38
public issue, these proved the catalyst for many of the international corporations’ defence
and marketing strategies.
93
Insurance companies understood the potential economic fallout
for their industry, but took precautions to protect only themselves.
94
Ironically the asbestos mines in Canada, the United States, South Africa, Zimbabwe,
Swaziland, Southern Rhodesia or Corsica and CSR’s Wittenoom mine tended to be in the
picturesque locations.
95
Workers’ families lived in the company towns near the mines and
were exposed to the remnant tailings and dust created from the extraction process. In the
cities, residents near asbestos factories experienced a similar fate.
96
Occupants of public
buildings and private dwellings, along with trades people, dock workers and
end users would
also suffer from environmental exposure.
97
Workers, asbestos company executives and the
public alike have fallen ill and died from ARDs.
Any attempt by workers, their widows or the public to seek compensation have met
with opposition by asbestos companies. Johns-Manville’s standard defence in the 1920s was
that the worker’s illness was due to the risks of employment and those risks were part of the
terms of the contract agreed to by him.
98
Workers faced problems of low rates of pay,
dangerous conditions and unyielding management. Technical factors made asbestos mining
particularly hazardous, while the dry method of processing the fibre to
preserve its physical
characteristics resulted in high levels of dust. Rather than companies halting production
(given the hazards to workers and end users) world production of some 3,000 products
entered its fastest period of growth between 1960 and 1980.
99
In choosing to continue
production and ignore the health warnings companies developed techniques “to calm public
fears, frustrate legitimate claims for compensation, and placate regulatory authorities”. Their
strategies included the suppression of evidence of risk, intimidation of medical researchers
and the circulation of favourable publicity. Furthermore the industry relied
on the defence that
medical discovery and the evidence about disease took decades to emerge. What they failed
93
McCulloch & Tweedale, Op Cit. pp. 97-118.
94
Castleman, Op Cit. pp. 246-249.
95
McCulloch & Tweedale, Op Cit. pp. 20-22 & 37-43.
96
Ibid. pp. 33-37.
97
McCulloch & Tweedale, Op Cit. Chapters 2 & 7.
98
Ibid. Chapter 3.
99
Ibid. pp.18-27 & 84.
39
to mention was their interference in the research process which had slowed down the
emergence of the evidence and their vertical integration
100
which kept them abreast of what
was happening at the various asbestos mines and factories with
regard to the appearance of
asbestos-related disease among workers.
101
The counter arguments defending the benefits of asbestos and questioning the
research results meant that its ban in Western countries took at least until 1999 in the U.K.
and until 2005 in Europe. Chile, Brazil and Australia banned asbestos production a year or
two earlier. In October 2012 the governments in Quebec and Ottawa ended their support for
asbestos production at Quebec’s Asbestos mine. They would no longer oppose international
efforts to have chrysotile (white asbestos) declared a hazardous substance. Until 2010
Canada exported its chrysotile mainly to India, Vietnam and other developing countries.
102
Canada’s occupational health record is similar to that of other industrialised
countries;
despite its assurances of the investment of “much time, money, effort and human suffering
learning to use asbestos safely”.
103
As a member of the G8, Canada, with its access to
forums such as World Health Organization and the World Trade Organization, had promoted
asbestos. Asbestos manufacture continues in Russia, Africa,
Asia and Latin America, where
a wide range of cheap and durable products are made.
104
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