Masaryk university

5.1Political Development in Georgia: Struggle for Independence

In order to address the escalation of two armed conflicts in Georgia, specific features of political developments have to be introduced at this point. In Georgia, the years 1987 to 1989 were marked by the emergence of different political groups, which had a serious impact on the political development of the country. By 1989, there were almost 50 political organizations and informal groups competing for the political re-arrangement in Georgia.²⁰⁸ The most influential one was the national-radical political wing, which played a significant role in the political processes during that period. The Georgian political landscape was so fragmented that there was no unity at all – even within one party.

During 1987-1991, the radical wing was represented by the Helsinki Union, headed by the leaders of the Georgian national movement, Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Merab Kostava. In 1988, they established new organizations, such as the Society of Saint Ilia the Righteous and the National Democratic Party. The major goal of these organizations was to secede from the Soviet rule and restoration of Georgia’s independence. They also shared an aspiration for a pro-Western orientation. These parties presented the future of the Caucasus as a unity. It was to be a political-economic and cultural space, a “Caucasian” confederation of the states.²⁰⁹

Georgian intellectuals established the Ilia Chavchavadze Society on October 31, 1987. The major objective of this organization was to establish a Georgian democratic republic by “peaceful means, political struggle, proclamations and spread of literature, meetings, demonstrations, manifestations and strikes.”²¹⁰

Democratization through the meetings and massive demonstrations together with disorganization of the ruling parties strengthened the idea of a national liberation and consolidated the space for such development. In 1988, due to the national liberation movement, the trans-Caucasian railway project as well as the construction of huge hydropower plants in the mountainous areas failed, causing the country to approach ecological disaster.²¹¹

One important detail about the political landscape in Georgia is that after two years the founders of this political organization – except one member, Tamar Chkheidze – created their own parties. This indicates that a lack of unity existed within the organization. Another significant detail is that the Ilia Chavchavadze Society was in opposition with Zviad Gamsakhurdia.²¹² This had dramatic consequences on the evolution of political processes in Georgia and brought the country to a fierce civil war.

On November 12, 1988, constitutional changes – loss of the (theoretical) right to secede from the USSR – led to a wave of demonstrations in Tbilisi. The major slogan at this time was the demand of Georgian people for full independence. On the domestic level, the worsening of the social-economic situation, the deficit of food production, a dramatic decrease in trading with the outside world, the radicalization of the opposition against the president led to the creation of oppositional forces. Along with the armed oppositional force – the National Guard, which led a campaign against Zviad Gamsakhurdia – armed clashes took place in South Ossetia against separatist and Soviet armed forces.

The years 1990 and 1991 could be marked as years of permanent demonstrations and meetings in Georgia, which led to civil war. This took place at the same time as the armed conflict in South Ossetia and therefore strengthened anti-Georgian feelings in another region, leaving the country at the brink of another unwanted conflict in Abkhazia.

At the same time, the process of dissolving the Soviet Union was taking place. Under these conditions, Georgia had to face its nation-building effort and become an independent state, separated from the former Soviet empire. However, in order to achieve success, Georgia lacked basic attributes. First, Georgia had to have a relatively strong army. Second, Georgia had to achieve territorial and national unity. Third, Georgia needed international support in order to neutralize Russian aggression.

At this point in time, Georgia did not have its own armed forces that could have addressed any aggression coming from the Kremlin. There were National Guards struggling against the Georgian government. The latter was not supplied by any armed forces or military technology. Furthermore, the Georgian nation was not united and, consequently, was not ready to confront the Russian Federation. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a leader who struggled for Georgian independence, had strong popular support, but the military coup in Georgia led to the end of his rule.

Lastly, Georgia did not have any international support, any allies to counterbalance the Russian influence. Georgia was not that important for the USA or for European countries to intervene in the post-Soviet space. Furthermore, the Georgian government supported the idea of the Chechen struggle for independence. This step strengthened the confrontation not only with Russia but distanced Georgia from the West, which did not question the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.

To sum up, their fierce struggle for independence was doomed to fail. As a result, instead, two armed conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia occurred, neither of which has been resolved yet.

5.2Case Study: Armed Conflict in South Ossetia

The newly established state of Georgia faced all the difficulties of a troublesome transformation process involved in forming a political and economic system independent of the Russian Federation. It witnessed bloody conflicts, all of which emerged under a weakening Soviet power, creating opportunities for various political projects competing with each other.²¹³

Tensions in Ossetian-Georgian relations could be traced back to the short period of Georgian independence from 1918 to 1921. The Bolshevik-led Ossetians revolted against the Menshevik Democratic Republic of Georgia in April 1920, as result of which more than 5,000 people died.²¹⁴ South Ossetians were calling for unification with North Ossetia; however, after the Sovietization of Georgia by the Red Army in March 1921, a South Ossetian Autonomou Oblast (SOAO) was created. For the first time in the history of relations between Georgia and South Ossetia, this turmoil period marks a serious deterioration of the relationship. According to some scholars, the Soviet ethnofederal system provided a framework to rule nations within the Soviet Union. Consequently, the demise of this system can explain the outbreak of a new wave of ethnic conflicts on the territory of post-Soviet states rooted in historical grievances and memories from the past.

