Masaryk university

5.3Case Study: Abkhazian-Georgian Conflict

The armed conflict between Abkhazians and Georgians is sometimes referred to as a “forgotten conflict.”²⁷⁰ The tensions between Georgians and Abkhazians, which escalated to a full-scale war in 1992-1993, have never been resolved; instead, they were intensified after the Russian-Georgian armed conflict of August 2008. The Abkhazians’ struggle for independence contradicts the territorial integrity of the Georgian state, having resulted in mutual mistrust, exclusive strategic goals, and an unresolved status of this conflict. This situation complicates the prospects for building stability and peace in the region. Detailed analyses of the origins of armed confrontation illuminate the explosive nature of this conflict, which can spark violence again in the future.

The Georgia-Abkhazian conflict is complex and requires detailed analysis of the nature of this conflict. It is not an easy task to measure the extent to which the armed conflicts in the South Caucasus are about ethnicity, weak statehood, or the result of the decisions of external powers. However, as revealed in this case study, the eruption of violence among these Caucasian people should be seen “as the result of failed institutional regulations, rather than inborn qualities or geopolitical factor.”²⁷¹

The debate about the causes of this conflict is subject to research among regional scholars. This conflict is often referred to as an “ethnic conflict”; however, as an in-depth analysis of the issues at stake unfolds in this chapter, it becomes clear that it is very hard to find the evidence for such conclusions (ethnic cleansing was not the primary objective of the conflict parties). Trying to explain the armed conflict in Abkhazia, the majority of regional authors emphasize the role of history in order to justify the claims of particular conflict parties, the protection of rights of ethnic minorities within Georgia, and the role Russia played in all of this.²⁷² This dissertation, however, argues that the modern development in this conflict could be explained by ethnic hatreds going back to medieval times.

This chapter addresses one of the bloodiest conflicts in Georgia – the armed conflict in Abkhazia. The goal is to uncover the characteristic features of the ongoing processes and to conduct a systemic analysis of each phase of the conflict. The subject of analysis is to uncover factors that formulated the attitudes of conflict parties toward each other, conceptualization of this armed conflict by Georgian administration and Abkhazian political elites, as well as changes in the paradigm²⁷³ transformation and shifts in policy formulation. This chapter offers a comparative analysis of three phases in the Georgian-Abkhazian armed conflict: phase A (1988-1992) addresses the factors that led to phase B (1992-1993), the armed conflict. This will be compared to phase C (August 2008). The period between the second and the third phase can be divided into several phases of de-escalation and escalation. Yet, for the analytical purpose of this study, this phase is examined as one whole because of the fact that there was no change in status quo – conflict resolution efforts were ineffective; there was no full-scale war.

5.3.1Phase A: Latent Conflict Between Georgians and Abkhazians

After Georgia regained its independence in 1918, there was a struggle between different forces in Abkhazia: supporters of North Caucasian peoples, supporters of the Turkish invasion, pro-Russian Bolsheviks, and pro-Georgian Menshevik forces.²⁷⁴ In November 1917, the Abkhaz People’s Council took place, which was originally in line with the interest of pro-Georgian supporters. At that time, Abkhazia gained autonomy. However, this status was abandoned soon after disloyalty of Abkhaz People’s Council to Georgian government in Tbilisi. This initiated a series of struggles that lasted until 1921, when the Red Army invaded Georgia.

Between 1921 and 1931, the relationship between Georgia and Abkhazia was regulated by special treaty, according to which Abkhazia gave a piece of “sovereignty” to Georgia. In 1931, Abkhazia became fully subordinated to Georgia since its status was reduced to Autonomous Republic. “In February 1931 the VI Congress of the Abkhaz Soviets approved the decision of the Central Executive Committee to transform the ‘treaty Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia’ into the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (AbASSR) within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (GSSR), still at that time part of the broader Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (TSFSR), with the relevant changes made to the Abkhaz Constitution.”²⁷⁵ This action became lodged in the collective consciousness of the Abkhaz as an injustice towards their people, perpetrated first and foremost by ‘Stalin the Georgian’. Abkhazians had their own state structures that were subordinated to the Georgian union republic, which in turn was subordinated to the Kremlin.

Unsatisfied with their position,²⁷⁶Abkhazians organized strikes and demonstrations in order to upgrade their status. The public’s dissatisfaction was unambiguously restrained in 1931, 1957, 1965, 1967, and 1978. Demonstrations took place in Sukhumi, Gudauta, and Gagra. The demands of Abkhazians were to gain the status of autonomous Soviet republic incorporated into the Soviet Union, which meant separation from Georgia. Abkhazian discourse indicates that subordination to Georgia was perceived as political discrimination, which paved the way to “Kartvelization” (Georgianization) and “colonization” of Abkhazia.²⁷⁷

One of the features of this policy was perceived by Abkhazians as a demographic imbalance in favor of Georgians. According to the last official census conducted in the Soviet Union, Abkhazians constituted only 18% of the population in Abkhazia. There was concern about the growing number of Georgians over the past century (see Figure 4).

Figure Demographic Changes in Abkhazian ASSR.

Source: Bruno Coppieters et al., A Question of Sovereignty: The Georgia–Abkhazia Peace Process (Conciliation Resources, 1999), http://www.c-r.org/accord/georgia%E2%80%93abkhazia.

