Masaryk university

Gruzino-Abkhazskii Konflikt: 1917-1992 [Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict: 1917-1992] (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Evropa, 2007), 41.

294^ Ghia Nodia, “Causes and Vision of Conflict in Abkhazia,” 19.

295^ “Deklaratsiya O Gosudarstvennom Suverenitete Abkhazskoy Sovetskoy Sotsialisticheskoy Respubliki: Prinyata X Sessiyey Verkhovnogo Soveta Abkhazskoy ASSR 11 Sozyva 25 Avgusta 1990 Goda’ [The Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Abkhaz Soviet Socialist Republic Adopted by the 10th Session of the 11th Supreme Soviet of the Abkhaz ASSR, 25 Aug. 1990],” August 25, 1990.

296^ Tamaz Diasamidze and Nana Tchkoidze-Japaridze, Regional Conflicts in Georgia (The Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia, The Autonomous SSR of Abkhazia 1989-2008): The Collection of Political-Legal Acts, the 2nd, updated edition edition (Tbilisi: Regionalism Research Centre, n.d.), 117.

297^ Eduard Shevardnadze and Nato Oniani, “Kvekana Shevida Aqtiuri Msheneblobis Pazashi [The Country Entered a Phaze of Active Reconstruction],” Saqartvelos Respublika, August 16, 1994, sec. N143(945).

298^ Nino Burchuladze, “Gasrola Okhureistan... Apkhazetis Omi Daicko [Shot Nearby Okhureisi... The War in Akhazia Has Started],” Kviris Palitra, n.d., N33(889) edition.

299^ Diasamidze and Tchkoidze-Japaridze, Regional Conflicts in Georgia (The Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia, The Autonomous SSR of Abkhazia 1989-2008), 140.

300^ Yuri Anchabadze, “Georgia and Abkhazia: The Hard Road to Agreement,” in Georgians and Abkhazians. The Search for a Peace Settlement (Brussels: Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 1998), http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/Georgians/chp0501.html.

301^ Cheterian, War and Peace in the Caucasus, 2009, 191.

302^ Ibid., 193.

303^ Levan Sharashenidze, Zametki Desantnika-Kommissara [The Notes of Commando-Commissioner], Manuscript, 2006.

304^ The local Russian commanders in Abkhazia “don’t like Shevardnadze and they are defending their sanatoria in Abkhazia. The war will go on until either Shevardnadze or Ardzinba joins Russia in some form or other. The generals have lost too much with the break-up of the USSR. Where there is hope, they will try to regain it” in Aleksei Zverev, “Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus 1988-1994.”

305^ Dov Lynch, The Conflict in Abkhazia: Dilemmas in Russian “Peacekeeping” Policy (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998), 16–17.

306^ For a detailed analysis of Russian military bases in Georgia, see David Darchiashvili, “The Russian Military Presence in Georgia: The Parties’ Attitudes and Prospects,” Caucasian Regional Studies 2, no. 1 (1997).

307^ Major Events and Trends in Politics, Economy and Social Life, The Georgian Chronicle, Monthly Bulletin (The Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, February 1993).

308^ Georgi Derluguian, “Abkhazia: A Broken Paradise,” in Sarai Reader 07: Frontiers (New Dehli: Impress, 2007), 77.

309^ UNSG, Report of the Secretary-General’s Fact-Finding Mission to Investigate Human Rights Violations in Abkhazia, Georgia (United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, November 17, 1993), 12.

310^ UNSG, Resolution 893 (United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, December 22, 1993).

311^ Official budget of Abkhazia was 287 million in 2012, from this approximately 65 million USD (22%) was direct budget support from Russia, 144 million USD (49%) was financed by infrastructure development pograms finded by Russia. Only 28 % of budget was Abkhazia’s own budget revenues. Apsnypress, “Kabinet Ministra RA Utverdil Otchot Ob Ispolnenni Gosudarsvennogo Budzeta Pespubliki Abzhazii Za 2011 Gog [Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of RA Approved the State Budget for 2011],” March 8, 2012, http://apsnypress.info/news/5652.html.

