Masaryk university

Chapter 6:Conclusion

Conflicts are not static, but multilayered and dynamic. In this regard, the armed conflicts in the South Caucasus region are no exception, but an example of the extremely complex interplay of issues at stake that have not been resolved yet. The aim of this dissertation was to trace the evolution of aspects and the issues at stake within five analytical categories in order to achieve a better scholarly understanding of the armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. The study achieves this goal by analyzing the processes and patterns of conflict behavior in the South Caucasus. In this way, we can highlight the internal and external dimensions of the armed conflict and their transformation from one escalation stage in the 1990s to another in 2008, both of which shaped the outcome of the initial conflict.

Understanding the fragile peace arrangements and the reasons why a resolution has become all but impossible is significant. However, what should be more important for scholars of the region is to understand all the factors at each phase of the conflict that may reignite to large-scale violence. Political, social, economic, and security dynamics may erode what stability is left in this region and enhance the potential for conflict escalation, as was the case in South Ossetia in 2008. Assessing the security arrangements is essential, as those conflicts may transform from the frozen status quo into violent confrontation and trigger, yet again, the vicious cycle of armed conflicts all over the region. This challenge underlines the need for a better understanding of conflict processes.

Armed conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh were brought about by historical injustice as well as ethno-demographic, territorial, political, legal, ideological, and socioeconomic factors that aggravated tensions and unrest. Analyses of multidimensional aspects and their evolution throughout the conflict cycle will lead us to the most fruitful conclusions. Consequently, we can first define the real issue at stake (or a combination of issues at stake) causing the escalation. In accordance with these findings, we trace the transformation of conflict issues (if any exist or if new variables occur) from one phase to another throughout the operationalization of aspects on the theoretical level. Second, we can determine to what type these conflicts belong in order to find ways that will expedite conflict resolution efforts. And third, we can draw theoretical conclusions, that ethnicity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the escalation of armed conflicts in the South Caucasus region. The following table sums up the empirical results of this research.

Table The Summary of Argument and Cases.

Cases	Nagorno-Karabakh			South Ossetia			Abkhazia
Phases / Issues at stake	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
Ethnic	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1
Political	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ideological	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1
Economic	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Territorial	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Note: This table was prepared by the author.
Ethnicity was a key aspect for self-identification for different nations living within the Soviet Union. It was a “determinant of national belonging,” granting “the titular nation of these Soviet Republics (in the South Caucasus) exclusive political rights and served to enforce a strong ideological connection between ethnicity and territory.”³⁵¹

Assessing the extent to which ethnicity is used to mobilize masses in the struggle over resources, land, and power is not an easy task, especially in the South Caucasus region, where the notion of ethnic hatred and primordial characteristics are widely used to justify incompatibility in goals and rights of conflicting parties. The in-depth study of ethnicity as an explanatory variable that has ignited full-scale armed conflicts has revealed that ethnicity was not a sufficient condition for the conflicts to emerge. It was, however, used in legitimizing mass mobilization by political elites.

The operationalized aspects in the case studies strongly support the following argument: ethnic animosity was the result rather than the cause of the escalation process in all three case studies. Ethnic animosity was not an issue at stake during the first phase. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, ethnic grievance and violence among Armenians and Azerbaijan was low. The same is true for the relationship of Georgians with Abkhazians and South Ossetians. In fact, the high level of inter-ethnic marriages and a history of peaceful co-existence without violent clashes along ethnic lines illustrate that ethnicity is not a strong explanatory paradigm to understand the modes of escalations of armed conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The most prudent explanation points out that there are three common factors determining evolution of the unresolved conflicts in the South Caucasus region: secessionism, political transformation and international competition among regional and global powers.

In case of the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, we have to distinguish between three ethnic groups: the Azerbaijani and Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian nation, and the Azerbaijani nation. Other ethnic groups – Russian, Chechen, and Afghan volunteers – were also part of the armed confrontations. The situation was even more complex due to the army factions and groupings that were not under control of any political leaders. These paramilitary groupings had a significant influence on the political development and led to coup d’états both in Azerbaijan and in Georgia. The lack of unified control and strategies demonstrates the absence of rationalist calculations among conflict parties. Under these conditions, explanations based on a security dilemma prevail to understand the escalation processes in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. The sporadic violent events magnified the security dilemma model. Under these conditions, conflicting parties created military forces in order to guarantee their security. The argument about militarization and further escalation of tensions in 2004 during the “war against smuggling” in South Ossetia demonstrates that a security dilemma can determine the behavior of conflicting parties even in the 21^st century.

