Masaryk university

4.2Phase B: Trigger Events – Emergence of Sporadic Clashes

The Sumgait episode (27-29 February 1988) is often referred to as “the birth of the Karabakh conflict.” It was a trigger event, the point that turned political mobilization to armed and bloody conflict.¹⁴⁹ According to Armenian reports, there were at least 26 Armenians killed and 54 militia personnel injured.¹⁵⁰ Azerbaijani sources reported 32 dead (26 Armenians and 6 Azeris) and 400 wounded.¹⁵¹

Before investigating the issues at stake that sparked the spiral of violence between Armenians and Azeris, it has to be noted that one of the least investigated issues in the academic literature is the gradual polarization of the population and the mobilization leading to radicalization by presenting competing models over historical and border issues to the masses. Investigating objective factors that transformed the peaceful campaign over inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh in the Armenian SSR into an explosion of violence is not enough without explaining the meaning of these factors. Unfortunately, we do not have any tools to test the feelings of all masses and clarify whether all Armenians believed in genocide against them. Nerveless, the majority of expert and available data nowadays emphasizes the significance of fear and prejudice, which generated an Armenian public discourse. This perceived threat was used by some individuals to outline the ethnic character of this conflict.

During the escalation phase, we can trace the emergence of events of sporadic violence. It is important to interpret milestone events that transformed a particular development into full-scale war. In this regard, on has to mention an earthquake that took place in Spitak in December 1988. In its aftermath, 25,000 people died and hundreds of thousand were left homeless. This event had an impact on the evolution of the conflict.¹⁵² Despite humanitarian aid, rail blockages and oil embargoes from Azerbaijan after the earthquake aggravated Armenian antagonism and led to the radicalization of political representatives.¹⁵³

Among violent events leading to full-scale war, the meaning of the Sumgait pogrom has to be addressed. It gave enormous symbolic legitimacy to the nationalist movement in Armenia. Their slogans at this time incorporated the paradigm of Genocide: “the Sumgait Genocide – the test of pan Turkic tactics.” The protection of Armenians against a “second Sumgait” was declared as a key national priority.¹⁵⁴ The spirit of the demonstrations changed too: the Armenian nationalist movement was not only voicing support to Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh but underlined the survival of the nation as a whole. Sumgait also started the first wave of refugee flows: the first Armenian refugee flow was from Azerbaijan to Armenia; within the month, most of the Azerbaijani population living in Armenia (almost 160 000) fled to Azerbaijan.¹⁵⁵

Sumgait was an industrial city in Azerbaijan, inhabited by 230 000 people of mixed ethnicities of which only 15 000-20 000 were ethnic Armenians. The city was characterized by a low level of development and a high number of unemployment. As stated in Azerbaijani sources, “On February 28 a group of hooligan elements provoked disturbances in Sumgait. There were instances of outrages and violence.”¹⁵⁶ Two days later, the same newspaper published addition information: “unstable and immature people who fell under the influence of provocative rumors and inflammatory talk about the events in Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia were drawn into illegal actions.”¹⁵⁷ On 5 March 1988, the official Soviet communist newspaper added that there were 32 killed and 197 injured in this accident.¹⁵⁸ Due to the lack of information about the identity of the “hooligans” and their intentions, “immature people ... fell under the influence of provocative rumors and inflammatory talk about the events in NK and Armenia were drawn into illegal actions… Tragic events occurred and there were fatalities.”¹⁵⁹ Due to lack of information, both Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders overestimated and misunderstood each other’s intensions.

Key political leaders in the Karabakh Movement had different interpretations of the events in Sumgait. Levon Ter-Petrosian, the head of the Karabakh Committee and the president of Armenia, believed that the Sumgait events “turned the constitutional process to physical clashes... Until then, we believed that if the Soviet Union was going towards democratization those questions had to be opened.”¹⁶⁰ According to this view, the Sumgait was not planned by the Kremlin, as it took three days for Moscow to intervene.