As mentioned above, the objective of this dissertation is to uncover the limits of that type of explanation. While history is a significant aspect to be studied, one has to consider the conditions under which the armed conflicts of the 1990s occurred. They were quite different from those in 1918. Furthermore, systemic and structural dimensions of the conflict overlook micro-level analyses. A more productive way to understand the conflict processes and the issues at stake of contemporary conflicts involves a detailed analysis of the conflicts that erupted in the early 1990s and reached the second stage of escalation in 2008.

Since 1988 the armed conflicts in South Caucasus has passed through several phases. This section explores the characteristic features of the armed conflict in its initial stage, turning discussion to the factors that had led to the violent confrontation in the beginning of 90s, exploring the reasons contributing to the “frozenness” of the conflict along the way. The frame of analysis is divided into three major periods: first, Phase A, the stage of initiation, last years before the demise of the Soviet Union; second, Phase B - culmination, when the conflicts escalated to the violent stage; third, Phaze C the second stage escalation during the Russia-Georgian armed conflict in august 2008. The objective of the section is to trace the process of transformation of aspects that determined conflict behavior in the outlined phases.

5.2.1Phase A: The Spiral of Conflict: The Process of Escalation to War

The tensions between Georgians and South Ossetians started in 1989, even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, and lead to the full-scale escalation in 1991. Due to the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgia has a high number of internally displaced persons (IDPs): in the 1990s, the number of IDPs was 233,453 (6 percent of the Georgian population); it increased to 249,365 after the Russian-Georgian armed conflict in 2008 (initially there were 22,000 people, but only 15,912 had refugee status in accordance with Georgian government policy).²¹⁵ The number of victims in the armed conflict in 1991 in South Ossetia is unclear. According to South Ossetian data, more than 1,000 people died and 3,500 were wounded in the aftermath of the conflict in SOAO, and the number of refugees topped 20,000 people.²¹⁶

The beginning of Georgia’s campaign for independence was characterized by a permanent jostling for power between the former members of the communist Nomenklatura elite, some of whom were inspired by nationalistic ideas. The process of dissolution of the Soviet Union opened up opportunities for bloody confrontations. It was believed that the “Russian empire” would use military force to defeat the Georgian national movement. The radical wing of the Georgian political spectrum at that time emphasized the need to restore independence.²¹⁷ On November 14, 1990, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the chairman of the Georgian Supreme Council (or Parliament), declared Georgia’s high national consciousness for freedom and declared this as the beginning of the more significant war for independence.²¹⁸

The nationalist mobilization and radicalization of the newly formed Georgian government, however, boosted separatist movements of non-Georgian ethnic groups. The dynamics of the Georgian-Ossetian armed conflict were shaped by a number of factors, including the extreme position of Georgian nationalists in 1989, led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s coalition “Round Table – Free Georgia” and his first presidency, the lack of a clear idea by the Georgian establishment of the autonomous regions, and the great faith of South Ossetian leaders in being supported by North Ossetia and the Russian Federation.²¹⁹

According to one of the most prominent social scientists in Georgia, Ghia Nodia, “Georgia’s nationalist movement was probably the most radical in style in the former Soviet Union, at least among the movements at the union republic level. However, this radicalism was primarily targeted at the imperial centre, not ethnic minorities.”²²⁰ After the tragic events of April 9, 1989, the Soviet rule lost its legitimacy in Georgia. The Georgian national movement called for a separation from the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces form Georgian territory.²²¹ “The peculiarity of Georgia,” according to Nodia, “consisted in the fact that it was a single republic where the ‘irreconcilable’ mentality dominated the opposition political agenda.”²²² Ossetians, who came from North Ossetia and who composed two thirds of the population in South Ossetia in 1989, were perceived as “ungrateful guests” on Georgian soil.²²³

The initial phase of the escalation of the conflict is interlinked with the political processes within Georgia. “Independence” and “democracy” became keywords in Georgian political discourse. Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s nationalistic agenda was primarily directed against the Soviet regime in Georgia, and the problem with Ossetia was considered part of that struggle. Claims of minority were interpreted as dictated from the Kremlin, and so there were no trust-building efforts for compromise.²²⁴ Gamasakhurdia’s rule and his struggle for independence had strong popular support; however, his efforts to dismiss the opposition and strengthen his power at the expense of the democratization processes led to his overthrow by military means, organized by anti-Zviadist pro-democratic coalition.²²⁵

Under these conditions, when anti-Gamsakhurdia forces were strengthening, the president of Georgia played the nationalistic card to stay in power at the expense of democratization and minority groups in the country. However, the further development failed to “unite the nation” by compelling the spirit of armed conflict in South Ossetia.²²⁶

One of the first manifestations of this process started with the confrontation over amendments to the Georgian Constitution - the law on the status of the state language, which demanded the need for the Georgian language in the public sphere. In the August 1990 election, which excluded the small region-based parties from participating in the parliamentary elections, this language law was passed.²²⁷ These policies were interpreted as antidemocratic as they cut down on the influence of minorities in the power-sharing institutions in Georgia.

