A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

part these principles are recognized and similarly acted upon by others.
Therefore the representative member of a well-ordered society will find
that he wants others to have the basic virtues, and in particular a sense
of justice. His rational plan of life is consistent with the constraints of
right, and he will surely want others to acknowledge the same restric-
tions. In order to make this conclusion absolutely firm, we should also
like to be sure that it is rational for those belonging to a well-ordered
society who have already acquired a sense of justice to maintain and even
to strengthen this moral sentiment. I shall discuss this question later
(§86); for the present I suppose that it is the case. Thus with all these
presumptions on hand, it seems clear that the fundamental virtues are
among the broadly based properties that it is rational for members of a
well-ordered society to want in one another.
A further complication must be considered. There are other properties
that are presumably as broadly based as the virtues, for example, intelli-
gence and imagination, strength and endurance. Indeed, a certain mini-
mum of these attributes is necessary for right conduct, since without
judgment and imagination, say, benevolent intentions may easily lead to
harm. On the other hand, unless intellect and vigor are regulated by a
sense of justice and obligation, they may only enhance one’s capacity to
override the legitimate claims of others. Certainly it would not be rational
to want some to be so superior in these respects that just institutions
would be jeopardized. Yet the possession of these natural assets in the
appropriate degree is clearly desirable from a social point of view; and
therefore within limits these attributes are also broadly based. Thus while
the moral virtues are included in the broadly based properties, they are
not the only ones in this class.
It is necessary, then, to distinguish the moral virtues from the natural
assets. The latter we may think of as natural powers developed by educa-
tion and training, and often exercised in accordance with certain charac-
teristic intellectual or other standards by reference to which they can be
roughly measured. The virtues on the other hand are sentiments and
habitual attitudes leading us to act on certain principles of right. We can
distinguish the virtues from each other by means of their corresponding
principles. I assume, then, that the virtues can be singled out by using the
conception of justice already established; once this conception is under-
stood, we can rely on it to define the moral sentiments and to mark them
off from the natural assets.
A good person, then, or a person of moral worth, is someone who has
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to a higher degree than the average the broadly based features of moral
character that it is rational for the persons in the original position to want
in one another. Since the principles of justice have been chosen, and we
are assuming strict compliance, each knows that in society he will want
the others to have the moral sentiments that support adherence to these
standards. Thus we could say alternatively that a good person has the
features of moral character that it is rational for members of a well-or-
dered society to want in their associates. Neither of these interpretations
introduces any new ethical notions, and so the definition of goodness as
rationality has been extended to persons. In conjunction with the theory
of justice which has the thin account of the good as a subpart, the full
theory seems to give a satisfactory rendering of moral worth, the third
main concept of ethics.
Some philosophers have thought that since a person qua person has no
definite role or function, and is not to be treated as an instrument or
object, a definition along the lines of goodness as rationality must fail.
25
But as we have seen, it is possible to develop a definition of this sort
without supposing that persons hold some particular role, much less that
they are things to be used for some ulterior purpose. It is true, of course,
that the extension of the definition to the case of moral worth makes many
assumptions. In particular, I assume that being a member of some com-
munity and engaging in many forms of cooperation is a condition of
human life. But this presumption is sufficiently general so as not to
compromise a theory of justice and moral worth. Indeed, it is entirely
proper, as I have noted previously, that an account of our considered
moral judgments should draw upon the natural circumstances of society.
In this sense there is nothing a priori about moral philosophy. It suffices
to recall by way of summation that what permits this definition of the
good to cover the notion of moral worth is the use of the principles of
justice already derived. Moreover, the specific content and mode of deri-
vation of these principles is also relevant. The main idea of justice as
fairness, that the principles of justice are those that would be agreed to
by rational persons in an original position of equality, prepares the way
for extending the definition of good to the larger questions of moral
goodness.
It seems desirable to indicate the way in which the definition of good
might be extended to other cases. Doing this will give us more confidence
in its application to persons. Thus let us suppose that for each person
25. See, for example, Hare, “Geach on Good and Evil,” pp. 109ff.
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there is a rational plan of life that determines his good. We can now define
a good act (in the sense of a beneficent act) as one which we are at liberty
to do or not to do, that is, no requirements of natural duty or obligation
constrain us either to do it or not to do it, and which advances and is
intended to advance another’s good (his rational plan). Taking a further
step, we can define a good action (in the sense of a benevolent action) as
a good act performed for the sake of the other person’s good. A beneficent
act promotes another’s good; and a benevolent action is done from the
desire that the other should have this good. When the benevolent action is
one that brings much good for the other person and when it is under-
taken at considerable loss or risk to the agent as estimated by his interests
more narrowly construed, then the action is supererogatory. An act which
would be very good for another, especially one which protects him from
great harm or injury, is a natural duty required by the principle of mutual
aid, provided that the sacrifice and hazards to the agent are not very great.