Available data confirm that the Georgian government did not have an official policy on how to address growing anti-Georgian sentiments in Abkhazia. We cannot find any evidence of discriminating policies towards Abkhazians. While only 18% of the population in this region was made up of Abkhazians, they filled 70% of the positions in government. At the end of 1980s, Abkhazians enjoyed 13 posts out of 12 ministers and 8 deputy ministers. The first secretary of the oblast’s committee was usually Abkhazian and the second secretary Georgian.²⁷⁸ Furthermore, the minister of education was Abkhazian as well as the chairman of the Supreme Court and the Chief Prosecutor. 40% of seats in the Supreme Council were occupied by Abkhazians in 1988.²⁷⁹ In addition, due to the tensions and demonstrations in Gagra, some Georgian officials were dismissed from their posts, as for example the First Secretary of the City Committee, R. Kvantaliani, and G. Nachkebia, both of whom were replaced by ethnic Abkhazians.

The proportion of Abkhazians in high-ranking positions did not correspond with the demographic size of this ethnic group. At that point in time, Abkhazians did not favor the democratization processes in Georgia. They were arguing against core democratic principles that would increase the number of ethnic Georgians and marginalize the position of the Abkhazian minority. In order to avoid confrontation, Zviad Gamsakhurdia proposed a compromise in the form of a new power-sharing rule in the Abkhazian Parliament. According to this proposal, Abkhazians would have 28 seats out of 65 in parliament (26 seats would go to Georgians and 11 to other ethnic minorities) in which any decision on constitutional matters required a two-thirds majority. However, “Abkhaz over-representation in local structures did not diminish their fear of being turned into minority. In their view the threat of extinction could only be avoided through state sovereignty and full control of local states structures.”²⁸⁰

A series of mass demonstration in Tbilisi followed. Georgians pointed out the underprivileged position of Georgians in Abkhazia. The Georgian nationalist movement, supported by the masses, required the Communist government to “stop carrying out a policy of silence and deafness with regard to the existing anti-Georgian campaign in Abkhazia and to give a quick and relevant answer to the separatist call adopted on 18 March in the village of Lykhny, which ignores the desire of the majority of its native population.”²⁸¹ Calls for independence increased the number of demonstrators to 100,000 in April 1989. After the tragic events on April 9, when Soviet rule definitively lost its legitimacy in the eyes of the Georgian population, Zviad Gamsakhurdia became one the most influential leaders of the national movement, and his policies to attain liberation have been the subject of debate among local intellectuals.

The first phase of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict could be marked by the emergence of separatist movements in Abkhazia. Among them were “Aydgylara” and “Slavianski dom” with strong anti-Georgian ideologies.²⁸² The open manifest of Abkhazians declaring to secede from Georgia was a major issue at stake from 1988 to 1992. In this spirit, a mass rally was held that gathered 30,000 people. The “Lykhny letter,” which was sent to the Kremlin, stated the aspiration of Abkhazians to return their region to its pre-1931 status.

After multiple appeals to Moscow, Aydgylara established contacts with the Assembly of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, which was formed at the First Congress of the Peoples of the Caucasus in August 1989. Militants from Adygeyan, the Karachayevo-Cherkessian, Kabardino-Balkarian, Chechen-Ingush autonomous districts, and Abkhazia composed the Assembly and aimed at political transformation in this region. The Assembly, which was renamed Confederation of Mountain People of the Caucasus, supported Abkhazians in their struggle against Georgia.²⁸³ During the armed conflict in Abkhazia up to 1,000 volunteers from the North Caucasus took part in the military confrontation in Gagra, which led to the defeat of the Georgian troops.²⁸⁴

First armed clashes between Georgian and Abkhazians, which resulted in 14 dead and over 200 injured, took place on 15 and 16 July 1989 in Sukhumi. The reason for the outbreak of violence was the opening of branch offices of Tbilisi State University in Sukhumi, a decision made by the republican government on 14 May. Several thousand people took part in the rally at Sukhumi, organized by the Abkhazian nationalist movement Aydgylara, which declared its negative position towards such a development. During 15 and 16 July, the situation worsened dramatically, ultimately resulting in fights during which stones, knives, batons, and even firearms were used. During these clashes, 9 Georgians and Abkhazians were reported dead, and 5,137 people were hospitalized, 15 of them in serious condition.

5.3.1.1Issues at Stake: Clashes Between Abkhazian and Georgian National Agendas

It is significant to emphasize that the emerging national movement in Tbilisi was not united, but divided between “radical” and “moderate” wings, which had different visions about the way in which independence was to be achieved. The radicals “were lead by former political prisoners and joined by young enthusiasts. They thought in moral rather than political terms, and these morals were based on the simple and clear values of Gulag life. There were ‘us’ and ‘them’ and the line dividing the two sides was sacrosanct,”²⁸⁵ writes Ghia Nodia.