Political issues at stake provoked the spiral of violence, causing increasing distrust between the titular nation and the South Ossetian minorities. A parallel trend took place in the South Ossetian Autonomous Region. In order to express their aspirations and their dissatisfaction with Georgian nationalist politics, the Ossetian minorities formed a popular front named Ademon Nykhas. In the atmosphere of accumulating tensions, South Ossetia adopted a declaration on the “sovereignty of South Ossetia” on September 20, 1990, which emphasized the right of self-determination of the Ossetian people. The demands of South Ossetians at this stage included the follow aspects: 1. Convert the South Ossetian Autonomous Region into the South Ossetian Soviet Democratic Republic; 2. Ask the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to absorb South Ossetia in the Soviet Union as an independent entity of the federation; 3. Request that the republics of the USSR sign a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with South Ossetia.²²⁸

Thus, the process to attain national liberation was twofold: Georgian political leaders aspired to attain independence from the Soviet Union while disregarding grievances by their own national minorities. At the same time, South Ossetia struggled for the preservation of its specific status, which it had enjoyed within the Soviet ethno-federal system. This system was asymmetric in its nature and enabled some groups to have certain political, economic, linguistic, and cultural rights under Soviet rule. After the demise of the Soviet Union, South Ossetians feared that the Georgian national movement would undermine their right to self-determination, which would lead to their assimilation with the titular nation. As a result, a triangular struggle occurred: Georgia struggled for independence, Moscow fought against Georgian secession from the Soviet Union, and South Ossetia tried to carve out a special status for itself and to protect its rights vis-à-vis Georgian nationalism under the protection of Moscow.

A second feature characteristic for the conflict at this time was the process of collapsing existing political institutions and the challenge to create a new one. The clashes that took place between the titular nation (Georgia) and ethnic groups (South Ossetians, for instance) were about the national project of how to organize political arrangements in the newly created state. In the early 1990s, South Caucasian states had started constructing their own state structures without armed forces. Conflicts that arose from these changes were led by paramilitary armed formations, often inspired by nationalistic ideology motivated by self-enrichment and criminal interest.²²⁹ According to the Georgian political establishment, these conflicts were not ethnic, as South Ossetians and Abkhazians were not recognized as “other.” Everybody was Georgian. So the armed conflict in South Ossetia was considered “political” because the conflicts were about statehood and territorial integrity of the post-Soviet state of Georgia. In other words, it has been argued that Georgia was not fighting specific ethnic groups but “separatists,” that is, people who are challenging its territorial integrity, whatever their ethnic origin.²³⁰

According to this logic, the conflicts inside Georgia with separatists were not caused by ethnic hostility. Rather they were struggles of forming a nation state, struggles over the status of some specific groups, and they were caused by contradictions between national projects.²³¹ Conflicts in Georgia were about defending territory, political status, and independence. However, it should be said that, nowadays, mutual relations between conflict parties are ethnically hostile. This can lead one to conclude that ethnic animosity was not the cause but the result of the armed conflict in South Ossetia.

For Ossetian minorities, then, the conflicts were about self-determination and reinforcement of their political rights in their ethnic homes. Ossetians themselves claimed that they did not have any better choice than looking for security guarantees from the Kremlin, “striving for survival as an ethno-historian entity – and identity – drove [them] ‘to side with Soviet Russia’ – not [their] genetic love for bolshevism, sovietism and other ‘isms’ … .”²³²

Finally, the armed conflict in South Ossetia was accompanied by mass mobilization. Clashes between popular movements were led under nationalist slogans of former dissidents and intellectuals. They played a significant role in the events of “re-writing” the history of the Caucasian nations. These clashes, involving mass-level violence, were attempts to define their strength, territory, and rights for independence.²³³ As Georgia was seeking to change its status from a Soviet republic, the former autonomous region - South Ossetia – was trying to upgrade its position as well. The South Ossetian parliament demanded to transform the region’s status from “Autonomous Region” to “Autonomous Republic.²³⁴

Georgian policies towards its secessionist regions were ambivalent and, therefore, have resulted in two secessionist conflicts inside Georgia, in South Ossetia (1989–1992) and Abkhazia (1992–1993). The conflicts have not been resolved, and in most of the specialized literature, they are referred to as frozen conflicts.²³⁵ Consequently, clinging to exclusivist national identity in an ethnically mixed Georgia led to armed conflict and destroyed a state.

Having failed at creating a new statehood, Georgia collapsed. It was the price the Georgian political establishment had to pay in order to abolish an exclusivist nationalist political culture. Furthermore, the Russian involvement in these conflicts resulted in the defeat of a titular nation against their minorities. Rumors had it that the conflicts really were not between Georgia and its ethnic minority, the Ossetians, but with Russia, which was punishing post-Soviet republics for their aspirations for independence. However, in order to study the conflict mechanisms in South Ossetia, it is significant to point out that this conflict was not between the state and non-state actors. The conflict actors at the stage of initiation involved parties involved in nationalist movements on both sides, competing over the rules of the new political structure in this region.

The international recognition of Georgia as an independent state did not change course in the process of conflict escalation. As mentioned above, Georgia did not possess the tools to regulate these increasingly severe tensions, nor did the government have the means to stop the escalation from conflict to war. Georgia was ill equipped to address the process of state building and the demands of ethnic minorities for autonomy.

