A’s second turn do not contain sentences: B’s turn contains a construction
centered around the verbal element
running; A’s
turn is a prepositional
phrase. But while these turns do not contain complete sentences, they are
nevertheless meaningful. Implied in B’s turn, for instance, is that those
who are roller skating are “running around the city” and in A’s turn that
they are skating “mainly in Golden Gate Park.” Therefore,
when dis-
cussing pragmatics, linguists tend to avoid labels such as sentence,
instead preferring to describe the constructions under discussion as
utterances, a category that includes not just sentences but any con-
struction that is meaningful in the context in which it occurs.
According to J. L. Austin (1962), when speaking (or writing, for that mat-
ter), we perform various “acts”:
locutionary acts, illocutionary acts, and
perlocutionary acts. The difference between locutionary and illocutionary
acts is sometimes referred to as, respectively, the difference between “say-
ing” and “doing.” Thus, if I utter
Leave, I
am on one level producing an
imperative sentence having a specific form (the
base form of the verb with
an implied
you) and meaning (e.g. ‘depart’). This is the locutionary force of
this utterance, what has thus far in this chapter been referred to as being
a component of grammar.
Additionally, I have intentions when uttering
this sentence, specifically I am using what is known as a directive to get
someone to do something. This is the illocutionary force of the utterance.
But utterances also have effects on the individuals to whom they are
directed: uttering
Leave may have the effect
of actually causing an indi-
vidual or individuals to leave, it may upset them, it may have no effect,
etc. This is considered the perlocutionary force of the utterance.
Although speech act theorists have proposed these three general types
of speech acts, they are primarily interested in speaker intentions:
the illo-
cutionary force of utterances. To study this facet of human communica-
tion, various types of speech acts have been proposed. Below are five
described in Searle’s (1979) seminal book on speech acts:
Assertives/Representatives: Utterances reporting statements of fact verifiable
as true or false (e.g.
I am old enough to vote;
Columbus discovered America
in 1492;
Water freezes at zero degrees centigrade)
Directives: Utterances intended to get someone to do something (e.g.
Stop
shouting;
Take out the garbage)
Commissives: Utterances committing one to doing something (e.g.
I prom-
ise to call you later;
I’ll write your letter of recommendation tomorrow)
Declarations: Utterances bringing about a change in the state of affairs
(e.g
. I now pronounce you husband and wife;
I hereby sentence you to ten
years in jail)
Expressives: Utterances expressing speaker attitudes (e.g.
That’s a beautiful
dress;
I’m sorry for being so late)
A speech act can be
explicit or
implicit,
direct or
indirect, and
literal or
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