To gain mass support and seize the power in Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia used the issue of ethnicity instrumentally. The political vocabulary used by Gamsakhurdia treated ethnic minorities as “guests” – a label that put the loyalty of ethnic groups under question and was alarming in the context of rising tensions among Georgians and Abkhazians. On the one hand, political discourse contributed to the gradual ethnization and radicalization. On the other hand, it strengthened the attitude that it would have negative impact to be part of the Soviet Union, which might lead to “Russification” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. “As for the question of Abkhazia joining the R.S.F.S.R., it can be evaluated as the logical result of the seditious policy conducted by certain political, clerical and other forces, first of czarist and then of Soviet Russia, to alienate Abkhazia from Georgia, eliminate the Georgian language and Georgian culture from Abkhazia, and introduce the Russian language and Russian culture into the Abkhazian milieu (which was achieved).”²⁸⁶

One of the key issues at stake, which is significant, but under-studied due to the lack of official data from this period, is economy and its influence on the escalation processes of the Georgian-Abkhazian confrontation. Official statistics show that the industrial development in Abkhazia and its employment rate were lower than in other parts of Georgia.²⁸⁷ However, in reality the opposite was true. The living standard of people in Abkhazia was significantly higher than in the rest of Georgia. This discrepancy can be explained with the fact that economic activities in Abkhazia were mostly illegal.

Access to the Black Sea, tourism, and a monopoly on the distribution of citrus fruits, tea, and flowers (mimosa) to non-state markets helped accumulate a lot of wealth in this region. “The blossoming of corruption and the ‘shadow’ economy in the 1980s created a peculiar quasi-market mentality among the political elite who took high profits from the natural rent for granted.”²⁸⁸ This region was strategically and economically one of the most significant regions in Georgia. The calls for independence stemming from Georgia’s nationalist movement might have been interpreted as a threat to already established illegal economic activities between Sukhumi and Moscow. Preservation of good relationships with Moscow promised more profits for leaders in Abkhazia than separation and paying taxes across the border. It is not my claim that economic incentives were the key issue at stake that caused the armed conflicts in Abkhazia, but we can argue that untaxed and illegal activities facilitated the eruption of the conflict.

Lack of analysis and wise policy of Georgian political elites (which were fragmented and lacked unity and control over the escalation of tensions) led to the bloody and nasty conflict among Georgians and Abkhazians. The role of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia, its Georgian faction, and the National Unity Council was significant. The Georgian faction, for instance, started to boycott parliamentary sessions. It formed a parallel government, the National Unity Council, which had its own (illegal) armed units, the Mkhedrioni. For the opposite side, Tengiz Kitovani led the National Guard units. The National Unity Council was against Gamsakhurdia, while the National Guard was initially loyal to the first president of Georgia. To sum up, at this time, Georgia was fragmented not between pro-communist and pro-independence ideology supporters, but between pro- and anti–Zviad Gamsakhurdia forces.

Important decisions in Abkhazia were made by local representatives of the leaders of the “Round Table” coalition, Aydgilara and Vladislav Ardzinba (chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia). However, as Napo Meskhia, one of the members of the Georgian faction, recalls in his memoires, the biggest problem was to establish trustful cooperation with the center in Tbilisi. The major challenge was that the State Council of Georgia perceived the members of the Georgian faction of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia as “Zviadists” – supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia.²⁸⁹

Crises of legitimacy, political fragmentation, different perceptions on how to acquire independent statehood were accompanied by the inability to handle the situation in two regions: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. During the process of consolidation of oppositional force in Georgia, the leading political coalition “Round Table – Independent Georgia” fell apart, Gamsakhurdia escaped to Samegrelo, and the National Guard turned out to be in opposition of the president as well. The country was drawn into civil war, which led the country to the edge of collapse. Under such conditions of lacking authority, unpunished illegal activities flourished across the country. The port in Poti and railways were blocked. Transit goods from Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan were robbed frequently, and instances of human kidnapping increased. In the first half of 1992 alone, there were 1,142 occasions of attacks and explosions.²⁹⁰

According to Eduard Shevardnadze, Georgia’s second president, war in Abkhazia was planned and went through three major stages. During the first stage, stereotypes and “enemy” images were created that instilled arguments about historical injustices in regards to ethnic groups. These were used to manipulate the national consciousness in Abkhazia. Appeals of Abkhazian nationalists when addressing Russia for help against Georgia intentionally hid the fact that during the Caucasian wars, the Czarist Russian administration exiled thousands of Abkhazians to Turkey and proclaimed that Abkhazians were a “guilty nation.” At the second stage, pseudo-arguments were prepared to legitimate the secession of Abkhazia from Georgia. Laws and documents were created to implement this step. The final step was the material-technical, organizational, military-political preparation of propaganda for a direct military confrontation.²⁹¹

The first period of the Georgian-Abkhazian armed conflict is characterized by a manifestation of issues at stake, which causes occasional outbreaks of violent events. It starts with the Lyhkny declaration in 1989 and ends with the hot stage in 1992. Escalation of tensions between Georgians and Abkhazians started over status, accompanied by a political struggle for independence. It is possible to conclude that the armed conflict in Abkhazia is the result of an escalation of political tensions in Tbilisi and Sukhumi. The civil war and the instability in the Samegrelo region only contributed to a transformation of the conflict into its armed form. Both Georgians and Abkhazians applied ethnic mobilization in order to bolster public support for full independence and to legitimize their right for independent statehood. A new coalition of democratic forces, which removed the communist government in Georgia, was unable to control paramilitary groupings and soon found itself in a crisis of legitimacy. This situation led to an escalation of tensions and eventually to a full-scale war in 1992-1993.