5.2.2Phase B: Economy of Conflict in South Ossetia

Control over oil, Black Sea ports, flow of commodities, and trans-Caucasian roads, as well as over local markets played a significant role in igniting conflicts in South Ossetia. The process of privatization also contributed to the escalation of tension. Even more so, “separatism and other political demands suggested by sides’ serious political and economic interests result from a vehement power struggle. This ends in oligopoly – a subject of the study of the economic theory – and explains how deeply-rooted economic interests are distorted by political, ideological, and religious motivations to be presented as the conflicting sides’ demands,”²³⁶ according to Paata Leiashvili, professor and leading expert in the administration of the Parliament of Georgia.

The issue at stake, which is understated and needs in-depth analysis, is economic development and its impact on the armed conflicts in the South Caucasus region. Economic development is a crucial factor as it will influence future dynamics of the conflict. It can also serve as a tool to promote peace in this unstable region. However, the unresolved status of the armed conflicts has jeopardized political stability and economic development in this region and has contributed to a re-escalation of tensions in 2008.

Unresolved armed conflicts in Georgia cause fundamental socio-economic problems in Georgia, such as vulnerability of the domestic market, economic insecurity along state borders, a large-scale contraband trade, a shadow economy and corruption, the criminalization of business, financial and budgetary crises causing tax and trade deficits, huge external debts, a high level of poverty among refugees, difficult living conditions in temporary shelters and consequent threat of political instability.

Leaders in conflict zones are involved in illegal trade with drugs, contraband, and weapons, and they are not interested in a resolution of the conflicts because of the benefits from the zones of conflicts. “Millions of dollars change hands in such places; this gives rise to powerful economic interest that exploit high-sounding patriotic slogans to keep the conflict alive.”²³⁷

5.2.2.1Smuggling Across the South Ossetia Region

Economic development in the Shida Kartli (South Osseti) region has proven to be most difficult. Some sources put the GPD of South Ossetia at 15 million USD per year or 250 USD per capita, one of the lowest in the region. The Ergneti market near Tskhinvali was a key place for illegal tax revenues. The “invisible” movement of goods across the state border, bypassing customs, has reached alarming proportions. Goods and petroleum products were imported without customs clearance into Georgia from Russia through the Roki Tunnel. Highly organized transnational groups were smuggling narcotic substances, weapons, and cigarettes, threatening the economic development in Georgia.²³⁸

According to the Emergency Legion of Tax Revenues, different groups smuggle goods worth 105 million USD per year, not including gasoline or diesel fuel. More than 260,000 USD per month worth of contraband in tobacco products alone was distributed to different parts of Georgia by cars from the Tskhinvali region. There were three market places controlled by high representatives of the South Ossetian and Georgian political elites before 2004. Most of the fuel, tobacco, flour, and food products entered Georgia through these channels. According to Georgian sources, the Georgian budget lacked almost 3.1 million USD due to smuggled goods, with the largest share, 1.6 million USD, attributed to illegal fuel and cigarette imports.²³⁹

The Ergneti market represented a “black hole” in the Georgian economy.²⁴⁰ It was also used to smuggle goods from Georgia to Russia. Heroin has been one of the major products smuggled through the conflict zone in the South Caucasus. According to some resources, the volume of heroin import from the Ergneti market is twice as much as the amount of drugs flowing from the territory of Azerbaijan.²⁴¹ The smuggling of drugs and weapons through South Ossetia was under the control of a few locals. Most of these products were imported and sold to Russian military forces before the Russian-Georgian armed conflict in 2008. The mechanism of the Ergneti market is illustrated on the Figure 3 below.

Figure The Layout of the Ergneti Market in South Ossetia.

Source: Vakhtang Dzhikaev and Alan Parastaev, Economy and Conflict on South Ossetian, in From War Economies to Peace Economis in the South Caucasus Phil Champain, Diana Klein and Natalia Mirimanova eds., (International Alert, 2004), 204.
The armed conflict in South Ossetia and its frozen status for more that two decades created unique conditions for the illegal distribution of goods. The region’s political instability led to an escalation of tensions in 2004, when the Georgian administration started an anti-smuggling campaign, aiming to close Ergneti market. Even though the Ergneti market produced the biggest part of South Ossetia’s economy, it did not guarantee stability and economic growth of the region (see Map 2 below). One reason for this was the fact that capital produced in Ergneti market did not stay in South Ossetia but was sent abroad. In addition, most of the profit from this market ended up in Russian and Georgian customs in the form of bribes. And finally, the market and its illegal economic activities had a negative impact on settling the Georgia-South Ossetia armed conflict. Under these conditions, it has to be pointed out, illegal border trade and dependence on illegal economic activities jeopardized the stability of this region and led to an escalation of armed conflict, as witnessed in 2004 and 2008.

Map Smuggling Routs in South Ossetia.

Source: Vakhtang Dzhikaev and Alan Parastaev, Economy and Conflict on South Ossetian, in From War Economies to Peace Economis in the South Caucasus Phil Champain, Diana Klein and Natalia Mirimanova eds., (International Alert, 2004), 206.

