time being. In general, there is a reasonably precise sense in speaking
simply of a good object of a certain kind, a sense explained by the first
stage, provided that there is enough similarity of interests and circum-
stances among persons concerned with objects of this kind so that recog-
nized standards can be established. When these conditions are met, say-
ing that something is good conveys useful information. There is sufficient
common experience with or knowledge of these things for us to have an
understanding of the desired features exemplified
by an average or stan-
dard object. Often there are conventional criteria founded upon commer-
cial or other practice which define these properties.
3
By taking up various
examples we could no doubt see how these criteria evolve and the rele-
vant standards determined. The essential point, however, is that these
criteria depend upon the nature of the objects in question and upon our
experience with them; and therefore we say that certain things are good
without further elaboration only when a certain background is presup-
posed or some particular context is taken for granted. The basic value
judgments are those made from the standpoint of persons, given their
interests,
abilities, and circumstances. Only insofar as a similarity of
conditions permits can we safely abstract from anyone’s special situation.
In cases of any complexity, when the thing to be chosen should be ad-
justed to specific wants and situations, we move to the second stage of the
definition. Our judgments of value are tailored to the agent in question as
this stage requires.
These remarks may be illustrated by looking at several examples from
certain typical categories: artifacts, functional parts of systems, and occu-
pations and roles.
Among artifacts, a good watch, say, is one that has the
features which it is rational to want in a watch. There are clearly a
number of desired features here, in addition to that of keeping accurate
time. It must not be excessively heavy, for example. These features must
be measured somehow and assigned appropriate weights in the overall
assessment. I shall not consider here how these things are done. It is
worth noting, however, that if we take the definition of good in the tradi-
tional sense as an analysis, that is, as a
statement of concept identity, and
if we suppose that by definition a watch is an article used to tell time, and
that by definition rationality is taking effective means to achieve one’s
ends, then it is analytic that a good watch is one that keeps accurate time.
This fact is established solely by virtue of truths of logic and defini-
tions of concepts. But since I do not wish to take the definition of good in
3. See Urmson, “On Grading,” pp. 148–154.
352
Goodness as Rationality
this sense but rather as a rough guideline for constructing substitute
expressions that can be used to say what on reflection we want to say, I do
not count this statement as analytic. In fact, for our present purposes I
shall sidestep this question entirely and simply take certain facts about
watches (or whatever) as common knowledge. There is no occasion to
ask whether the statements that express them are analytic. On this ac-
count, then, it is certainly true that a good watch keeps accurate time and
this correspondence with everyday facts suffices to confirm the propriety
of the definition.
Again, it is plain that the letter “X” in the phrase “a good X” often has
to be replaced by various noun phrases depending on the context. Thus it
is usually not enough
to speak of good watches, since we frequently need
a more fine-grained classification. We are called upon to assess wrist
watches, stop watches, and so on; or even wrist watches to go with a
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