312^ Apsnypress, “Gosudartvennii Budget Abkhazii Na 2013 God Po Doxodam I Po Rasxodam Sostavlaet 7 046 556,1 Tisac Rublei [Abkhazia’s State Budget for 2013 rRevenue and Expenditure Is 7046 566 100 Rubles],” July 16, 2013, http://apsnypress.info/news/9557.html.

313^ The International Crisis Group, Abkhazia: The Long Road to Reconciliation (Brussels, April 10, 2013), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/caucasus/georgia/224-abkhazia-the-long-road-to-reconciliation.pdf.

314^ Phil Champain, Diana Klein and Natalia Mirimanova eds., From War Economies to Peace Economis in the South Caucasus, 144.

315^ The Georgian Ministry of Finance stated that “smuggled petroleum enters the country mostly from South Ossetia (Ergneti), Abkhazia, and Azerbaijan (from Krasny Most, Lagodekhi and Jandara). The Ministry of Finance calculates that around 5,000 tons of petroleum enter illegally from Ergneti market every month, equal to 6% of the total consumption and 12% of smuggled fuel. Most of it is brought in by train or unregistered vehicles. Petroleum is imported by ship from Russia to Abkhazia, from where it is transported across the River Inguri into Georgia. According to the State Department of Secret Services, gasoline is also shipped in railway tankers belonging to the Russian peacekeeping forces. Petrol and diesel are also brought in by rail and sea through Sukhumi and Ochamchira. Overall, Abkhazia imports more than 8,000 tons from the Russian Federation each month, the majority intended for resale in Georgia. The trade in petroleum products from Turkey adds an additional 1,000 tons to the monthly total” in ibid., 137.

316^ For further details about the activies of military groups in Dodge Billingsley, “Security Deteriorates Along the Abkhazia–Georgia Ceasefire Line,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 13, no. 9 (2001).

317^ Leila Tania, “Public Opinion and the Georgian-Abkhazian Peace Process,” Perspectives 4 (2002).

318^ Nana Khubutia, Western Georgia Blighted by Crime Wave. Smugglers and Armed Gangs Flourishing in the Border Zone between Western Georgia and Abkhazia (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, February 27, 2003), http://iwpr.net/report-news/western-georgia-blighted-crime-wave.

319^ Alexandre Kukhianidze, Alexandre Kupatadze and Roman Gotsiridze, Smuggling Through Abkhazia and Tshkinvali Region of Georgia (Tbilisi: American University’s Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) Georgia Office, 2004), 24, http://www.alexanderkupatadze.com/resources/Smuggling_Georgia_eng.pdf.

320^ “Police Operation Held in Kodori,” Civil Georgia, July 25, 2006, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13162.

321^ Alexandre Kukhianidze, Alexandre Kupatadze and, and Roman Gotsiridze, Smuggling Through Abkhazia and Tshkinvali Region of Georgia, 28.

322^ Almost 50,000 Georgians were forced to leave their homes and flee from the Gali region, resulting in the death of several dozen partisans. Despite these casualties, some influential politicians, including Zurab Zhvania (a chairman of parliament), supported the mobilization of all forces and military confrontation in Abkhazia. Shevardnadze decided to wage another war. For a detailed analysis of this episode see Petre Mamradze, Absurduli Omi, Romelic Ar Unda Momkhdariko [Absurd War], 19–21.

323^ Civil Georgia, “Conflicting Reports Prevail over Ongoing Kodori Operation,” July 26, 2006, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13166.

324^ Natella Akaba and Iraklii Khintba, Transformation of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict: Rethinking the Paradigm (London: Conciliation Resources, 2011), 26–27, http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/Abkhaz%20Perspective_Transformaton%20of%20Georgian:Abkhaz%20Conflict_201102_ENG.pdf.