Claims of Armenian President Robert Kocharian about “the ethnic incompatibility” between Armenians and Azerbaijanis during the election campaign in January 2003 and the bellicose statements of Azerbaijani leaders show two nations portraying images of each other in monstrous ways. Ethnic animosities nowadays are based on the notion of supremacy and rights of one nation over another.

An assessment of actions of conflict actors during the first phase of escalation of the armed conflict in Abkhazia has revealed that the official goal of Georgian troops in August 1992 was to ensure security of railways. It could be argued that this claim was a pretext to mask the real intentions: overthrowing Vladislav Ardzinba in order to establish control over Abkhazia. It is important to acknowledge that even in this case, the objective of a very fragmented Georgian establishment (undergoing a civil war as well as experiencing a crisis of legitimacy of the first president and uncontrolled activities of paramilitary groups) was not the liquidation of ethnic Abkhazians. And on the other side of the conflict, the Abkhazian leadership interpreted Georgia’s incursion into Abkhaz territory as an act of imperialistic politics. So, the struggle was directed not against ethnic Georgians, but it was about strengthening political power and control over particular territories by emerging political elites.

During the violent stage, we can prove that Abkhazia received support from the Northern Caucasus and that there were Russian and Armenian fighters on the Abkhazian side. Abkhazian leaders tend to emphasize that Abkhazian troops were multiethnic. Therefore, the study of inter-group dynamics is equally important as the study of intra-group relations. From the Georgian perspective, it is not a struggle between Abkhazians and Georgians, but between Russia and Georgia in which Abkhazian leaders are manipulated for geopolitical goals of the Russian Federation. A detailed analysis of the case studies allows us to conclude that historical myths were manufactured and used by political leaders; these, then, had strong implications on the consolidation of populations and groups across ethnic lines. The question of territory accelerated the rivalry and reinforced the myths about the ethnic origins of the populations living in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia.

Indeed, as the conflict evolved so did the images of enemies in terms of primordial ethnic grievances, as illustrated in the empirical chapters of this dissertation. Along with the changing political situation, the claims of conflicting parties have changed as well, leading to competing theories constructed by intellectuals in order to mobilize the masses along ethnic lines. The case of Nagorn-Karabakh is exemplary in this regard. Politicization of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict took place through a process of separation of socio-economic structures of the NKAO from the ASSR. Harassment by corrupt structures that served the interests of the “shadow” economy aggravated ethnic issues. One side of the conflict, Armenia, injected the ethnic issue, images of genocide, and latent danger of being subject to genocide as in 1915, as a prototype of the events in Sumgait. The other side of the conflict, Azerbaijan, pointed out the feeling of violated sovereignty and wounded national pride.

The offensive strategies of the Azerbaijani mafia to undermine the position of the Armenian mafia accelerated the Karabakh problem. The conflict was transformed from economic to political through the implementation of principles for self-determination, justified ethnically and leading to the claim of a particular territory. From the moment the conflict became politicized, its “shadow economic” nature was masked. The trajectory of the conflict reveals that clashing interests over territorial demands – Armenia supported the inclusion of the Nagorno-Karabakh territory into Armenia while Azerbaijan wanted to preserve its territorial integrity – were transformed into an ethnic controversy (Sumgait, refugees), then into a political battle, and finally into a conflict between two nations. Thus, the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region is presented by the conflict parties as a clash of two principles of international law: territorial integrity (Azerbaijan) vs. self-determination (of the Armenian nation).

It was not the dissolution of the Soviet Union that caused violent conflicts in the South Caucasus region. Escalation of tensions and eruption of sporadic violent events were present before the demise of the communist regime. In the latent phase of the conflicts (before 1991), ideological motivations were the driving force behind achieving independence and seceding from the Soviet Union. The nationalist movement enjoyed bigger popularity among the Armenian, Georgian, and Azerbaijani population. Escalation of conflict led to the replacement of two presidents in Azerbaijan and the first president in Georgia. Manipulation of the public consciousness by charismatic leaders, who used ethnic sentiments to mobilize and enhance collective action in order to achieve political goals, led to the spiral of escalation of tensions. A series of sporadic violence that occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia transformed the conflict from its latent phase to phase B. The further transformation of conflict was the result of the decisions made by each side of the conflict. The conflict was transformed by the institutionalization of violence by political elites. As a result, large-scale violence followed.