Saakashvili’s main goals were to accomplish a process of transformation for the Georgian state, eliminating corruption and poverty in the country, and achieving NATO membership and territorial integrity. Georgian political establishment verbally emphasized its desire for a peaceful settlement of the conflicts. The new Georgian government realized the need to deal with the issue of territorial control to build a strong state. The first success in this regard was achieved in Ajara by overthrowing Aslan Abashidze’s regime in 2004.²⁴² In a way, this turned out to be a double victory for the Georgian government: first, the victory over an autocratic ruler in the name of democracy, and second, a victory in the state building process. After Ajara had become a part of Georgia without major international complications or an outbreak of violence, the Georgian government started to deal with the issue of South Ossetia.

Before 2004, there was no major deterioration of the situation on the conflict zone with South Ossetia. Georgians and South Ossetians were engaged in active trading across the zone. The characteristic “cold peace” ideology – free movement and trade in the region-wide Ergneti market — saw the biggest challenge for peace in the ruling clan of Eduard Kokoiti in South Ossetia. They assumed that sending support to the Ossetian people would lead to the fall of the separatist government in Tskhinvali. The Georgian government believed that the problem was only the corrupt clan of Eduard Kokoiti ruling in South Ossetia and that South Ossetians would be willing to fight him. Indeed, the overall goal of the Georgian administration was not only its economy, but the usage of “anti-contraband measures as a dual-purpose mechanism: ... to add revenues to Georgia’s ailing budget (but also) to oust the ... government of the de-facto president, Eduard Kokoiti ... Without contraband funds to prop up his government and security services, Kokoiti’s ‘regime of bandits’ would fall apart.”²⁴³

In May 2004, Georgia launched a campaign against smuggling in South Ossetia. Contrary to the expected outcome, the Georgian strategy of trade restrictions threatened South Ossetians, which led to armed skirmishes, while Ossetians consolidated behind the de-facto government in order to defend their territory, their freedom of movement, and to prevent Georgian military success in this zone. From the Georgian perspective, the countermeasures taken by Ossetians represented a danger for the local Georgian population and the territorial integrity of the country. On the other hand, Kokoiti blamed the Georgian government of following aggressive policy and countered with an offensive operation, declaring that the South Ossetians were ready to defend themselves with armed forces.²⁴⁴ At the same time, Kokoiti claimed that the relationship with Georgia would not be restored until the Georgian side fulfilled the following demands: first, restoration of the damages in the Republic of South Ossetia caused during the Georgian aggression; second, the Georgian parliament was expected to give a political assessment of the events of 1989 to 1992, recognizing the genocide of the Ossetian people; third, Georgia was expected to adopt a law on refugees that included reinstituting their rights and fully reimbursing for reparations. Kokoiti also claimed that he had “no doubts” that “the historical justice will prevail, and the Ossetian people will be united and be a part of the Russian Federation.”²⁴⁵

These demands led to a rapid escalation, which reached its culmination in August 2004, when fire-fights erupted between Georgian and Ossetian soldiers near the village of Tamarasheni.²⁴⁶ The Georgian side attacked the village of Didi Liakhvni in its attempt to take control over the bypass road. According to the Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania, Georgia’s goal was to protect Didi Liakhvni in order to overcome “large-scale ethnic cleansing.”²⁴⁷ The spiral of insecurity-driven escalation of tension in the conflict zone led to the edge of an unwanted conflict. Unlike the triumph in Achara, this development indicated an overall setback and worsening relationships in the conflict zone.

The “war on smuggling” in South Ossetia was in line with the new anticorruption strategy of Saakashvili’s government by improving state revenue collection and increasing state involvement in cross-border crime to secure Georgian territory. The cornerstone of the new administration, which gained popular support and legitimacy, rested upon the fight against corruption, strengthening state institutions, and increasing state security. The struggle against corrupt activities was part of the broader security strategy. As declared by Michael Saakashvili in June 2004, South Ossetia “was a black hole from where contraband was coming. We have stopped that contraband. This is the main achievement… According to my calculations, this will bring an extra 200 – 250 million lari (100 – 125 million USD) to the Georgian budget, once we have (also) blocked contraband in Samegrelo (the region, which borders with the second breakaway region – Abkhazia). Most of that money will be spent on strengthening our state agencies, including in the first place, our police and military structures, so that there is peace and our population is protected.”²⁴⁸

The intensification of rhetoric and discourse about the peaceful transformation of South Ossetia into the Georgian jurisdiction, along with the claims of Georgian political elites that “we do not need a war,” indicates that there were no plans for a full-scale offensive military strategy. However, the deployment of Georgian troops on May 31 was an alarming sign for South Ossetia and Russia. It foreshadowed the possibility of a repetition of the tragedy of 1991. Consequently, the reaction of South Ossetia was perceived by the Georgian side offensive operation and disproportionate to Georgia’s own action. As rightly identified by Cory Welt, “while Georgia knew that it was making at least the South Ossetia insecure, it still perceived that it was doing it non-violently, while the South Ossetian leadership was now threatening violence and ethnic cleansing in response.”²⁴⁹

