for the concept of right; and in contract theory the latter is derived in
another way. Moreover, to construct the conception of moral goodness,
the principles of right and justice must be introduced. It is easy to see that
with many occupations and roles moral principles have an important
place in characterizing the desired properties. For example, a good judge
has a strong desire
to give justice, to decide cases fairly in accordance
with what the law requires. He possesses the judicial virtues which his
position demands: he is impartial, able to assess the evidence fairly, not
prejudiced or moved by personal considerations. These attributes may not
suffice but they are generally necessary. The characterizations of a good
father or wife, friend or associate, and so on indefinitely,
rely upon a
theory of the virtues and therefore presuppose the principles of right.
These matters belong to the full theory. In order for goodness as rational-
ity to hold for the concept of moral worth, it must turn out that the virtues
are properties that it is rational for persons to want in one another when
they adopt the requisite point of view. I shall try to show in due course
that this is in fact the case (§66).
62. A NOTE ON MEANING
62. A Note on Meaning
I shall supplement this account of the thin theory
with a few words about
the meaning of judgments of value. These matters are not central to our
inquiry but several comments may prevent misunderstanding. Perhaps the
chief issue is whether these judgments represent a descriptive or a pre-
scriptive use of language. Unfortunately the notions of a descriptive and a
prescriptive use are obscure, but I shall try to come to the main point
straightway.
6
All sides seem to agree upon two general facts. First, the
terms “good” and “bad” and the like are typically used in giving advice
and counsel, and to praise and extol, and so on. To be sure, these terms
are not always used in this manner, since they may appear in conditional
statements, in commands and questions, as well as in other remarks that
have no practical bearings. Still, their role in giving advice and counsel
and in praising and extolling is characteristic. Second,
the criteria for
evaluation vary from one kind of thing to another. What is wanted in
dwellings is not what is wanted in clothes. A satisfactory definition of the
goodness must fit these two facts.
6. For the most part my account follows J. R. Searle, “Meaning and Speech Acts,”
Philosophical
Review,
vol. 71 (1962). See also his
Meaning and Speech Acts
(Cambridge, The University Press,
1969), ch. VI; and Ziff,
Semantic Analysis,
ch. VI.
355
62.
A Note on Meaning
Now I shall simply define a descriptive theory as maintaining the
following pair of theses. First, despite the variation in criteria from object
to object, the term “good” has a constant sense (or meaning) that, for
philosophical purposes, is of the same kind as that of other predicates
normally counted as descriptive. Indeed, this constant sense enables us to
understand why and how the criteria for evaluation vary from one kind of
thing to another. The other thesis is that the propriety of using the term
“good” (and its relatives) in giving advice and counsel,
and in expressions
of commendation, is explained by this constant sense together with a
general theory of meaning. I assume that this theory includes an ac-
count of speech acts and illocutionary forces along the lines suggested by
Austin.
7
A descriptive theory holds that the constant descriptive meaning
of good accounts for its being used, when in fact it is properly used, to
praise and to advise, and the like. There is no necessity to assign “good” a
special kind of meaning which is not already explained
by its constant
descriptive sense and the general theory of speech acts.
Goodness as rationality is a descriptive theory in this sense. In the
required way, it explains the two general facts which everyone recog-
nizes. The constant sense of “good” is characterized by the definition in
its several stages. Thus something’s being good is its having the proper-
ties that it is rational to want in things of its kind, plus further elabora-
tions depending on the case. In the light of this definition it is easy to
account for the fact that the criteria of evaluation differ from one kind of
thing to another. Since we want things for different purposes, it is obvi-
ously rational to assess them by different features.
It is helpful to think of
the sense of “good” as being analogous to that of a function sign.
8
We can
then view the definition as assigning to each kind of thing a set of
properties by which instances of that kind are to be assessed, namely, the
properties which it is rational to want in things of that kind.
Furthermore, the account of goodness as rationality explains why the
term “good” appears in statements of advice and counsel, and in remarks
of praise and approval. Thus, for example, when we are asked for advice
someone wishes to have our opinion as to which course of action, say, is
best for him. He wants to know what we think is rational for him to do. A
climber who advises another about the equipment
and route to use on a
difficult pitch takes up the other’s standpoint and recommends what he
thinks is a sensible plan of attack. The meaning of “good” and of related
7. See J. L. Austin,
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