325^ United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, Report of UNOMIG on the Incident of April 20 Involving the Downing of a Georgian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Over the Zone of Conflict, April 20, 2008, http://globe.blogs.nouvelobs.com/media/01/02/cf530afbef0fb6f305824428f6c83509.pdf.

326^ In accordance to the Russian sources number of Russian troops composed 2, 500 soldiers, while the Ministry of Interior of Georgia stated that the number of Russian troops exceeded 4 000, See: Parliamentary Temporary Commission on Investigation of the Military Aggression and the Acts of Russian Against the Territorial Integrity of Georgia, Parliament of Georgia, Parliamentary Temporary Commission on Investigation of the Military Aggression and the Acts of Russian Against the Territorial Integrity of Georgia, n.d., http://www.parliament.ge/files/1329_22127_506571_Conclusion_E.pdf.

327^ “U.S. Calls on Russia to Reconsider Abkhaz Moves,” Civil Georgia, May 1, 2008, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17732; “Rice Concerned over Increase in Russian Troops in Abkhazia,” Civil Georgia, May 1, 2008, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17743.

328^ NATO, NATO Secretary General’s Statement on the Deployment of Russian Railway Troops into Georgia, Press Release, June 3, 2008, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-076e.html.

329^ Russia Warns Georgia Could Use Force against Abkhazai, South Ossetia, Ria Novosti, 25 April 2008, avaliable at: http://en.ria.ru/world/20080425/105945463.html

330^ “Saqartvelo Rusetis Qmedebas Mtrul Nabijad Apasebs [Georgia Assesses Russia’s Actions as a Hostile Step],” Rustavi 2, June 1, 2008, http://www.rustavi2.com/news/includesG/get_news_print.php?id_news=26513&ct=1.

331^ International Crisis Group, Georgia and Russia: Clashing over Abkhazia, June 5, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/193_georgia_and_russia_clashing_over_abkhazia.ashx.

332^ Interview with Sergei Bagapsh, El Pais, 7 May 2008ibid.

333^ “Saakashvili Outlines Tbilisi’s Abkhaz Initiatives,” Civil Georgia, March 28, 2008, http://www.civil.ge/eng/_print.php?id=17473.

334^ “Rukovodstvo Abkhazii Otnositsja K Novomu Predlozheniu Gruzii, Kak K Propagande Nakanune Sammita NATO [The Abkhaz Leaders Treat the New Georgian Iniciative as Propaganda on the Eve of the NATO Summit],” Interfax, March 29, 2008, http://www.interfax.ru/world/322551.

335^ For militarization and deployment of Russian troops in Abkhazia see Illarionov, Andrei: The Russian Leadership’s Preparation for War, 1999-2008, chapter 4, in Cornell, E. Svante and Starr Frederick (2009): The Guns of August 2008 Russia’s War in Georgia, New York, London: M.E. Sharpe, p.49-84.

336^ Mark John, “Georgia Offers NATO Troops for Afganistan,” Reuters, March 31, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/03/31/us-nato-georgia-afghanistan-idUSL3189194620080331.

337^ Georgia respond was diplomatic by bringing attention of international actors on Russia’s “creeping annexation” of Georgian territory. “The reality is that August 2008 war was neither provoked not a product of miscalculation. It was initiated and waged by Russia for well-articulated geopolitical reasons. Georgia behaved diplomatically – perhaps too long”. See in David J. Smith, “The Saakashvili Administration’s Reaction to Russian Policies Before the 2008 War,” in The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia, Svante E. Cornell, Svante and Frederick S. Starr eds. (ME Sharpe, 2009), 142.

338^ Alexander Cooley and Lincoln A. Mitchell, “Engagement without Recognition: A New Strategy toward Abkhazia and Eurasia’s Unrecognized States,” The Washington Quarterly 33, no. 4 (2010): 62, doi:10.1080/0163660X.2010.516183.

339^ International Crisis Group, Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence, February 26, 2012, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/202_abkhazia___deepening_dependence.ashx.

