Tourism, Security and Safety From Theory to Practice

Stalling of the Recovery
Fiji remained under a state of emergency and many regions were still under cur-
few. The lifting of travel advisories, which TAG had initially anticipated, did not
occur. The benchmark for the launch of the recovery program was shifted to the
time at which the travel advisories were downgraded. In a sense this made tourism
a captive to external events and actions. The hostage-taking of two Air Fiji pilots
(both New Zealand nationals) on Vanua Levu on July 27 increased the determina-
tion of governments in source markets to persist with their travel advisories. While
the pilots were only interned for two days and were unharmed, the incident stiff-
ened the resolve of the New Zealand government concerning its travel advisories.
It was not until late August that the situation in Fiji was sufficiently settled for New
Zealand and Australia to follow the actions of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Japan in downgrading their travel advisories. Although the organiz-
ers of the Spirit of Fiji campaign attributed their initiative as having played “an
instrumental role in the lifting of travel advisories against Fiji,” it is more likely
that the more settled prevailing political situation resulted in the change.
The tourism industry looked forward to the start of the much-awaited recovery
with the downgrading of the advisories. As originally planned, TAG immediately
launched Phase One of the recovery with a range of price-driven recovery-marketing
initiatives in Fiji’s key markets. The implementation of Phase One, with its special
recovery airfare and accommodation packaging and comprehensive media and
public relations campaign, was followed by Phase Two in October. Phase Two
focused on revised airfare and land content packages, continued public relations
efforts, and market-specific cooperative campaigns.
The campaign achieved some success. Visitor arrivals for September and October
exceeded the post coup forecasts, showing a slow but steady recovery, particularly in
the New Zealand market. Australian numbers also increased marginally, but the
Sydney Olympics, staged in September, had a diversionary effect on potential travel
to Fiji. The TAG media visitation program was also deemed a success after positive
international print and media exposure for Fiji was realized. Despite these optimistic
signs of recovery, the challenges of the 2000 coup were not yet over.
Shortly after the launch of Phase One of the recovery program, a device was found
outside a popular hotel frequented by foreign travelers in Suva. Although the device
was safely disarmed, the wide reporting of the incident further reinforced the inter-
national image of Fiji as a volatile place. Then, after 2 months of relative calm in the
country, an attempted rebel mutiny occurred at the headquarters of the Fiji military
in Suva leading to a number of casualties. Twenty of the armed rebels escaped
prompting the imposition of a 36-hour curfew in the greater Suva region. Most of the
rebels were quickly apprehended. TAG immediately went into damage control, lob-
bying foreign embassies to downgrade travel advisories and disseminating the mes-
sage that the upgraded advisories applied only to the greater Suva region. They made
it clear that the rest of the country remained safe and that tourism establishments such
as hotels, resorts, and attractions were unaffected by the uprising. Such arguments are
difficult to sustain in tourism because the security consciousness of visitors makes
them reluctant to accept arguments that attempt to confine security problems to par-
ticular localities, especially where normally tranquil resorts become targets (as was
mentioned previously, Turtle Island was one of these).
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Tourism Security and Safety: From Theory to Practice
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The swift and decisive response by the military along with TAG’s quick action
resulted in the mineralization of the impact on the recovering tourism industry.
Few cancellations were received from either New Zealand or Australia and resorts
around the tourism centers reported good occupancies. All airlines in and out of
Nadi and all tourism services continued to operate as normal.
Ongoing political unrest was not the only threat to TAG’s recovery efforts. Phase
One of the recovery campaign itself came under fire through an objection lodged
with the Advertising Complaints Standards Board in New Zealand, which high-
lighted fundamental contradictions between the views of the tourism industry and
those wishing to prolong the sense of political crisis. The recovery campaign, which
showed an idyllic Fiji beach scene with the caption “Fiji Before and Fiji After . . .
The only thing that’s changed is the price,” drew complaints from the Coalition for
Democracy in Fiji (Pacific Media Watch, 2000). The latter claimed that the caption
did not differentiate between Fiji’s tourism product and the country itself. It was
argued that this left room for the viewer to infer that the coup had inflicted no last-
ing effect on Fiji. The campaign was subsequently amended to read “Fiji holidays
before and Fiji holidays after . . . The only thing that’s changed is the price.” The
impact of the message was clearly reduced as a result of the qualification that had
been added to the statement. Despite widespread media coverage for the incident in
both New Zealand and Fiji, no detectable decrease in tourist numbers was evident.
This confirms the view that tourists seeking relaxation take little notice of political
matters at the destination, provided that personal security is assured.