Thus, the unresolved conflict in South Ossetia has remained the biggest challenge of Georgia’s state-building efforts. Since the developments in 2004, Saakshvili’s strategy has been to achieve success through internationalization of any Georgian conflicts, through NATO membership, and by gaining support from the West. Georgia came up with peace initiatives based on a three-level solution in 2005 – demilitarization, economic rehabilitation, and political solution – and Mikhail Saakashvili’s peace plan in 2007. However, this took place against a backdrop of pressure on South Ossetian political representatives. For example, in December 2005, the Minister of Defense of Georgia at the time, Irakli Okruashvili, announced that Georgia would regain control over South Ossetia by January 1, 2007. None of the peace plans were ever implemented or contributed to a substantial improvement of mutual relations and the situation in the region.²⁵⁰

5.2.3Phase C: Red Lines in South Ossetia

The second stage of escalation of the conflict started 18 years after the ceasefire agreement in 1992. State weakness was the key problem that undermined Georgia’s development since its independence. Nation-building efforts to achieve national integration as well as state effectiveness (or “state capture”) to provide territorial control were ill prepared. After Mikheil Saakashvili came to power, he launched a policy of consolidating the Georgian state, developing the elementary features of functional statehood.²⁵¹

On 7 August 2008 at 11:35 p.m., the Georgian armed forces entered the region of South Ossetia, according to official pronouncements, to “restore constitutional order.”²⁵² The Russian response was very quick. The next day, using the Roki Tunnel, the Russian armed forces reached the territory of South Ossetia. During 10 and 11 August, Russia opened a second front on the territory of Abkhazia. The Russian armed forces crossed the borders of the separatist regions and entered the Georgian inland. The Russian armed forces stopped at the city of Mtskheta, only 35 km from the capital of Tbilisi.²⁵³

After it became an independent country, Georgia had to build its own armed forces, starting with what it had inherited from the Soviet Union. Following the Rose Revolution in 2003, the Georgian armed forces went through the process of radicalization. To achieve that, a number of planning documents inspired by the US armed forces planning procedures were created, namely the “National Security Concept” and the “Threat Assessment Document and National Military Strategy.” The “National Security Concept” defined the main tasks for the Georgian army: achieving compatibility with NATO standards; acquiring the capacity for providing assistance to civil-political authorities in post-crisis rehabilitation and maintaining law and order; and, last but not least, acquiring the capacity for carrying out peace support, military operations, and antiterrorist operations.²⁵⁴ In order to achieve “de-occupation” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, resolution of conflict by peaceful means, struggle against terrorism, and integration into NATO, these tasks were broken down into more details in the “Foreign Policy Strategy of Georgia 2012-2015”²⁵⁵ and in the “National Strategy 2014.”²⁵⁶ According to both documents, before the Russian-Georgian armed conflict, Georgia was equipped only to enter into territorial defense, deterrence of potential aggression, and international expeditionary operations.

While the answer to who started the offensive campaigns in August 2008 remains in dispute among Georgian and Russian experts, the speed with which the Russians responded—opening of the second front in Abkhazia, Russian espionage activities in the region, military provocations carried out on the eve of the war, shooting down Georgian unmanned aircraft, attack on a radar station of Georgian aircraft defense, and Russian military exercises in the region—indicates that the armed conflict might have been prepared by Russia.

If this assertion is true, that is, if what the Georgian army tried to resist was a carefully orchestrated Russian military operation for which the pretext had been supplied by the Georgians themselves, then Georgia clearly acted on a wrong strategic assessment of the situation and of Russian intentions. Attempting to resolve the secession issue through the use of military force clearly failed because the Georgian army lost to an army that outnumbered it heavily, was vastly superior in terms of heavy military weapons, and controlled the airspace over the battlefield.²⁵⁷ The deficiencies revealed by the war at higher levels of command are more serious and less easy to remedy than the deficiencies at the tactical level because education and military training at the top military level needed much more time than at the basic levels.

Because of the deployment of large Russian contingents on Georgian territory (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), the strategic situation of Georgia has deteriorated significantly. Apart from acting as a deterrent against any future attempt of Georgia to use force in dealing with the secessionists, Russian troops pose a permanent threat to Georgia by shortening the warning times for potential Russian attacks. Furthermore, the armed conflict also reduced the capacity of Georgia to participate in expeditionary operations. The Russian-Georgian conflict highlighted the importance of one of the main aims of Georgian defense policy – strengthening the capability of the Georgian army to defend the homeland against direct aggression.²⁵⁸

The Russian-Georgian armed conflict was by some scholars interpreted as a first armed clash between the West and the East after the end of the Cold War.²⁵⁹ However, it is questionable whether such an interpretation is sustainable. The West did not enter a conflict with Russia because of Georgia. After all, Georgia had never received any security guarantees from the West.²⁶⁰ On the other hand, this conflict involved some aspects of ideological confrontation: Georgian pro-Western orientation and Russian great power ambitions in the South Caucasus region. Russia started to recover after the demise of the Soviet Union and under the Putin’s rule being a Great Power was no longer an aspiration but a determining element aiming to secure its special status. One of the most prominent scholars of Russia’s foreign relations, Ted Hopf defines Russia has never really concealed its great power ambition and can hardly imagine itself in any other role²⁶¹. According to Robert Kagan Russian-Georgian conflict is part of Russian grand strategy. “Putin cares no more about a few thousand South Ossetians than he does about Kosovo's Serbs. Claims of pan-Slavic sympathy are pretexts designed to fan Russian great-power nationalism at home and to expand Russia's power abroad.”²⁶²

