in stark contrast to the touristic images of a peaceful, friendly, and above all relaxing
South Pacific holiday destination. At the very least they undermined the credibility
of the images being projected by the industry. The brand was very tarnished.
Ironically the pre-1987 branding of Fiji was “Fiji—the way the world ought to be.”
The 2000 branding was in some ways a return to this theme,
and had been prompted
by the sense that Fiji had now moved beyond the political uncertainty and division of
1987. This renewed confidence has proved to be short-lived.
Negative media images had also been broadcast in 1987, but communication
developments ensured a larger international audience and consequently greater mar-
ket penetration and currency. In particular, the Internet provided up-to-the-minute
information and commentary about the happenings in Fiji to a worldwide audi-
ence. Web
sites such as
Fijilive!
and
Fijivillage
became much consulted sources of
information within Fiji and overseas.
Fijivillage,
for example, received 4,373,893
hits in July 2000. Of those, 83% originated in the major source markets of visitors
to Fiji, namely the United States (64%), Australia (13%), and New Zealand (6%)
Fiji Village Statistics, 2000). In an on-line article, ABC News even referred to the
political events as a Coup D’Net. “Last night, the world watched a coup attempt—
on the Internet.
Fijilive.com
. . . posted the dramatic details
of the coup attempt as
they happened . . . even the major news services got much of their information
from the site—including this one” (Mazza, 2000).
The Internet projected uncensored news in an uncontrolled fashion to a poten-
tial audience of millions. Supplementing this coverage, the various chat rooms and
discussion sites ensured that the events in Fiji were deconstructed as well as
reported. According to Narayan, attempts at gagging
some Internet-based media
during the coup were unsuccessful, as the blocked sites simply moved to a sympa-
thetic mirror site (Narayan, 2000). Such coverage greatly impeded the ability of
the government and the tourism authorities to control the message or to ensure
selective coverage.
The recovery program has had to compete with a constant media barrage of neg-
ative image and copy. The easy accessibility of archival information on the Internet
has also helped keep the situation in Fiji alive in the public’s
mind long after it might
have faded. The ubiquity of the Internet also prevented tourism operators from iden-
tifying potential market sources that may have been unaware of the relevant politi-
cal events. One notable resort on the island of Taveuni focused its post-1987 coup
promotion on the US market on the basis that few agents and even fewer potential
consumers in that market had any consciousness of the political events that had
occurred. The assumption appeared to be correct since the resort returned rapidly to
high occupancies. Such opportunities were not available in 2000.
In 2000, the experiences of the Korean and Japanese markets appeared to be
contradictory. Korean Airlines recommenced services to Nadi on August 6,
bring-
ing in 200 passengers and 18 “key tourism related officers.” These led to a steady
recovery and to numbers that outstripped the previous year. In contrast, Air Pacific
recommenced flights to Narita in Japan on August 10, but this action failed to
prompt a recovery. The price sensitivity of the Korean market may have played a
part in the different responses. It may have been that the discounted prices on offer
were a major incentive to attract Korean operators. The
responses may also indi-
cate that the affected destination country (in this case Fiji through its national
carrier Air Pacific) is less able to make a quick impact than an initiative launched
in the source country (i.e., in Korea through the national carrier Korean Airlines).
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