Other influential leaders of the Karabakh Movement, Vazgen Manukyan and Ashot Manucharyan, believe that external parties organized the events in Sumgait. The idea that the KGB got involved in the escalation of the conflict between Armenians and Azeris is maintained by some Azerbaijani political leaders, as, for example, by Isa Gambar, the leader of the Azerbaijani Musavat Party. According to this view, the Sumgait pogrom was supported by Moscow in order to overcome the democratization of Armenia: “The government is genuinely scared of our unity… They just wanted to intimidate us to stop the demonstrations from happening. They thought it was all being directed from somewhere… they just could not imagine that half a million people would interrupt the day-to-day business of their lives to express their bitterness at how they had been treated.”¹⁶¹

Sumgait converted past trauma into immediate threat. The genocide provided the most suitable framework through which the events could be portrayed. For Armenians, the Sumgait pogrom was a continuation of genocide by Turks. Placards at mass demonstrations underlined this perspective: “What took place in Sumgait was genocide especially since the pogroms were perpetrated by the representatives of one nation towards another… the genocide had deep roots.”¹⁶² Lack of information and rumors contributed to the escalation of tensions.

The violence in Sumgait was followed by other events leading to the gradual transformation of conflict to its armed phase. The next tragic event took place in Ganja, the second largest city in Azerbaijan. It resulted in the next wave of refugee flows of Armenians. The situation escalated further in January, when the opposition in Baku organized a demonstration against the government calling for more radical measures in the Karabakh issue. This resulted in the intervention by the Soviets in Baku. “Black January” caused a victimization of Azerbaijani consciousness, as did the Sumgait events to Armenians. In the aftermath, more than 100 people died and over 1,000 were wounded.¹⁶³

Karabakh Armenians struggled against corruption while asking for improvement of environmental and working conditions. This struggle transformed into demands for political independence. What started as a nonviolent protest over environmental issues and clashes over activities in a “shadow” economy was soon taken over by leaders of an emerging nationalist movement that sought to strengthen a sense of solidarity in the Armenian and the Azerbaijani nation in order to attain political advantages. This served as a platform for an emerging pro-independence democratic movement.

4.2.1The Road to Armed Conflict: Political Mobilization in Armenia and Azerbaijan

While the conflict was escalating and mass demonstrations took place, the Kremlin established a “special administration” in Nagorno-Karabakh. Moscow approved 400 million rubles to improve industrial, housing, and educational capacities in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF) reacted with rail blockades in order to block any special assistance from Moscow.¹⁶⁴ This had a huge impact on the evolution of Armenian attitudes towards Azerbaijan. Armenia was completely dependent on Azerbaijani gas and oil imports after the earthquake in Spitak mentioned above. The government of Azerbaijan supported the radical measures of the APF. Evidently, the Armenian nationalist movement became frustrated with Moscow’s unwillingness to support the Armenian demand for unification.

If we analyze the relationship between the government and its role in the escalation process of the conflict, it is evident that it had a direct role in this process. The inability of the government of Azerbaijan to prevent Soviet intervention in Baku delegitimized the communist rule in the eyes of masses.¹⁶⁵ The weakness of the government supported the creation of paramilitary forces, and their cooperation with the Soviet Army led to the military operation “Ring.” The goal of this operation was to deter Armenians from their major demand: unification with Armenia.¹⁶⁶ This resulted in escalation of the conflict and in its transformation to the military form because at this point, a military confrontation was seen as the only solution to the situation.

The Kremlin’s policies towards Nagorno-Karabakh resulted in growing tensions and in distrust about its intension. After the events at Sumgait and the deployment of the Soviet Army in Yerevan, the new nationalist government in Armenia changed its strategy. The environmental issues and calls for unification were transformed into calls for full sovereignty and the creation of an independent Armenian state. Democratization and reform slogans were a tactic used by the Karabakh Committee in order to overcome direct conformity of politicized masses with Soviet Security forces. This would assure achieving political goals and the replacement of the old, corrupted Communist government by a new nationalist one, which would rescue the state from collapse.

