AFGHANISTAN
IRAN
IRAN
TURKMENISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
KYRGYZSTAN
KYRGYZSTAN
PAKISTAN
PAKISTAN
KAZAKHSTAN
RUSSIA
CHINA
INDIA
AFGHANISTAN
IRAN
TURKMENISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
KYRGYZSTAN
PAKISTAN
Central Asia
Frie_9780385517058_3p_all_r1.qxp:Layout 1 10/31/08 4:30 PM Page 110
PDF
111
r u s s i a 2 0 2 0
nically these were independent countries, but the United States was asking
for help with the Northern Alliance and couldn’t afford to anger the Rus
sians. The Central Asian countries did not want to anger the Russians
either—and U.S. planes had to fly over the former Soviet Union to get to
them.
The Russians agreed to an American military presence in the region,
thinking they had an understanding with the United States that this was a
temporary situation. But as the war in Afghanistan dragged on, the United
States stayed on; and as it stayed on, it became more and more influential
with the various republics in the region. Russia realized that what had been
a benign buffer zone was becoming dominated by the main global power—
a power that was pressing Russia in Ukraine, the Caucasus, and the Baltics.
In addition, as the price of energy rose and Russia adopted its new eco
nomic strategy, Central Asia’s energy became even more significant.
Russia did not want American forces a hundred miles from the Volga.
Russia simply had to react. It didn’t act directly, but it began manipulating
the political situation in the region, reducing American power. It was a
move designed to return Central Asia to the Russian sphere of influence.
And the Americans, on the other side of the world, isolated by chaotic
Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, were in no position to resist. The Russians
reasserted their natural position. And tellingly, it was one of the few places
U.S. naval power couldn’t reach.
Central Asia is an area where the United States can’t remain under Rus
sian pressure. It is a place where the Chinese could potentially cause prob
lems, but as we’ve seen, that is unlikely to happen. China has economic
influence there, but the Russians, in the end, have both military and finan
cial capabilities that can outduel them. The Russians might offer China ac
cess to Central Asia, but the arrangements created in the nineteenth century
and maintained by the Soviet Union will reassert themselves. Therefore, it is
my view that Central Asia will be back in the Russian sphere of influence by
the early 2010s, long before the major confrontation begins in the west, in
Europe.
112
t h e n e x t 1 0 0 y e a r s
Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: |