In my analaysis, I have revealed that the armed confrontation from 1990 to 1992 differs from the one in 2008. Mass mobilization, which was a key factor in the first escalation phase, disappeared in the second escalation phase. Masses were mobilized in Georgia in a struggle against electoral frauds, corrupted elites, and state weakness, culminating in the Rose Revolution in 2003. In the armed conflict in 2008, the state is not endangered by popular movement, rather the state itself is the actor, initiating change through its military might rather than through nationalistic appeals of political leaders who use ethnicity for purposes of manipulation.

The Russian-Georgian armed conflict did not touch the hearts of Georgians or their self-identification. It was more about defending Georgian territory and the state’s borders. The issue at stake in 2008 was the pro-Western orientation of Georgia and Russia’s interests to undermine the penetration of other powers in the South Caucasus. On the other hand, Georgia’s main objective is to be incorporated into the Euro-Atlantic institutions, which would guarantee security, democratic tranformation, sustainable economic development, and peaceful resolution of the conflicts. In this way, we can argue, the territorial issues that played a primary role in the second escalation phase were correlated with ideological aspects of the future orientation of the Georgian state.

This ideological confrontation stems from grand startegic interests by the Russian Federation. Russia is against the Georgian integration into NATO for several reasons. First, there is a fear of the domino effect: if Georgia enters into NATO, it may serve as an example for Azerbaijan, which would then also seek to attain NATO membership. That would cause Armenia to become alienated from Russia and more inclined to turn to the United States for help; as a stronger power in the international system it would thus gain the ability to manage Azerbaijan. Consequently, Moscow would lose any leverage in Baku and become a footnote in Armenia. Despite the fact, that Russia rejects the notion that it was a conflict party in the Russian-Georgian armed conflict in 2008, the conflict was a decision of leaders of two states, which resulted in worsening mutual relations between the complicated triangle of Georgia, South Ossetia, and Russia.

“Frozen” conflicts have a significant impact on the stability in this region. The heavy military presence in the South Caucasus gives the Russian Federation support in manipulating the unresolved conflicts in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. This is especially dangerous now, during the crisis in Crimea, because as the crisis evolves, Russia can use its leverage in the South Caucasus in order to extend its power and control over these territories by supporting any escalation of simmering tensions and the transformation of “frozen” conflicts into a next series of “hot” wars.

One of the major findings of this dissertation lies upon the role of political leaders and political processes that lead to escalation of tensions. Without the support of political elites, the conflict in the South Caucasus region would never have escalated to a war. The conflict in South Ossetia in the 1990s was the outcome of the disintegration of the previous political order and an attempt to create a new one. It was about defending territory, political status, and independence. The issue at stake at the stage of escalation was characterized by conflicting visions about the political arrangement and secessionist aspirations of the South Ossetians. Ethnicity was used by political leaders to legitimize their claims, strengthen their position, and mobilize the masses.

At the end of the 1980s, we can identify the emergence of parallel political processes. Along with existing Soviet nomenclature, the nationalist movement emerged, composed of intellectuals without any experience to govern a state. In Armenia, the Communist government tried to find a balanced approach between Moscow and a nationalistic government. Azerbaijani representatives of the Communist party were in sharp opposition with the nationalists, as they counted on Moscow’s support against irredentist claims by Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, ethnic narratives gained momentum in order to mobilize the masses. Territorial integrity and achieving independence were promoted to gain political support. Mobilization of ethnic kin around the idea of independence was to consolidate the rule of the newly emerged political elites both in Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is the legacy of war and persistence of unresolved conflict that has established ethnic animosity, mistrust, and mutually hostile attitudes among conflicting parties in the South Caucasus.

Political elites in Azerbaijan and Georgia challenged by the crisis of legitimacy of their rule were ill prepared to handle the escalation of conflict in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Territorial integrity has been a key component of the national project; any division of the nation was seen as equivalent to dissolution of state and state failure. On the other hand, Armenia emphasized the notion of “genocide” if they lose the war over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Political leaders played on ethnicity and ethnic fears in order to mobilize masses and consolidate their rule.

When economic decline and inequality is addressed, it has to be mentioned that at the initial stage of the conflicts, it is hard to provide evidence indicating that the economy triggered the spiral of escalation. In fact, there was not a big difference in economic development in the autonomous regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, according to the official data. However, the overall decline in economic development in Georgian and Azerbaijan, civil war, and uncontrolled criminality led to concerns and disappointment of the population. As mentioned above, the lack of data makes it difficult to link the economic decline to the initiation of the armed conflict. In the case of re-escalation of tensions in 2008, one can argue that the large scale of the shadow economy was causally linked to the initiation of the armed conflict in South Ossetia. However, other factors that transformed a low-intensity conflict into a full-scale war also have to be taken into consideration.

