Tourism, Security and Safety From Theory to Practice

The 2000 Recovery Plan
The 2000 coup had an immediate and significant impact on Fiji’s economy and
tourism industry. Many tourists to Fiji cut short their holidays and many prospective
Table 1
Visitor Arrivals by Source, 1996–2000
% change 
Country
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
1999/2000
Australia
79,534
80,351
100,756
118,272
76,883
−
33%
New Zealand
63,430
68,116
70,840
72,156
49,470
−
31%
USA
38,707
43,376
48,390
62,131
52,534
−
15%
Canada
11,431
13,359
12,837
13,552
10,532
−
22%
UK
28,907
35,019
39,341
40,316
29,215
−
28%
Europe
31,875
32,806
29,334
28,371
22,506
−
21%
Japan
44,598
44,783
35,833
37,930
19,674
−
48%
Korea
14,770
12,181
1,613
1,489
3,386
127%
Asia
6,334
6,345
7,708
7,797
6,750
−
13%
Pacific
18,545
20,381
22,850
26,090
21,534
−
17%
Others
1,429
1,724
1,840
1,851
1,586
−
14%
Total
339,560
359,441
371,342
409,955
294,070
−
28%
Source:
Fiji visitors Bureau, 2001
H7898_Ch04.qxd 8/24/05 8:30 PM Page 70

---

tourists made cancellations. The peak tourism months in Fiji are June through
August. These three months include a school holiday period and many in the
Southern Hemisphere take winter sun holidays at this time. The coup resulted in a
decline of visitor arrivals in that period of almost 70%. The loss of tourism revenue
had reached an estimated F$84.6 million by the beginning of August (excluding earn-
ings by the national carrier Air Pacific). As a result, the hotel sector experienced a
44% reduction in employment. Major tourism operators such as Shotover Jet and the
Sheraton Royal closed down as a result of low numbers. The tourism industry had
gone into a free fall, and swift and effective action was essential.
The prior experiences of 1987 prompted the tourism industry to mobilize
quickly. A meeting of key members of the tourism industry was convened jointly
by FVB and Air Pacific during the week after the 2000 coup. At that meeting, sev-
eral resolutions were adopted as part of a crisis management plan. The key issues
were identified as:
■
Communication with overseas source markets, overseas diplomatic missions, and
the media;
■
Operational issues such as how to deal with cancellations and travel insurance
issues;
■
Monitoring of key relationships for resorts and operations (e.g., landowners,
unions, and staff); and
■
Developing a long-term strategy to address tourism industry issues.
Consistent with the cooperative and cohesive response to the events of 1987,
TAG 2000 was formed. Headed by the Managing Director of a tour operating com-
pany and including representatives from FVB, Air Pacific, Air New Zealand, the
Fiji Hotel Association, and the Society of Fiji Travel Associates, TAG 2000 met for
the first time in early June. The group implemented a series of initiatives intended
to expedite a recovery. According to the TAG the objectives were to:
■
Develop an International Plan that was fully coordinated;
■
Establish that Fiji is safe and desirable;
■
Finance the promotion of Fiji with cooperative support from the private sector and
government;
■
Seek the involvement of wholesalers and retailers in all source markets;
■
Implement multiphase marketing strategies to achieve both short-term and long-
term objectives; and
■
Reinstate lost employment in the industry.
The following activities were scheduled:
■
A public relations and media management consulting firm was contracted to assist
in the management of the recovery program;
■
Funding was solicited from private and public sector sources to support a short- and
medium-term advertising and promotion campaign in all major visitor markets;
■
Visits were made to consular representatives to encourage the lifting of travel advi-
sories;
■
Travel agent/wholesaler visits were arranged;
■
A comprehensive media campaign was planned; and
■
Special recovery fare packages were prepared.
Fiji Islands: Rebuilding Tourism in an Insecure World
71
H7898_Ch04.qxd 8/24/05 8:30 PM Page 71

---

Tourism Security and Safety: From Theory to Practice
72
TAG secured F$5 million in funding (FJ$3.65 million from public sector con-
tributions and FJ$1.35 million from local industry) to support the campaign
(FVB, 2000a; TAG, 2000b). With the funding and strategies in place, the recov-
ery plan was ready to be operationalized as a two-phase campaign. Phase One
was to be an intensive tactical promotional campaign in all key markets, fol-
lowed by Phase Two, a follow-on coordinated, long-term advertising support
program.
It was hoped that these strategies would be implemented immediately. The
2000 coup, however, proved to be very different from its predecessors because
of the lengthy internment of the hostages (56 days) and the endemic political
unrest and uncertainty. The chronology of events that followed the 2000 coup
is outlined in Figure 2. Unlike the situation in 1987, the 2000 coup was not
bloodless and an estimated 10 people died as a result of coup-related events.
Graphic media images of unrest and violence were projected to millions
around the globe. The situation was compounded by a pattern of political
unrest that ensued in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. The inci-
dents in these two Melanesian countries conveyed an impression of turmoil
across the region, which further reinforced the negative images of Fiji and pro-
vided ongoing copy for the media. The perception of instability across the sub-
region is symptomatic of how one piece of bad news may be quickly picked up
by the media and can become associated with often unrelated problems being
experienced elsewhere. This was unusual because the media normally shows
little interest in South Pacific issues. Despite the success of the recovery pro-
gram in 1987 and lessons learned, it soon became clear that 2000 needed a dif-
ferent strategy.
In 2000, the timing of the implementation of the full recovery plan became a
major preoccupation. Marketing could not bring about recovery in the tourism
industry until the political situation was stable enough to warrant the lifting (or at
least the downgrading) of the travel advisories issued by foreign governments.
This scenario was unlikely until two key events occurred: (1) the release of the
hostages, and (2) the return of illegally held arms to the Army. Some foreign gov-
ernments warned that any preemptive launch of a full recovery campaign before
the lifting of the relevant travel advisories would force them to react, and to
actively discourage their citizens traveling to Fiji. In anticipation of such conse-
quences, TAG determined that the recovery campaign would be delayed until the
achievement of certain preconditions. This was defined as “the time that the
hostages are released safely and that all the weapons are returned to the Army”
(TAG, 2000a). Few anticipated how long it would take before the necessary
preconditions were satisfied.
During the wait for preconditions to be satisfied TAG undertook a range of pre-
launch activities. Regular contact was maintained with diplomatic representatives
within Fiji regarding the status of travel advisories and a series of domestic public
relations activities was undertaken. These public relations activities were seen as
being essential in preparing Fiji for the recovery program and protecting Fiji’s
tourism product. One element of the campaign was the “Spirit of Fiji” (