5.3.1.2Manifestation of an Issue at Stake: Clashes Over Status

The primary goal of the Aidgylara National Forum was political: the secession from Georgia and a change of status to Union republic in order to be a part of the (revised) Soviet Union. As mentioned above, the Lykhny letter in 1989 was sent to Moscow at the suggestion of Aidgylara. The Georgian side abolished the “Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Abkhaz Soviet Socialist Republic” in 1990. In February 1992, when the Georgian Military Council restored the Georgian Constitution, Abkhazian deputies argued that it ignored the question of Abkhazia. In reality, however, the autonomous status of Abkhazia was part of the Constitution.²⁹² But the major issue at stake for Abkhazian deputies was to achieve new status, which would be equal to the Georgian status.

Aspirations of the Abkhazian national movement were regarded as a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia. The Georgian government treated decisions made by Abkhazian colleagues as illegitimate. The Georgian political establishment did not treat Abkhazia as a separate nation. As Gamsakhurdia claimed in a meeting on 5 April 1989, “The Abkhaz nation has never existed... They struggle with Georgians and with Georgia in order to become Russified.”²⁹³ Additionally, the over-representation of Abkhazians in the regional decision-making organizations discriminated against Georgians. And the Abkhazian nationalist movement was a fifth column supported by Russia in order to punish Georgia for wanting to create a sovereign state.²⁹⁴

Abkhazian and Georgian national projects to attain new status contradicted each other and took diametrically opposed forms during the all-Union referendum in March 1991. The union republic for Abkhazia and independence for Georgia marked the beginning of “war of laws” between Abkhazia and Georgia. Table 3 below illustrates the legislative struggle between conflict parties, which increased in scale after the overthrow of the first president of Georgia.

The “war of laws” describes the first tensions between Abkhazians and Georgians. If a decision was adopted by one side of the conflict, it was automatically a matter for contradiction and was followed by rejection by the other conflict party. For example, the decision of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia to adopt the declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Republic, which declared a “sovereign socialist state having all the power of authority on its territory except the rights voluntarily delegated by it to the USSR and Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic by the previous agreements,”²⁹⁵ was annulled by Georgia.

As demonstrated above, the civil war in Georgia between pro- and anti-Gamsakhurdia forces and the fact that Georgian deputies left the Supreme Council of Abkhazia in order to establish another government gave Abkhazian deputies an opportunity to make a series of decision about the status of Abkhazia. The most significant decree justified the status of Abkhazia as follows: “the Republic of Abkhazia enjoys sovereignty, has it state borders, independently decides issue related to the administrative-territorial settlement, performs the measures on its territory aimed at strengthening of the territorial integrity.”²⁹⁶

Table The “War of Laws”: The Spiral of Escalation in the Armed Conflict in Abkhazia







Céline Francis, Conflict Resolution and Status: The Case of Georgia and Abkhazia (1989-2008) (Asp / Vubpress / Upa, 2011), 77–82.

5.3.2Phase B: The Logic of Violence in the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict

The Georgian-Abkhazian conflict became a military operation on 14 August 1992. “Gangs, hundreds armed people, numerous cases of kidnapping of leaders and regular citizens, destroyed bridges, highways, looted buildings etc. This course of action could not be tolerated and there was a need of action. Measures had to be used against terrorist and bandits and at that point there had been no other power than military force. The police by then could not solve any serious problems,” recalled Eduard Shevardnadze two years later.²⁹⁷ What was intended to be a police operation turned to an armed conflict with political goals.

Shevarnadze, the chairman of the State Council of Georgia at the time, claims that an agreement was reached with Vladislav Ardzinba (the chairman of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia) that Tbilisi would send troops in order to establish order at Ingiri-Sochi Railway. However, fire was opened between Georgian and Abkhazian paramilitary groups at the Ochamcire and Gali border, on the outskirts of the village of Okhureis. In his televised speech on August 14, Ardzinba emphasized that by sending troops to Abkhazia, Georgian leaders demonstrated their real attitude towards Abkhazia. He called on every person to protect Abkhazia: “... in these difficult times, I appeal to every citizen, no matter what nationality he is, defend Abkhazia.”²⁹⁸ From the beginning, Ardzinba interpreted the deployment of Georgian troops “as a real threat against sovereignty of the Republic of Abkhazia and its population.”²⁹⁹

The war changed the relationship between the two conflict parties. As noted by Yuri Anchabadze, “the antagonism of political elites having transferred to the level of mass consciousness could not but cause a growing feeling of ethnic resentment. That resentment, exacerbated by the losses and casualties of war, led to the deepening of negative emotions and turned them into a mutual phobia when everything to do with the other ethnic group was perceived as hostile, hateful, devoid of any moral and ethnical norms and, therefore, subject to destruction and annihilation.”³⁰⁰

It is hard to pinpoint an exact strategy by the Georgian leadership. It can be argued that a “small victorious war” in Abkhazia would have strengthened the popularity of the political elites that seized the power after the coup of Gamsakhurdia.³⁰¹ However, the Georgian troops did not have any strategy how to achieve this goal. “The Georgian leadership, then, ordered the military adventure in Abkhazia while being in a state of civil war against Zviadists, while knowing that Russian military would intervene as they had just done weeks earlier in Tskhinvali, while knowing that they would not control the mountainous part of Abkhazia and therefore face a guerilla war and all this without having a proper army.”³⁰²