Moscow’s involvement in the violent events between Azerbaijan and Armenia contributed to the confusion. “The Azerbaijanis believed that Gorbachev favored the Armenians, particularly after the administrative arrangement of 12 January 1989, which the Azerbaijan considered as the fist step in giving Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. The Armenians, who considered that the Karabakh cause was a test of perestroika and hoped that Moscow would unify Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, gradually came to believe that he was pro-Azeri.”¹⁶⁷

The failure of the Government of Azerbaijan to achieve its objectives in Nagorno-Karabakh, in the Sumgait events, and during Operation “Ring,” as well as their ineffective relationship with APF contributed to an escalation of the conflict. The mass demonstrations in Baku demanded that the government resign. Since then, “the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict became the single most important toy in the hands of the political struggle between opposition and government in Baku. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict grew to be dominant in Azerbaijan not as a nationalist cause of great urgency unifying the political forces in Armenia, on the contrary, it was simply the most important tool to political infighting in the capital.”¹⁶⁸

The process of statehood in Azerbaijan and Armenia took different forms. Regime type and its consequences on the dynamics in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are under-analyzed, and there is a need to address this issue in order to understand the outbreak, conduct, and duration of this conflict. It is important to note that the Armenian government remained loyal to the Kremlin. However, the pressure stemming from the Karabakh issue and the increase in tension resulted in the acceptance of a nationalist program by the Armenian government. It also supported the demand of the Karabakh Committee that Nagorno-Karabakh should be unified with Armenia, declaring itself as the United Armenian Republic including NKAO¹⁶⁹ (see Appendix D).

This decision was annulled by Azerbaijan, which resulted in growing antagonism at between the two republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The decision of the Azerbaijani government was based on Article 78 of the Constitution of the USSR, according to which “the territory of a union republic may not be altered without its consent. The boundaries between republics may be altered by mutual agreement of the union republics concerned, subject to confirmation by the USSR.”¹⁷⁰ The growing antagonism between Armenia and Azerbaijan led to a rapid change of the communist government by the nationalist government, which started the process of attaining independence by declaring the Republic of Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh as part of the new republic.¹⁷¹

Even though the Armenian nationalist government remained in power – and unlike Azerbaijan and Georgia there was no civil war in Armenia – the relationship with the Kremlin and Baku during this phase of the conflict was not free of tensions. Military groups that were against the Azeri population in Armenia also contributed to the escalation of the conflict. Later on, Ter-Petrosian’s government failed to establish control over radical groups among Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. Their declaration of independence and the creation of a national army¹⁷² were interpreted as undeclared war among the political elites in Azerbaijan.¹⁷³

The pathway of Azerbaijan’s political transition was bumpier than the one in Armenia and was affected by the armed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The conflict led to mass mobilizations in both countries. As argued by Rasim Musabekov the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh “served as a key impulse mobilizing the population for social and political reforms.”¹⁷⁴ However, the reforms in Azerbaijan were not carried out in a sense of democratic transformation. The Popular Front was created, which organized a wave of protests over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.¹⁷⁵ The militarization of the Popular Front led to a crisis of power characterized by fierce competition, violence, and military coups that resulted in a military revolt in June 1993.¹⁷⁶ The regime of Azerbaijani President Ayaz Mutalibov relied on a small number of armed forces due to the lack of a professional army and the fear that it might threaten his regime.¹⁷⁷ The political landscape in Azerbaijan, which had an impact on mass mobilization, was different from the developments in Armenia, where less turmoil evolved. The process of a democratic transformation in Azerbaijan has not been implemented, the mechanism of elective democracy has not been established, and the state is still governed by authoritarian methods “in the presence of the decorative democratic institutions.”¹⁷⁸

Some popular organizations played an even more negative role than the government. The Karabakh Committee (later Armenian National Movement) played a decisive role in the escalation process. Together with the Azerbaijan Popular Front, which incorporated a number of groups in opposition to the Communist regime, the Karabakh Committee was a key player in radicalizing the masses. The Committee also supported the creation of militias to implement its popular goals. Both of these organizations acted similarly in that they both adopted a radical stance on Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians calling for secession from Azerbaijan had support from Armenia contributed to the transformation of the conflict to its military forms.