Indeed, the incentives of conflicting parties to have control over key profitable resources have always been high, but as data have revealed, the enclaves of South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh belong to the poorest and least developed parts of Georgia and Azerbaijan. It is also a fact that all of these regions, including Abkhazia, are heavily dependent on financial support from Russia. The presence of this shadow economy is profitable for all conflict parties, and any change in this regard may cause another wave of anxiety and hostilities. In 2004, Georgia’s efforts to contain corruption and to declare a “war against smuggling” in South Ossetia as part of its state-building project, with broader political goals, led the country to the edge of war. Economic decline and a shadow economy were the results during the initial stage of the armed conflict at the beginning of the 1990s, which also contributed to the re-escalation of tensions in Georgia in 2004. The causal relationship between the armed conflicts and economic development became two-sided during the conflict initiation phase, but it cannot be explained without other variables that catapulted the conflict into its hot stage.

Even though it is hard to separate territorial issues and their correlation from other issues at stake in the process of conflict escalation, we have to make a distinction in nature and in the level of territorial claims of the conflicting parties. For Azerbaijan and Georgia, the conflicts are about territorial integrity of their countries, which was challenged by aspirations of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, Abkhazians, and South Ossetians. Irredentist claims of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians were also determined by the geographical proximity to Armenia. It is more likely that, without Armenia’s and Russia’s support, Nagorno-Karabakh would not be successful in its struggle over this territory. The same is true for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Abkhazian secessionist (initially Abkhazia wanted to be a Union Republic within the Soviet Union, which is to say that its irredentism transformed into secessionist claims) and South Ossetian irredentist (South Ossetia seeks to be integrated with North Ossetia, which is part of Russia) claims are supported by trans-border support from Russia. Territorial claims were even stronger in 2008, when the armed conflict was about strengthening control over the entire territory of the state of Georgia. Defending Georgian territory and the state’s borders was one of the key issues at stake in the conflict escalation process. The issue at stake in 2008 was Georgia’s pro-Western orientation and Russia’s attempts to undermine other powers that were penetrating into the South Caucasus region. Consequently, we can argue that territorial issues that played a primary role in the second escalation phase were correlated with ideological aspects.

The majority of reports labels the conflict in the South Caucasus as ethnic. In reality, it is difficult to find any evidence of Georgian, Armenian, or Azerbaijani intolerance towards ethnic minorities. According to Georgian political discourse, the Georgian establishment is not fighting Abkhazians, Ossetians, or any other ethnic minorities because of their ethnicity. The issues at stake are political in nature rather than ethnic. Thus, ethnic hatred is the outcome of the armed conflicts in the South Caucasus region and will shapes the evolution of these conflicts in the future.

Once the armed conflict erupts, violence can spiral out of control, shaping the outcome of the conflict. Issues at stake may persist for decades. Eventually, another trigger event may turn the lingering conflict into a new cycle of confrontation. Studying the trajectory of conflicts has demonstrated that the issues at stake during the onset of an armed conflict are not necessarily the same as during the escalation of the conflict. A distinction should be made between conflicts over territory, political arrangement, ethnicity, ideological confrontation, or economic development. Differentiation between what is at the core of the conflict and what serves as a structural factor is significant in order to uncover necessary and sufficient conditions in the process of conflict escalation. Ethnic conflict could be just one of the outcomes of hostile relations between a state and its ethnic group, but it does not necessarily make the conflict ethnic by definition.

National identity is one key aspect during the process of nation building in the newly creating states of the old Soviet Empire. The pattern of inter-ethnic relationships nowadays is determined by undefined relations with other ethnic minority groups. National unity and territorial integrity in this regard are the most significant aspects in order to strengthen and develop the states of Georgia and Azerbaijan.

The varied types of issues at stake make us appreciate that conflict takes many forms. Understanding modes of escalation and the process how conflicts transform from one phase to another helps to illustrate the density of aspects both on the systemic and the unit level of analysis. Competing theories of armed conflict have illustrated that each of them can tell us only part of the story. Therefore, an approach that synthesizes different theories is more successful in pinpointing the issues at stake and how they transform over time. By understanding the modes of escalation, we can conclude that issues at stake in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have not been eradicated yet. Thus, unfortunately we should expect that the conflict in the South Caucasus will remain and that the path of escalation will be in the hands of political leaders who are determined to achieve goals desirable to them.