Because of the war, Georgia has become a country without definite borders of its own territory, and hence it does not meet one of the key requirements for new NATO members declared in a NATO study on its potential expansion. Opponents of Georgian membership in NATO have been using this unquestionable fact intensively in recent years. However, it is only a secondary argument. The main problem lies in the lack of willingness in the West to provide Georgia with any obligations, as it is unable to defend it. In other words, Georgia is not strategically important for the West, despite many Georgians thinking quite the opposite.

Recent development have reviled, that Russia maintains a substantial military presence in the conflict zones and even after Bidzina Ivanishvili became a head of the new government in Georgia, Russia continues to undermine Georgian territorial integrity by erecting barbed wire barricades in South Ossetia, as well as keeping Georgians from Western-style sovereign state by putting pressure on joining the Eurasian Union. It can be concluded that the Russo-Georgian armed conflict, and the subsequent recognition of the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be independent states by Russia institutionalized the old dividing lines in the region of South Caucasus.

5.2.4Putting the Armed Conflict into the Context

Taking into consideration how complex and multidimensional the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia is, as well as interests of international actors and their mutually exclusive goals it is necessary to analyze the new realities after the August 2008 events. In this way we can trace that the process of transformation, which was not towards the resolution, but deepening the conflict.

At the systemic level, the impacts of the Russo-Georgian conflict were minimal. This conflict had no impact on the anarchic nature of the international system or the distribution of power. In the international system, the number of the main powers did not change. Nor did the events in the Caucasus change the customs of forming military alliances. Even though some researchers do interpret this conflict as the first armed clash between the West and the East after the end of the Cold War, it is questionable whether such an interpretation is sustainable (Asmus 2010: 236). The West did not enter a conflict with Russia because of Georgia. After all, Georgia had never received any security guarantees from the West.

Generally, it can be stated that the military campaign against Georgia and the unilateral recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia did short-term harm to the Russian “image” of a reliable and peaceful member of the international community. Hence if the Russian political elites had relied on the fact that the war would not do a long-term harm to its prestige in the world, this estimate has so far been successful. Nevertheless, Russia did fail to impose its own interpretation of the events on the West, i.e. that it had responded to an attack on its own citizens. The West also has disagreed with the adopted territorial changes and its representatives expressed their disapproval of Russia having recognized the independence of these two republics.

On the other hand, the West is not willing to get involved in this matter and it prefers developing economic relations with Russia. After Barack Obama’s inauguration, the tense relations between Russia and the USA, characteristic during part of the Bush administration, were replaced by an effort to converge. Negotiations between the USA and Russia concerning nuclear matters resulted in signing a new treaty on 8 April 2010, which replaced the START treaty from 1991, and it introduced further restrictions on strategic nuclear warheads. Georgia has not been of crucial importance for the Obama administration and is overshadowed by more important accounts of Afghanistan or the Iranian nuclear program.

Regarding Russian relations with non-Western countries, the consequences of the armed conflict up to now have been mixed. Russia has still not managed to gain support either of CIS or the Shangai Cooperation Organization. Even though Russia has great influence upon the states of the CIS, none of the states of this group recognizes the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia²⁶³ and China blocked any initiative to support separatist movements. After the Russo-Georgian war, the CIS states have exhibited more circumspection in their relations with Russia, especially those which are themselves exposed to separatist threats.

The Russian military action in Georgia pointed out the dangerous new risks for this territory and European security. Russia acted in the interest of defending its “kin-state,” exploiting the right of ethnic minorities to self-determination. As one of its foreign political goals, it declared the protection of “kin” minorities. This concept was tested with success during the Russia-Georgia armed conflict, by which Russia sent a clear signal to other neighbors to take it as a lesson to be learned and the main result of the armed conflict.

On the whole, it is possible to reach the conclusion that as a consequence of the armed conflict, Russia accomplished many of its aims: to have at its disposal strategic place d'armes in the middle of South Caucasus; to stop the penetration of Western influence into the region and prevent Georgian membership in NATO; to arouse a feeling of fear among Russia’s neighbors; to get rid of Georgian enclaves in South Ossetia representing the main obstacle to Russian annexation of this area, and to ensure a significant military presence. Russia’s aim has been and further remains to suppress Western influence and make sure that Georgia will not set an example for other countries in the region. Last but not least, Russia managed to send a clear signal to its neighbors that their friendship with the West is not a guarantee against a Russian military attack.

On the other hand, Russia did not manage to deprive President Saakashvili of power; additionally it failed to earn worldwide international recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moreover, it is also necessary to take into account that from the long-term perspective, financing the above-mentioned independent states will represent a certain financial burden for Russia.

