drink, it is not until the moment comes that we decide to have a
meal consisting of this or that course. These decisions depend on the
choices available, on the menu that the situation allows.
Thus planning is in part scheduling.
12
We try to organize our activities
into a temporal sequence in which each is carried on for a certain length
of time. In this way a family of interrelated desires can be satisfied in an
effective and harmonious manner. The basic resources of time and energy
are allotted to activities in accordance with the intensity of the wants that
they answer to and the contribution that they are likely to make to the
fulfillment of other ends, The aim of deliberation is to find that plan
which best organizes our activities and influences the formation of our
subsequent wants so that our aims and interests can be fruitfully com-
bined into one scheme of conduct. Desires that tend to interfere with
12. See J. D. Mabbott, “Reason and Desire,”