On 8 August, the Karabakh Committee was transformed, calling itself the Armenian National Movement (ANM). The leaders of the newly formed movement indicated that they “would organize rallies and strikes, would participate in the elections and campaigns for changes in Armenia’s constitution and legal structures.”¹⁷⁹ Over half a million people gathered in the Matenadaran area to hear Ter-Petrosian’s speech, in which he proposed democratization and a key role of ANM in the process.¹⁸⁰ We have traced how an environmental movement became political in its content. The non-Communist government gained power on 5 August 1990, when political power was transferred into the hands of nationalists. Political elites included single-minded nationalists, former communists who were eager to wear a coat of nationalism, and liberal democrats.¹⁸¹

Relationships between Armenia and Azerbaijan deteriorated through continuing attacks on the transport routes connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. The Government of Azerbaijan passed the “Law of Sovereignty,” which underlined territorial integrity and Nagorno-Karabakh as part of it. The National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Krunk Committee demanded transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, secession from Azerbaijan SSR, and creation of a common budget with Armenian SSR.¹⁸² Members of this committee supported creating paramilitary forces, which contributed to violent events. As a result, it “grew to be an uncontrollable body neither by Moscow nor by Baku and Armenia.”¹⁸³ The Krunk Committee supported the decision of the Karabakh Oblast Soviet to secede from Azerbaijan and “renamed the Oblast the Artsakh Armenian Autonomous Region.” This demand escalated political tensions between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. The creation of a new state was the primary objective of the national movement in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, ready to struggle for democracy and independence.

Uncontrolled military groups dominated the process of escalation of conflict in a very profound manner. The major activities of the Armenian military groups involved fighting against the Azerbaijan population and Azerbaijani military groups. The lack of clear strategy, disobedience to the government, self-enforced decisions escalated the conflict into a full-scale war. Similar methods against Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians were deployed by the Azeri independent militias. The activities of these ultra-nationalist groups made an outbreak of war inevitable. It has to be noted that even the Armenian National Army (ANA) and the Special Function Militia Troops (OMON) were not under full control of their respective governments until the ceasefire agreement in 1994.

The full-scale war in Nagorno-Karabakh was the result of politicization of issues at stake. For the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, which was an integral part of Azerbaijan (it was a part of Azerbaijan’s economy and was entirely dependent on Azerbaijan oil and gas), it was obvious that Azerbaijan would not stand by and watch the loss of this territory and its unification with another state. Distrust of political leaders led to the creation and popular support of a nationalist opposition in both countries. Moscow used the Nagorno-Karabakh issue to manipulate both governments in Armenia and Azerbaijan and keep them under control. Pro-Kremlin Ayaz Mutalibov came to power in Azerbaijan in August 1991; his rule, however, did not last long. The prewar period in Azerbaijan cannot be characterized as a period of democratization; however, it was full of competition among various groups, which used the Karabakh issue to advance their interests.¹⁸⁴ The transfer of power in the case of Armenia took place through an election in accordance with the constitution. On 21 September 1990, Armenians voted for an independent state, apart from the Soviet Union. In October 1991, Ter-Petrosian, one of the active leaders of the nationalist movement, became the first president of Armenia.

The escalation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was the result of decisions made by nationalist governments rather than by Moscow or the Communist Party. Ethnicity became a political tool, which was used by the nationalist movement in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh to mobilize the population in order to legitimize their demand to transfer this territory from Azerbaijan to Armenia. Environmental issues were manifested under a framework of genocide. Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians interpreted Azerbaijani policies as a cultural genocide against them. It is significant to point out that Karabakh Aremenians identified themselves as Armenians, and nationalist leaders used this fact during various rallies and demonstrations. Gradually, what started as an environmental movement gained political momentum, involving two major demands: first, to secede the territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh region from Azerbaijan; and second, democratization and the creation of independent statehood for Armenia. Azerbaijan used all available forces to strengthen its control over its territory. It is important to note that “the Karabakh conflict was used as a pre-text for mobilizing power.”¹⁸⁵ Unsurprisingly, a violent stage followed from 1992 to 1994.

4.2.2Violent Stage of the Armed Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh

Military operations escalated very quickly between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh became a battlefield for two years, and no solution has been reached to date for the issues at stake. The examination of military strategies goes beyond the scope of this study. What is more important for the purpose of the analysis is to shed light on the conflict processes at this stage and their meaning for the conflict parties involved.

