14.3.1 The crime of aggression
The absence of an acceptable binding definition of ‘crimes against peace’, since that
offence first appeared as Art 6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter, coupled with resistance
from the permanent members of the Security Council over its definition and
identification by another body, meant that the definition of aggression for the
41
Ibid,
Arts 17(6) and 19(8).
42
Ibid,
Art 18(5) and (3).
43
Ibid,
Art 16.
44
Op cit,
Scheffer, note 28, p 13.
45
Op cit,
Arsanjani, note 37, p 29.
46
34 ILM (1995), 482.
47
ICC Statute, Art 26.
48
Ibid,
Art 29. This is in accordance with the 1968 Convention on Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Art 1, 754 UNTS 73.
International Criminal Law
382
purposes of the Statute had become too cumbersome to negotiate in time. Clearly, an
appropriate definition under Art 5(2) of the Statute would need, as is clearly required
for reasons of coherency, to take cognisance of the UN Charter, but it is less clear
whether this obligation extends beyond Arts 2(4) and 51 of the Charter to encompass
also Security Council determination of an act of aggression under Art 39 of the
Charter. Whilst it would be prohibited to implicitly or explicitly amend the UN
Charter when defining any aspects of the crime of aggression, the referral of acts of
aggression as international offences by a concerned State or the prosecutor, especially
in cases where the Security Council is blocked by veto, does not necessarily amend the
UN Charter, nor does it usurp Security Council powers. Let us consider these issues
in light of developments a little prior to and subsequent to the Nuremberg process.
A century apart, both Napoleon and Kaiser William II of Germany were arraigned
for international offences akin to crimes against peace. In the case of the Kaiser, Art
227 of the 1919 Peace Treaty of Versailles contemplated his arraignment on the basis
of initiating war in violation of international morality and the sanctity of treaties.
Whereas Napoleon was exiled twice, the Kaiser fled prosecution. As already
explained in Chapter 12, no international instrument between 1919 and 1939
contained provision to the effect that individuals would incur liability for acts of
aggression. Thus, the inclusion of crimes against peace in the Nuremberg Charter,
and later in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) Charter,
was criticised as violating the principle
nullum crimen sine lege
. Article 6(a) of the
Nuremberg Charter stipulated individual criminal responsibility for crimes against
peace, constituted of the following elements:
Planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in
violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances, or participation in a
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
The Nuremberg Tribunal held that Germany had violated a number of bilateral anti-
aggression pacts, as well as other multilateral agreements prohibiting the use of
armed force, especially the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact.
49
From a legal point of view,
however, neither the bilateral agreements nor the Kellogg-Briand Pact stipulated
individual criminal responsibility, merely State responsibility. Therefore, and in
accordance with the
nullum crimen sine lege
rule, no one could be tried for crimes
against peace, since they had not been recognised as offences in international law
prior to the enactment of the Nuremberg Charter. The Tribunal brushed aside the
nullum crimen sine lege
objections to the charge, by relying on the unlawfulness of the
force used by Nazi Germany and by making an analogy with the 1907 Hague
Convention IV, which it found to stipulate personal responsibility despite the absence
of an express provision to that effect. Nonetheless, the allocation of responsibility to
individual defendants reflected the precise and actual function of each accused in
the commission of the ingredients of crimes against peace under the Charter.
50
The
inclusion of the crime of aggression sparked two dissenting opinions by Pal and
Roling JJ in the IMTFE judgment.
49
94 LNTS 57.
50
C Antonopoulos, ‘Whatever Happened to Crimes Against Peace?’, 6
Journal of Conflict & Security
Law
(2001), 33, p 38.
Chapter 14: The Permanent International Criminal Court
383
Despite the inclusion of crimes against peace in the set of the Nuremberg Principles,
adopted by the General Assembly in 1946,
51
the crime of aggression has not featured
in any legally binding instrument since. The explanation is simple. Unlike war crimes,
crimes against peace and genocide which require that the perpetrator commit the
act
us reus
of the offence, crimes against peace require that an act typically associated with
the functions of a State must first occur; namely, an act of aggression in violation of the
rules of international law dealing with the use of force.
52
If this is so, then the criminality
of aggression depends to a large extent on the legal definition of armed force under
international law, which itself is a controversial matter. In brief, Art 2(4) of the UN
Charter prohibits all instances of armed force by one State against another, save for
two express exceptions. The first concerns force as a means of self-defence, in accordance
with Art 51 of the Charter, whereas the second relates to authorisation by the Security
Council to use force under Art 42 of the Charter. Art 51 permits the use of armed force
only in cases where a State is under an ‘armed attack’, clearly suggesting that an armed
attack constitutes a significant amount of force against the defending State.
Controversies arise from the various interpretations of the concept of self-defence, as
enshrined in Art 51, and specifically the precise meaning of the word ‘Inherent’,
describing the right of self-defence. Some States argue in favour of the validity of pre-
Charter use of force law, such as anticipatory self-defence, humanitarian intervention,
and others, whereas the majority of States adhere to a restricted interpretation of Art
51, as allowing for no other exceptions. This controversy in the scope of and the precise
definition of the permissible exceptions to the use of force by States has necessarily
imposed a stalemate in the construction of an internationally agreed definition of
aggression as a crime. This ambiguity, both in terms of permissible uses of force as
well as the contours of the crime of aggression, was not fully resolved even by the
General Assembly’s Definition of Aggression of 1974, despite the fact that it called a
‘war of aggression’ an international crime.
53
Antonopoulos correctly argues that the
1974 Definition was intended to serve as a guide for the Security Council in determining
acts of aggression, and therefore did not precisely elaborate who and under what
particular circumstances an individual would incur personal liability as a result. It
did, however, strongly suggest that the criminality of aggression is to be sought at the
level of State action.
54
It is true to say that the 1974 Definition gave a satisfactory
construction as regards the term ‘aggression’, but not one that satisfies the needs of
criminal law in assessing criminal responsibility.
55
The assessment of culpability regarding the crime of aggression necessitates, as
already stated, determination of aggression undertaken on behalf of a State. It is not
entirely obvious that this task befalls the ICC. Rather, the ICC Preparatory
Commission has put forward a proposal whereby the ICC will defer the task of
determining the existence of aggression to the UN system for a certain period of
51
GA Res 95(1) (11 December 1946).
52
Op cit,
Antonopoulos, note 50, p 37.
53
GA Res 3314(XXIX) (14 December 1974).
54
Op cit,
Antonopoulos, note 50, p 39.
55
GA Res 2625(XXV) (24 October 1970), confirmed in Principle I that a war of aggression is a crime
against peace entailing individual responsibility.
International Criminal Law
384
time, after the lapse of which the ICC would be seized of the matter.
56
It is clear that
the allocation of responsibility for the crime of aggression incorporates the following
elements: (a) the unlawfulness of a specific resort to force of some magnitude; and
(b) only those persons that played a direct, actual and influential role in the aggression
and the decision making behind it, in accordance with the Nuremberg principles
and judgment. Thus, the mere fact that someone was a member of the government
or a high-ranking official in the armed forces does not
ipso facto
render that person
culpable of the offence.
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