340^ Moscow and Sukhumi agreed to establish a Russian military base in Abkhazia. It is very hard to verify the actual number, but according to offical statements, Gudauta base accommodates 3,800 Russian troops. Russian military also serves on the border with Georgia, and there is a Russian Black Sea fleet.

341^ John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gerard Toal (Gearóid Tuathail), “Inside Abkhazia: Survey of Attitudes in a De Facto State,” Post-Soviet Affairs 27, no. 1 (2011): 1–36, doi:10.2747/1060-586X.27.1.1.

342^ Goverment of Georgia, “Saqartvelos Kanoni Okupirebuli Teritoriebis Shesakheb [The Law on the Occupied Territories],” October 23, 2008, http://www.smr.gov.ge/docs/doc215.pdf.

343^ “Interview with Mikheil Saakashvili,” Vlast’, March 1, 2010, No 8(861) edition.

344^ Saqartvelos Mtavroba, “Chartulobis Strategiis Samoqmedo Gegma [Action Plan for Engagement],” n.d., http://www.government.gov.ge/files/224_31227_382248_action_plan_ge.pdf.

345^ Goverment of Georgia, “Sakhelmcipo Strategie Okupirebuli Teritoriebis Mimart: Chartuloba Tanamshromlobi Gzit [State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement Through Cooperation],” n.d., http://www.government.gov.ge/files/224_31227_132584_SMR-Strategy-ge(1).pdf.

346^ Archil Gegeshidze and Ivlian Haindrava, Transformation of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict: Rethinking the Paradigm, 2011, 38, http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/Georgian%20Perspective_Transformation%20of%20Georgian:Abkhaz%20Conflict_201102_ENG.pdf.

347^ In accordance to Sokrat Jinjolia, former Prime Minister and foreing minister of Abkhazia „Georgia's policy towards Abkhazia, supported by Western countries, all European institutions and the U.S. aims to eventually convince us to return to Georgia, which of course is impossible. They say: "Russia will reconsider its decision and cancel it. And what are going to do then? It is better to return to Georgia by your indepdentent decsion.“ But they must understand that it is impossible“

348^ “Strategicheskoe Partnerstvo Abkhazii i Rosii Budet Ukreplatsja [Strategic Partnership Between Abkhazia and Russia Will be Strengthened],” Apsnypress, August 25, 2012, http://apsnypress.info/news/7063.html.

349^ The latest data released by the EU Neighbourhood Barometer for Georgia, conducted in November-December 2012, found that the vast majority of Georgians support a greater role within the EU. According to the survey, 71% of Georgians consider the EU an important partner, with 62% believing that the EU and Georgia share common values to deepen mutual cooperation. The Georgian population supports economic development (92%), trade (87%), human rights (87%), democracy (85%), and regional cooperation (83%) with the EU. Most important, 71% of Georgians trust the EU more than their own government (65%), their parliament (62%), or their political parties (46%), see in EU Neighbourhood Barometer, Autumn 2012, http://euneighbourhood.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/FactsheetENPI_wave2-GE-EN1.pdf.

350^ In his speech to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in Strasbourg on April 13, 2013, former Prime Minister Ivanishvili appealed to Europe for support in building good relations with Russia. On the one hand, Ivanishvili reiterated that a “western policy course and integration into EU and NATO represent our [Georgia’s] strategic choice that has no alternative. This choice does not belong to any particular political groups; this choice was made by Georgian people long ago,” see in: Goverment of Georgia, Adesss of the Prime Minister of Georgia H.E. Bidzina Ivanishvili to the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe, Govermnet of Georgia, Prime Minister’s Press Service, April 2013, http://government.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=270&info_id=36672.

351^ Ekaterine Metreveli et al., State Approaches to National Integration in Georgia Two Perspectives, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program (Washington, D.C: A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center, 2009), 8, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/silkroadpapers/0902Georgia-integration.pdf.