A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

Econometrica,
vol. 28 (1960).
369
64. Deliberative Rationality

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estimated locally, increasing expectations provide a measure of content-
ment that makes the difference. But even leaving this element aside, the
rising or at least the nondeclining plan appears preferable since later
activities can often incorporate and bind together the results and enjoy-
ments of an entire life into one coherent structure as those of a declining
plan cannot.
In these remarks about the devices of deliberation and time-related
principles I have tried to fill in Sidgwick’s notion of a person’s good. In
brief, our good is determined by the plan of life that we would adopt with
full deliberative rationality if the future were accurately foreseen and
adequately realized in the imagination. The matters we have just dis-
cussed are connected with being rational in this sense. Here it is worth
stressing that a rational plan is one that would be selected if certain
conditions were fulfilled. The criterion of the good is hypothetical in a
way similar to the criterion of justice. When the question arises as to
whether doing something accords with our good, the answer depends
upon how well it fits the plan that would be chosen with deliberative
rationality.
Now one feature of a rational plan is that in carrying it out the individ-
ual does not change his mind and wish that he had done something else
instead. A rational person does not come to feel an aversion for the
foreseen consequences so great that he regrets following the plan he has
adopted. The absence of this sort of regret is not however sufficient to
insure that a plan is rational. There may be another plan open to us such
that were we to consider it we would find it much better. Nevertheless, if
our information is accurate and our understanding of the consequences
complete in relevant respects, we do not regret following a rational plan,
even if it is not a good one judged absolutely. In this instance the plan is
objectively rational. We may, of course, regret something else, for exam-
ple, that we have to live under such unfortunate circumstances that a
happy life is impossible. Conceivably we may wish that we had never
been born. But we do not regret that, having been born, we followed the
best plan as bad as it may be when judged by some ideal standard. A
rational person may regret his pursuing a subjectively rational plan, but
not because he thinks his choice is in any way open to criticism. For he
does what seems best at the time, and if his beliefs later prove to be
mistaken with untoward results, it is through no fault of his own. There is
no cause for self-reproach. There was no way of knowing which was the
best or even a better plan.
Putting these reflections together, we have the guiding principle that a
370
Goodness as Rationality

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rational individual is always to act so that he need never blame himself no
matter how his plans finally work out. Viewing himself as one continuing
being over time, he can say that at each moment of his life he has done
what the balance of reasons required, or at least permitted.
18
Therefore
any risks he assumes must be worthwhile, so that should the worst hap-
pen that he had any reason to foresee, he can still affirm that what he did
was above criticism. He does not regret his choice, at least not in the
sense that he later believes that at the time it would have been more
rational to have done otherwise. This principle will not certainly prevent
us from taking steps that lead to misadventure. Nothing can protect us
from the ambiguities and limitations of our knowledge, or guarantee that
we find the best alternative open to us. Acting with deliberative rationality
can only insure that our conduct is above reproach, and that we are
responsible to ourselves as one person over time. We should indeed be
surprised if someone said that he did not care about how he will view his
present actions later any more than he cares about the affairs of other
people (which is not much, let us suppose). One who rejects equally the
claims of his future self and the interests of others is not only irresponsi-
ble with respect to them but in regard to his own person as well. He does
not see himself as one enduring individual.
Now looked at in this way, the principle of responsibility to self resem-
bles a principle of right: the claims of the self at different times are to be
so adjusted that the self at each time can affirm the plan that has been and
is being followed. The person at one time, so to speak, must not be able to
complain about actions of the person at another time. This principle does
not, of course, exclude the willing endurance of hardship and suffering;
but it must be presently acceptable in view of the expected or achieved
good. From the standpoint of the original position the relevance of re-
sponsibility to self seems clear enough. Since the notion of deliberative
rationality applies there, it means that the parties cannot agree to a con-
ception of justice if the consequences of applying it may lead to self-re-
proach should the least happy possibilities be realized. They should strive
to be free from such regrets. And the principles of justice as fairness seem
to meet this requirement better than other conceptions, as we can see
from the earlier discussion of the strains of commitment (§29).
A final observation about goodness as rationality. It may be objected
that this conception implies that one should be continually planning and
18. For this and other points in this paragraph see Charles Fried,