Thus a supererogatory act may be thought of as one which a person does
for the sake of another’s good even though the proviso that nullifies the
natural duty is satisfied. In general, supererogatory actions are ones that
would be duties were not certain exempting conditions fulfilled which
make allowance for reasonable self-interest. Eventually, of course, for a
complete contractarian account of right, we would have to work out from
the standpoint of the original position what is to count as reasonable
self-interest. But I shall not pursue this question here.
Finally, the full theory of the good enables us to distinguish different
sorts of moral worth, or the lack of it. Thus we can distinguish between
the unjust, the bad, and the evil man. To illustrate, consider the fact that
some men strive for excessive power, that is, authority over others which
goes beyond what is allowed by the principles of justice and which can be
exercised arbitrarily. In each of these cases there is a willingness to do
what is wrong and unjust in order to achieve one’s ends. But the unjust
man seeks dominion for the sake of aims such as wealth and security
which when appropriately limited are legitimate. The bad man desires
arbitrary power because he enjoys the sense of mastery which its exer-
cise gives to him and he seeks social acclaim. He too has an inordinate
desire for things which when duly circumscribed are good, namely, the
esteem of others and the sense of self-command. It is his way of satisfy-
ing these ambitions that makes him dangerous. By contrast, the evil man
aspires to unjust rule precisely because it violates what independent per-
sons would consent to in an original position of equality, and therefore
its possession and display manifest his superiority and affront the self-
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respect of others. It is this display and affront which is sought after. What
moves the evil man is the love of injustice: he delights in the impotence
and humiliation of those subject to him and he relishes being recognized
by them as the willful author of their degradation. Once the theory of
justice is joined to the theory of the good in what I have called the full
theory, we can make these and other distinctions. There seems to be no
reason to fear that the numerous variations of moral worth cannot be
accounted for.
67. SELF-RESPECT, EXCELLENCES, AND SHAME
67. Self-Respect, Excellences, Shame
On several occasions I have mentioned that perhaps the most important
primary good is that of self-respect. We must make sure that the concep-
tion of goodness as rationality explains why this should be so. We may
define self-respect (or self-esteem) as having two aspects. First of all, as
we noted earlier (§29), it includes a person’s sense of his own value, his
secure conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth
carrying out. And second, self-respect implies a confidence in one’s abil-
ity, so far as it is within one’s power, to fulfill one’s intentions. When we
feel that our plans are of little value, we cannot pursue them with pleasure
or take delight in their execution. Nor plagued by failure and self-doubt
can we continue in our endeavors. It is clear then why self-respect is a
primary good. Without it nothing may seem worth doing, or if some
things have value for us, we lack the will to strive for them. All desire and
activity becomes empty and vain, and we sink into apathy and cynicism.
Therefore the parties in the original position would wish to avoid at
almost any cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect. The
fact that justice as fairness gives more support to self-esteem than other
principles is a strong reason for them to adopt it.
The conception of goodness as rationality allows us to characterize
more fully the circumstances that support the first aspect of self-esteem,
the sense of our own worth. These are essentially two: (1) having a
rational plan of life, and in particular one that satisfies the Aristotelian
Principle; and (2) finding our person and deeds appreciated and con-
firmed by others who are likewise esteemed and their association en-
joyed. I assume then that someone’s plan of life will lack a certain attrac-
tion for him if it fails to call upon his natural capacities in an interesting
fashion. When activities fail to satisfy the Aristotelian Principle, they are
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likely to seem dull and flat, and to give us no feeling of competence or a
sense that they are worth doing. A person tends to be more confident of
his value when his abilities are both fully realized and organized in ways
of suitable complexity and refinement.
But the companion effect of the Aristotelian Principle influences the
extent to which others confirm and take pleasure in what we do. For while
it is true that unless our endeavors are appreciated by our associates it is
impossible for us to maintain the conviction that they are worthwhile, it is
also true that others tend to value them only if what we do elicits their
admiration or gives them pleasure. Thus activities that display intricate
and subtle talents, and manifest discrimination and refinement, are valued
by both the person himself and those around him. Moreover the more
someone experiences his own way of life as worth fulfilling, the more
likely he is to welcome our attainments. One who is confident in himself
is not grudging in the appreciation of others. Putting these remarks to-
gether, the conditions for persons respecting themselves and one another
would seem to require that their common plans be both rational and
complementary: they call upon their educated endowments and arouse in
each a sense of mastery, and they fit together into one scheme of activity
that all can appreciate and enjoy.
Now it may be thought that these stipulations cannot be generally
satisfied. One might suppose that only in a limited association of highly
gifted individuals united in the pursuit of common artistic, scientific, or
social ends is anything of this sort possible. There would seem to be no
way to establish an enduring basis of self-respect throughout society. Yet
this surmise is mistaken. The application of the Aristotelian Principle is
always relative to the individual and therefore to his natural assets and