The Abkhaz side was supported by volunteers from the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus and the Russian Ministry of Defense. Through this support, the Abkhaz people were able to shift the balance of power in their favor and take control over Gagra and northern Abkhazia by the end of 1992. The battle in Gagra on 24 August demonstrated disorder, a lack of united command, and insufficiency of Georgian troops. “The Georgian forces: uncoordinated formations, hastily completed, absence of a united command. The forces are insufficient and they are not trained to break deep lines of defence and to fight an urban battle. Today we do not have superiority in forces or in means,”³⁰³ wrote Levan Sharashenidze, the former Georgian Minister of Defense in a letter to Eduard Shevardnadze. This battle determined the major military offensive against Sukhumi in March 1993. After that, an already difficult political situation between Tbilisi and Sukhumi was destabilized even further to the extent that Abkhazia demanded separation from Georgia.

Despite the fact that Georgian authorities believed that the armed conflict in Abkhazia was a result of the “divide and rule” politics of the Kremlin, closer investigation of this conflict reveals that internal problems actually caused the escalation of tensions. When the conflict in Abkhazia started, the political elites in Russia were not united and there was a power struggle between President Boris Yeltsin, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev, and the Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev. While the first one had good relations with Shevaradnadze and supported him, the second one supported Abkhazians.³⁰⁴ Indeed, it was not of primary concern to the Ministry of Defense of Russia to defend Abkhazia and its interests, but the conflict was perceived as a way to keep Georgia under Russian control.³⁰⁵

Russian military support to Abkhazians became evident when Abkhaz troops acquired sophisticated heavy weapons, T-72 and T-80 tanks, Su-25 and Su-27 aircrafts, artillery, and a Grad rocket system. The armed conflict in Abkhazia enabled Russian forces to keep a physical presence on this territory, at the pretext of maintaining security in Georgia. Most of the bases were stationed in strategically important locations, like the military base in Vaziani, Gudauta Batumi, and Akhalkalaki.³⁰⁶ As it was the case in the armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Russians supported both sides of the conflict. While the Ministry of Defense of Russia supplied Abkhazians with heavy military force, it supported Georgia as well. In the biggest offensive in Sukhumi, Abkhazians attacked Georgian positions by Su-25 and Su-27. At the same time, Georgian troops received arms from Russia as well.³⁰⁷

During this phase of the conflict, Russia can hardly be described as a unified actor with long-term objectives. However, “the acts of Moscow were guided by a secret genius enforcing a devilishly complicated plan, or deduce less hyperbolically that the events followed an inherently chaotic trajectory consisting of myriad contradictory acts and motivations that in the end benefited Moscow as still the most powerful player on the field.”³⁰⁸

After the fall of Sukhumi in September 1993, a massive displacement of the Georgian population took place. The conflict parties accused each other of ethnic genocide; however, as stated by the UN fact-finding mission, it is hard to find any evidence of ethnic cleansing. The forced displacement of over 250,000 people was not “to ascertain whether it [the massive displacement of population] had been an actively pursued policy of the authorities of either side, at any time, to clear the areas under their control of either the Abkhazian or the Georgian population.”³⁰⁹

The military confrontation brought no change in contested issues at stake over the status of Abkhazia. In 1992, Shevardnadze was “prepared to consider only defining the legal status of the Abkhazian autonomous region.”³¹⁰ Peace negotiations took place in Geneva in November 1993 with the UN, Russia, and the CSCE facilitators. The Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz Conflict was signed on 4 April 1994. Agreement on a ceasefire and separation of forces was approved on 14 May of the same year, which was annulled and replaced by the six-point agreement signed by Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008.

5.3.2.1Economic Issues and Sporadic Violence

The ceasefire agreement did not bring a resolution to the issue at stake, the political status of this region. Furthermore, the conflict established conditions under which the resolution of the conflict was not a priority for involved actors. Characteristic features within Abkhazia are corrupted elites, lack of transparency, an underdeveloped party system with no long-term reform strategy, large-scale shadow economy, and weak institutions. Since the ceasefire agreement in 1993, Abkhazia has been under isolation and economic sanctions, which has a negative impact on the development in this region. This situation has considerably increased the dependence of Abkhazia on Russia as its only ally and contributed to the growth of illegal economic activities across the region.

