A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

Mind,
vol. 44 (1935); and R. M. Hare,
“Geach on Good and Evil,” 
Analysis,
vol. 18 (1957).
381
66. Good Applied to Persons

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the two basic cases of a good person and a good society. Developing the
thin into the full theory via the original position is the essential step.
Several ways suggest themselves for extending the definition to the
problem of moral worth, and I believe that at least one of these will serve
well enough. First of all, we might identify some basic role or position,
say that of citizen, and then say that a good person is one who has to a
higher degree than the average the properties which it is rational for
citizens to want in one another. Here the relevant point of view is that of a
citizen judging other citizens in the same role. Second, the notion of a
good person could be interpreted as requiring some general or average
assessment so that a good person is one who performs well in his various
roles, especially those that are considered more important. Finally, there
may exist properties which it is rational to want in persons when they are
viewed with respect to almost any of their social roles. Let us say that
such properties, if they exist, are broadly based.
24
To illustrate this idea in
the case of tools, the broadly based properties are efficiency, durability,
ease of maintenance, and so on. These features are desirable in tools of
almost any kind. Much less broadly based properties are properties such
as keeps its cutting edge, does not rust, and so on. The question whether
some tools have these would not even arise. By analogy, a good person, in
contrast to a good doctor or a good farmer, and the like, is one who has to
a higher degree than the average person the broadly based properties (yet
to be specified) that it is rational for persons to want in one another.
Offhand it seems that the last suggestion is the most plausible one. It
can be made to include the first as a special case and to capture the
intuitive idea of the second. There are, however, certain complications in
working it out. The first thing is to identify the point of view from which
the broadly based properties are rationally preferred and the assumptions
upon which this preference is founded. I note straightway that the funda-
mental moral virtues, that is, the strong and normally effective desires to
act on the basic principles of right, are undoubtedly among the broadly
based properties. At any rate, this seems bound to be true so long as we
suppose that we are considering a well-ordered society, or one in a state
of near justice, as I shall indeed take to be the case. Now since the basic
structure of such a society is just, and these arrangements are stable with
respect to the society’s public conception of justice, its members will in
general have the appropriate sense of justice and a desire to see their
institutions affirmed. But it is also true that it is rational for each person to
24. For the notion of broadly based properties and its use here, I am indebted to T. M. Scanlon.
382
Goodness as Rationality

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act on the principles of justice only on the assumption that for the most