Starting with 1991, we can trace the offensive strategies by the Armenian side. Radicalization of guerrilla activities between the two nations were also intensified. Over 10 000 people were deported to Armenia on the pretext of self-defense. “Bandits blocked roads between Azerbaijani villages, established military posts on the highway leading from Khanlar to Kelbajar, and blew up water pipes supplying Ganja with drinking water. Their unpunished activity was a direct threat for the activity of Western Azerbaijan with more than one million inhabitants.”¹⁸⁶

Full-scale war broke out in February 1992. The city of Khodjaly saw one the bloodiest massacres during which 636 people died.¹⁸⁷ The Khodjaly massacre had sincere consequences for the Azerbaijani population. President Ayaz Mutallibov was forced to leave office, which contributed to the instability in Baku. New presidential elections were planned;¹⁸⁸ however, another crisis intervened after the fall of city Shusha (mainly populated by Azerbaijanis). Armenians seized this moment and chose an offensive strategy while Azerbaijan was very close to civil war and had no clear strategy for Karabakh. Armenians perceived Azerbaijan’s lack of a unified political and military leadership and their struggle to attain their goals as a weakness.¹⁸⁹

After the victory in Khodjaly, which ensured an air corridor between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, the next step was to secure Shusha, which would ensure a land connection and end the blockade imposed by Azerbaijan. After two days of violence, there were 57 victims on the Armenian side and almost 200 on the Azerbaijani side.¹⁹⁰ The next step in this struggle was to resolve logistical problems in order to supply the Armenian troops. In this regard, the occupation of the Lachin Corridor had particular significance. Without much confrontation, it was soon abandoned by Azerbaijani forces.

At this point, it has to be pointed out that most of the Armenian victories were achieved during political turmoil in Azerbaijan. A power struggle, contradictions, and the lack of unified military forces capable of advancing military strategy are important factors that determined the developments at the beginning of the hot stage in this armed conflict. The first president, Mutalibov, was accused of being too weak to protect Nagorno-Karabakh. When Adulfaz Elchibey came to power in June 1992, his major strategy was to finish the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. At that time, we can see that a massive offensive was staged in the north Karabakh by Azerbaijan. But after some initial success, Azerbaijani forces were defeated in the battle of Kelbajar in March 1993. Elchibey lost control over military groups on the Karabakh front, which led to the loss of legitimacy of his rule. This brought further deterioration and another political crisis to Baku, leading to yet another change of presidents in Azerbaijan. Heydar Aliev, the third president of the country, was called up by the Popular Front. His presidency started with another offensive strategy in Karabakh. Initially, Azerbaijani forces were successful, but it did not bring any change to the war front. During the campaign, almost 5 000 of his soldiers were killed¹⁹¹ compared to 600 Armenian casualties. Azerbaijani forces were exhausted.

Armenia and Azerbaijan were set to confront each other. What started as an internal problem within the Soviet Union in 1988, when Armenians demanded the transference of the Nagorno-Karabakh region to Armenia from the Kremlin, has become an armed conflict between two independent states. The ill-prepared response of the Soviet Union in terms of socio-economic support and their ignorance of political issues led to the emergence of a political movement with a new agenda leading to independent statehood. Unlike the turmoil in Azerbaijan, the political scene in Armenia was more stable, and Levon Ter-Petrosyan stayed in power throughout the war. However, this does not mean that there was no rivalry behind the scene. Not all the political leaders shared a common goal in regards to Karabakh. The war in Nagorno-Karabakh provided a window of opportunity for a shadow economy and for illegal activities of the “mafia.”¹⁹²

In both countries, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue was an important political factor. The security architecture and the fate of Armenians and Azerbaijanis living in the South Caucasus region have been shaped in various ways by this conflict. What started out as skirmishes in the early stage in 1988 turned into a full-scale war between Armenians and Azeris by 1992 with over 20,000 casualties and over one million refugees.¹⁹³ The number of Armenian refugees is 350,000. According to the International Displacement Monitoring Centre, more than 700,000 Azeris became refugees in 1994.¹⁹⁴ This conflict, which resulted in the creation of a de facto unrecognized state of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, has shown that the conflict parties are unable to settle their rivalry, which has dragged on for more than twenty years. Nagorno-Karabakh, populated mainly by ethnic Armenians, is by international law part of Azerbaijan, constituting 14% of its territory.