Russian financial aid to Abkhazia has now reached 67 million USD per year, which is 22% of Abkhazia’s 287 million USD budget.³¹¹ Russia has allocated an additional 163 million USD in 2013 as a comprehensive aid plan to Abkhazia, which composes 70% of the overall budget of Abkhazia.³¹² The majority of pensions in Abkhazia are paid for by the Russian Federation (according to the Crisis Group, this amounted almost 70 million USD in 2013).³¹³

Illegal economic activities have been common in the break-away region of Abkhazia. There are several places in Abkhazia that allow for illegal border crossings: 1. the Psou River. 2. the Black Sea ports Sukhumi, Ochanmchira, Gagra, and Gudauta and 3. the Engurin River in Gali and Zugdidi districts (Appendix C). The major route for contraband runs along the Enguri River from the Black Sea to the village of Djvari. The central bridge over this river has various “secret” passages, which have served the purpose of moving illegal goods in different directions. Non-ferrous metals and illegal cigarettes that reached Sukhumi on foreign ships (mostly from Turkey and Russia) were transported to Zugdidi and distributed throughout Georgia. Abkhazians smuggle goods to Russia too. In Georgia, high-ranking officials and the police of the Samegrelo region lobbied for the smuggling activities in Abkhazia. According to experts, both Georgian guerrillas and Abkhazian criminals were engaged in criminal activities. It is worth noting that despite different ethnic affiliations between the criminal circles, the different conflict parties found a “a common language” and achieved full agreement in their activities.

However, these mutually profitable economic relations have not contributed to a political solution of the armed conflict. Due to these economic activities being mostly illegal, the post-conflict chaos in this region has only been enhanced. One of the major reasons for the budget deficit in Georgia were lost revenues from petroleum goods, corruption, and unrealized taxes. The black market of tobacco products encompassed 75% of all trade with cigarettes without taxation in Georgia. Illegal trade with timber and scrap metals, kidnapping and human trafficking, as well as the drug and weapons trade have reached an alarming point.

Available data show that specific economic activities in Abkhazia are taking place in specific regions. Criminal groups from western Abkhazia control the smuggling of tobacco, fuel, and food products into Georgia and drugs to Russia. An Armenian group from Gagra contributes to the production of drugs; the drugs, then, are exported by a criminal group from Gudauta. Some criminal groups are controlling Eastern Abkhazia and the main railways routes. Experts have reported that fishing boats, the railway, and vehicles have been used for the transportation of drugs in Abkhazia. “Drugs produced in laboratories in Abkhazia are smuggled in specially constructed secret compartments across the River Psou, which marks the Russian-Abkhaz border. These exports are destined for Krasnoda, Rostov and Volgograd in southern Russia as well as Ukraine and Moldova... Latin American cocaine and heroin from Central Asia are both transported through Abkhazia en route to the Russian and European markets. High-ranking officials in the Russian military figure prominently in the trade, which makes use of Gudauta military airport. The drug route from Russia to Turkey also runs through Abkhazia, using Turkish shipping as its chief means of transport.”³¹⁴

This gray zone in the economy is a source of income to certain people who control illegal activities. However, the more influential illegal economic activities become in a country, the less interested people will become in a political solution of armed conflicts. This puts the economic development and security of the region under question.

According to Georgia’s Ministry of State Security, Abkhazia has control over the most profitable products, including smuggling of oil, petroleum, and cigarettes. Similarly, in South Ossetia, trading with narcotics is one of the most profitable illegal activities.³¹⁵

Figure Mechanism of Smuggling in the Gali and Zugdidi Districts in Georgia.

Source: Alexandre Kukhianidze, Alexandre Kupatadze and, and Roman Gotsiridze, Smuggling Through Abkhazia and Tshkinvali Region of Georgia (Tbilisi: American University’s Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) Georgia Office, 2004), 39.

Criminal activities in in Abkhazia occur for self-enrichment purposes rather than for political reasons. Any effort to resolve the conflict has met with more hostilities by criminal groups, as it happened in May 1998 and January 2001.³¹⁶ The lack of economic development is identified as the key factor hindering the political resolution of the Georgia-Abkhazian conflict. According to a survey in 2002, 42% of Abkhazians believe that any development in Abkhazia is blocked due to the unresolved conflict with Georgia; 26% identified a lack of democratic experience, 21% pinpointed the economic isolation of Abkhazia as a problem, and 21% found that a clan structure existed in conflict zones.³¹⁷

In April 2001, the cooperation between criminal gangs deteriorated security situation in the Gali region. The “Forest Brothers” (a Georgian partisan group) and Abkhazian separatists fought each other due to the contrabanding of tobacco when 2 Georgians were killed and 3 others were captured. The Georgians in return captured 5 Abkhazians. Following this incident, the chief of the regional office of the Security Ministry declared that this type of “business is the main reason for the murders and explosion and unfortunately we have to admit the men in uniform are often mixed up in the smuggling.”³¹⁸

Georgian paramilitary groups – such as the “Forest Brothers” and the “Patriot’s Union” – have played a dual role. On the one hand, they fought against Abkhaz separatism, but on the other hand, they were engaged in criminal activities with Abkhaz criminal groups.³¹⁹ The Kodori-based paramilitary group “Monadire” has also contributed to the escalation of sporadic violent events, as it was the case in 2006 during a “police operation” of the Georgian government in this region.³²⁰

Smuggling and illegal activities have contributed to crime, corruption, and the prolongation of the conflict in Abkhazia. Lack of security and central control created a profitable environment to criminal groups. “Smuggling and protracted conflict are two pillars which help political clans … to control material and coercive resources, limit democracy and keep political power for an indefinite time.”³²¹ This situation deteriorated the relationship between Georgians and Abkhazians and led to a series of sporadic violence. The first crisis started in May 1998 in Gali and was resumed in October 2001 in Kodori Gorge. Both ethnic Abkhazians and Georgian were killed and injured.³²² The second Kodori crisis came when Georgian armed forces entered Kodori Gorge in July 2006, which was perceived as a threat in Sukhumi. The official mission of the Georgian units was to “restore constitutional order” in the Upper Kodori area.³²³ The major goal of the Georgian administration was to relocate the Abkhaz government-in-exile to this region. However, as Abkhaz expert Liana Kvarachelia argues, this did no result in trust building between Tbilisi and Sukhumi; on the contrary, it deteriorated the relationship with the de facto government in Abkhazia.³²⁴