For Georgia, the armed conflict had an overall impact of the conflict on Georgia’s prestige in the world was tremendous. Probably the most adverse consequence for Georgia was the violation of its territorial integrity, as Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lavrov, announced that Georgia could forget about its territorial integrity.²⁶⁴

The case of Georgia and South Ossetia resulted in hundreds of military and civilian victims and vast damages to infrastructure, which had a clearly negative impact on the country’s economic development. Amnesty International reached the conclusion that approximately 192,000 people had fled from the fights, 138,000 of them to Georgia. A majority of them returned to their original places of living, which are the so-called “buffer zones” near South Ossetia. As a result of the summer 2008 conflict, there remain 21,000 internally displaced persons on the Georgian territory.

The World Bank report implies that the conflict had a negative influence on the stable development in Georgia and it reduced the anticipated economic growth for 2008 from 9% to 3.5%, and this reduced figure for economic growth in Georgia could last for several years. According to some experts, the Georgian government estimates war damages at 1 billion USD. This number includes damages to the civil infrastructure and costs arising due to internally displaced persons (approximately 30,000 people). In other words, this number does not include damages on the regions where the Georgian government has no access, and damages to military armament. Beyond any doubt, the Russian military intervention in Georgia did have a short-term impact on the Georgian economic growth, but it cannot be clearly determined what degree of reduction was caused really by the war and what was, on the contrary, brought about by the impending economic crisis.

Besides the fact that the Georgian economy and infrastructure had been damaged due to the armed conflict, the Russian forces also destroyed a substantial part of the Georgian military armament. The Georgian army’s ability to successfully defend the country’s territory was undoubtedly undermined by the conflict. According to a report by the Georgian Ministry of Defense, 160 soldiers died and 10 were lost during the Russo-Georgian War.²⁶⁵ According to a different report released by Georgian government, 326 Georgian citizens died as a consequence of the conflict; 155 of them were civilians.²⁶⁶

Nevertheless, it is much more important that the Georgian strategic situation deteriorated by deploying relatively strong Russian contingents on Georgian territory (Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Russia keeps 7,600 troops on the Georgian territory where secessionists have declared independent states.²⁶⁷ These forces serve not only as a deterrence to Georgia’s future efforts to use military force against secessionists, but they also pose a permanent threat to Tbilisi, as they reduce the period of warning for the Georgian army in case of a Russian attack against this country.

Military experts have attempted to evaluate the purpose of Russian military bases in Gudauta and Ochamchira (in Abkhazia) and Java (South Ossetia). Gudauta could be used for offensive troops, air forces, or air protection, while Ochamchira could serve as a naval base, which would enable Russia to transfer the Black Sea fleet from Sevastopol. As far as Java is concerned, this city could be used for the dislocation of the motorized infantry brigade.²⁶⁸ However, the most serious military consequence is unquestionably the reduction of time necessary for a direct threat for the Georgian metropolis of Tbilisi by troops stationed in South Ossetia, which is situated on the southern side of the South Caucasus ridge, and thus it is an ideal strategic starting point for a potential military occupation of Georgia.

The conflict also affected the perception of Georgia as a transit country for energy supplies to the European Union. If infrastructure was constructed over this state’s territory permitting the transport of energy resources from the Caspian region to the European market, the country’s geopolitical importance for the European Union would certainly grow. Nonetheless, the armed conflict increased the risky character of Georgia for the European Union as a transport corridor for energy resources from the Caspian Sea region.

Among others, the Russo-Georgian armed conflict strengthened anti-Georgian attitudes both in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; despite President Saakashvili’s optimistic declarations, this makes the possible reintegration of these areas into Georgia in the near future even less likely. Russia takes these attitudes into account in its politics and uses them actively when obtaining support for the new “independent” states. As is evident from the negotiations in Geneva, the attitude of all sides of the conflict does not offer much space for a compromise. A great role in this respect is played by the fact that Russia wants Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be treated as sovereign states. The Russian Federation calls on Georgia to sign an agreement on the non-use of military force in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In this regard, the Georgian position lies in the preparedness to sign such an agreement with Russia, as it does not recognize the separatist regions as the subjects of international law.²⁶⁹ So far the most recent round of negotiations taking place did not lead to any particular results. The main issues lay in the requirements imposed by the Georgian side to withdraw financial support for terrorist attacks on Georgia’s territory by the Federal Security Service (FSB) of the Russian Federation. The positions of the individual sides of the conflict remain unchanged and at odds on the issue of a secure return of internally displaced persons to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At this moment, it is evident that Georgia has de facto lost these territories and cannot hope to regain them soon.

Due to the Russo-Georgian armed conflict, there has been a shift in the perception of domestic conflicts in Georgia both by Georgian political elites and inhabitants. The Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts are regarded as a part of the Russo-Georgian conflict. After the Russo-Georgian armed conflict, the possibility of a direct dialogue between the conflicting sides (Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia) diminished as the separatist governments negotiated with Russia. In this respect, it is necessary to point out the paradoxical situation that Russia recognizes the existence of South Ossetia as an independent state, while North Ossetia is regarded as a part of Russia. That implies that Russia considers the sovereignty of South Ossetia as an instrumental principle, using it as a tool to pressure Georgia and the international community.