10.
Has the child’s stated preference been unduly influenced by
others?
At one extreme, have one or both parents instructed the child
in what to say, or promised or threatened outcomes that bear on his
or her position? At the other extreme, is the child’s stated preference
subject to an unhealthy concern for a parent who might become ill or
self-destructive, or simply disappear if the child is absent?
INVOLUNTARY SEPARATION: THE INCARCERATED,
ENLISTED, INCAPACITATED, OR HOSPITALIZED PARENT
A parent can be separated from his or her child for any of a handful
of reasons that fall beyond the jurisdiction of the family courts, but
which may yet call for the opinion of a developmentally informed
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Part III
Topics in Separation, Visitation, and Reunification
mental health or family law professional. These matters arise largely
when parent and child are involuntarily separated, risking damage to
the relationship and the stress of instability, loss, and traumatic change
to the child.
As different as the causes of these separations are, children’s experi-
ences prior to, during, and following each can be quite similar. We
know, for example, that compared to children with no trauma history,
children with a history of abuse or neglect, family violence, and/or
substance abuse are at greater social, emotional, cognitive, academic,
and occupational risk when a parent is incarcerated (Poehlmann,
2005a), when an active duty or reservist parent is deployed (Lincoln,
Swift, & Shorteno-Fraser, 2008), and when a parent is incapacitated
or hospitalized (Leedham & Meyerowitz, 2000).
We know that the separation and stresses associated with each of
these circumstances can prompt developmental regression, causing
some children’s socioemotional development to stall for months and
even years pending reunification (Faber, Willerton, Clymer, MacDer-
mid, & Weiss, 2008) and creating immense de´calage within the child.
We know that the parent’s absence inevitably throws the family’s
prior roles and interpersonal boundaries out of balance, no matter
whether the cause is illness (Rolland, 1999a,b), imprisonment (Pim-
lott & Sarri, 2002), or military service (Faber et al., 2008). In each of
these cases, and in many others of the same sort, the remaining family
members must more or less spontaneously adapt to the missing parent’s
absence by taking on new roles in each other’s lives. Whereas “families
that frequently have a member absent for periods of time due to work
(such as employment as an oil rigger or as an active duty military
member) may have learned to tolerate ambiguous loss without boundary
ambiguity” (Faber et al., 2008, p. 223), others struggle with the imbal-
ance, putting children at risk for parentification, adultification, and
neglect (Boss, 2002; Boss & Greenberg, 1984).
And we know that across these circumstances, some parent–child
relationships will become permanently scarred beyond repair; that when
the absence is long enough, the stresses intense enough, and the sup-
ports weak enough, the parent–child relationship can spontaneously
break (e.g., Drummet, Coleman, & Cable, 2003; Smyth & Ferro, 2002)
or be broken by others. These are among the cases that can come before
the family courts.
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