In conclusion, the stalemate in the relationship between Georgians and Abkhazians has not produced a reconciliation or any shift in the perceptions of the conflict parties. Instead, it reinforced Georgia’s claims of territorial integrity and has resulted in a complete deadlock regarding negotiations of Abkhazia’s status. On the one hand, Abkhazia is de jure part of Georgia; on the other hand, Abkhaz leadership had established their own statehood on the basis of pre-war institutions, including legislative and executive bodies. The following table presents the evolution of the contested issue at stake over the status of Abkhazia.

Table Evolution of the Issue at Stake: De facto, De jure and Desired Status of Abkhazia (1989-2008).

Source: Francis, Celine (2011): Conflict Resolution and Status: The Case of Georgia and Abkhazia (1989:2008), VUBPRESS Brussels University Press, p. 100.

5.3.3Phase C: Changing the Paradigm – Backwards Instead of Forwards

The second phase of escalation of the conflict in Abkhazia came in the spring of 2008 when the Georgian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle “Hermes-450” was shot down over the Gadida village in the Gali region by a Russian MIG-29 fighter plane.³²⁵ This incident was also confirmed in a report of the UN Observer Mission in Abkhazia. Russia accused Georgia of mobilization of troops in the Kodori Gorge and increased its number of Russian troops.³²⁶ In addition, new checkpoints were added in the Ochamchire and Tkvarcheli regions and an additional 400 Volgograd railway troops were deployed. Russian troops were preparing platforms to transport military equipment to Abkhazia. These activities were criticized by the US,³²⁷ NATO,³²⁸ and the EU as a violation of the cease-fire agreement in 1994; however, the Russian side argued that it was in line with the “peacekeeping mandate.” On 25 April, Russia’s Ambassador-at-Large Valery Kenyaikin warned that “... if a war is unleashed, we will have to defend our compatriots even through military means. We will use every means to do this; there should be no doubt about this.”³²⁹

These developments were alarming for Georgia. As stated by the Georgian foreign ministry in May 2008, Russia “started to enlarge its military infrastructure in Abkhazia, (Georgia), … to prepare for a large-scale military aggression against Georgia.”³³⁰ According to the International Crisis Group, the increased military presence of Russia in Abkhazia might have “reassured on their physical security but at the same time increased their fears of being swallowed by Russia. Many Abkhaz worry that their national cause is being diluted, and they are reverting to minority status in a larger entity by de facto integration into Russia.”³³¹

It is significant that Abkhazian leader Sergei Bagapsh believed that “Russia is interested in access to the sea, of which our territory offers 240km. That is why Georgia needs to think and recognize us as a neutral and demilitarized country.”³³² The Georgian response at that stage was a new peace plan, which was proposed by Mikheil Saakashvili in March 2008. This initiative offered “unlimited autonomy, wide federalism and very serious representation in the central governmental bodies of Georgia... We offer them (Abkhazia) the position of vice-president of Georgia and we offer them the right to veto all those decisions by the central authorities which concern or will concern their constitutional status, as well as all important preconditions related with the preservation and further development of their culture, language and ethnicity,” stated Saakashvili.³³³ The proposal, however, was rejected by the Abkhazian leadership, as it was perceived as a “part of propaganda ahead of the NATO summit in Bucharest… Saakashvili’s proposals are unacceptable for us and we reject them.”³³⁴

From the low-intensity conflict that started on April 20 to the hot stage in August 2008, the development in Abkhazia could be characterized by militarization of the region.³³⁵ While it is not the purpose of this dissertation to find out who launched offensive and defensive military operations, it is important to keep in mind that on 31 March 2008, Davit Bakradze, Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced that another 350 Georgian soldiers would be send to Afghanistan.³³⁶ The deployment of 2, 000 troops in Iraq was also extended for several months. This is an indication that the Georgian administration was not planning to wage war on its own territory any time soon.³³⁷ The escalation of the Russian-Georgian armed conflict in August 2008 increased the scope of Russian targets beyond the South Ossetian territory. On 9 August, Russia opened the second front in Abkhazia and bombed Kodori Gorge (see Appendix A), where the Abakhazian government-in-exile was located. As a result, more than 2,000 Georgians had to leave their homes. The next day, Russia attacked other Georgian cities in Zugdidi, Senaki, and Gori. In combination with air and ground attacks, Russian battleships blocked the Georgian coast (see Appendix B).

The armed confrontation in August 2008 between Russia and Georgia had an impact on the Georgian-Abkhazian relations and undermined any prospects of security. The Kodor factor, which escalated Georgian-Abkhaz relations in 2006, ceased to be important after the armed conflict in 2008. Russia, Nauru, Nicaragua, and Venezuela recognized Abkhazia as an independent state. After a two-decade long hot stage of the conflict, Abkhazia remained isolated from international norms and rules, while the regional powers competed to monopolize their powers and influence. As argued by Alexander Cooley and Lincoln Mitchell, this “isolation has threatened to turn the South Caucasus into a proxy war.”³³⁸

As indicate in a report by the International Crisis Group, there have been more than 30 so-called bilateral agreements between Moscow and Sukhumi, which deepened the dependency of Abkhazia to Russia in two significant ways:³³⁹ the build-up of the Russian military and the economy in Abkhazia. The military treaty, which was signed in September 2009, granted Russia the right to have military bases in Abkhazia for 49 years, with the possibility of extension for another 15 years.³⁴⁰ The agreement on Joint Measures to Strengthen the Security of the National Borders of the Abkhaz Republic, the Agreement on a Combined Military Base, and the Agreement on Joint Customs Space demonstrate that Abkhazia views cooperation with Russia a key factor for its security.

The constantly bad relations between Abkhazians and Georgians have negative effects on the willingness of Abkhazia to become part of Georgia. In accordance to the survey of attitude in Abkhazia conducted in March 2010 “ethnic Abkhaz tend to see the state as their natural right though their titular status, their hard-fought and costly separation from Georgia, and their effort to build a new state.” Political integration in Russia was not also desired: 79% of Abkhazians support independence of Abkhazia and only 20% wish to be integrated into Russia.³⁴¹ The sporadic escalation of tensions (1998, 2001, 2006) and the Russian-Georgian armed conflict in 2008 resulted in increased mistrust and the failure of confidence building among Georgians and Abkhazians. The negative role of the Russian Federation cannot be overseen in this process. Its support not only increased the dependency of Abkhazia on Russia but allowed the radicalization of attitudes between Abkhazians and Georgians.

After the August 2008 events and the recognition of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence, the only platform for negotiations and trust-building efforts were the talks in Geneva. However, the status issue remains as the most crucial aspect. Tbilisi’s refusal to recognize Abkhazia’s independence is preventing the conflict parties from finding a resolution. According to the Caucasus Research Resource Centre, 74% of Georgians are against granting Abkhazia any type of autonomy.

Figure Georgian Attitudes Towards Abkhazia’s Independence.

Source: Caucasus Research Resource Center: Georgia-Abkhazia, 25 February 2014, http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.cz/2014_02_01_archive.html

In retaliation to the Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Georgian Law on Occupied Territories was launched on 23 October 2008. The key objective of this law was to “define the status of those territories, that have been occupied by the Russian Federation as a result of military aggression.” The law emphasized two facts: “Abkhazia’s occupation by the Russian Federation” and “Moscow’s effective control”³⁴² over this territory. Tbilisi rejected to sign an agreement on non-use of force with Sukhumi, as Russia was perceived as a “real” conflict party. President Saakashvili described Georgia’s strategy and its tactics concerning the confrontation with Russia as follows: “Even if there had been a chance of international legalization of the creation of a new state there [in Abkhazia] the Russian occupation has put an end to it.”³⁴³ In other words, the will for independence in this “occupied territory” was not executed by its people, but by Russian leadership in order to implement Russia’s interests.

On 27 January 2009, the Georgian Cabinet of Ministers created a new State Strategy on Occupied Territories: engagement through cooperation. The new strategy, which included an Action Plan,³⁴⁴ aimed at economic cooperation with Abkhazia, educational opportunities, and a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The primary objective of the document was to illustrate a goal to overcome the isolation of Abkhazia by establishing linkages among the “divided societies.” The ultimate goal, of course, was to solidify the territorial integrity of Georgia.³⁴⁵

None of these documents and strategies were acceptable to the Abkhazian side. From the Abkhazian perspective, there was “no connection between the future of Abkhazia as an internationally recognized state and the resolution of the conflict with Georgia.”³⁴⁶ Abkhazian experts claim that after the recognition of Abkhazia’s independence by Russia, a key strategic partner, “Georgia lost its right” over Abkhazia. Intensive cooperation with Russia opened up entirely new possibilities, economically and socially. The main objective for Abkhazia was not conflict resolution with Georgia, but recognition of its independence by other states.³⁴⁷ Sokrat Jinjolia, former prime minister and foreign minister of Abkhazia, declared, “Georgia’s policy towards Abkhazia, supported by Western countries, all European institutions and the U.S. aims to eventually convince us to return to Georgia, which of course is impossible. They say: ‘Russia will reconsider its decision and cancel it. And what are we going to do then? It is better to return to Georgia by your own independent decision.’ But they must understand that it is impossible.”³⁴⁸

In fact, there is now more to it than different positions of conflict parties over the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; Abkhazia and Georgia are moving away from each other. On the one hand, Georgia determined its commitment to its “European choice”³⁴⁹ even after Georgia’s first democratic transfer of power that followed the parliamentary elections in October 2012, which marks one of the most crucial moments in foreign policymaking since Georgia became independent in 1991.³⁵⁰ On the other hand, due to the current developments in Abkhazia as mentioned above, Abkhazia is even further removed from Georgia and closer to Russia than before August 2008. Paradoxically, in the long term, these processes might put the key political goals of Abkhazia – independence and international recognition – in question.