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The Lucifer Effect
were. They did not bring into the Stanford Prison Experiment any tendencies to
harm, abuse, or dominate others. If anything, we might say they brought in ten-
dencies to be caring of other people in accordance with the contemporary social
conditioning of their era. Similarly, there was no reason to expect the students
role-playing prisoners to break down so quickly, if at all, given their initially posi-
tive mental and physical health. It is important to keep this temporal and cultural
context in mind when considering later attempted replications of our study by
researchers in totally different eras.
W H Y S Y S T E M S M A T T E R T H E M O S T
The most important lesson to be derived from the SPE is that Situations are cre-
ated by Systems. Systems provide the institutional support, authority, and re-
sources that allow Situations to operate as they do. After we have outlined all the
situational features of the SPE, we discover that a key question is rarely posed:
"Who or what made it happen that way?" Who had the power to design the be-
havioral setting and to maintain its operation in particular ways? Therefore, who
should be held responsible for its consequences and outcomes? Who gets the
credit for successes, and who is blamed for failures? The simple answer in the case
of the SPE is—me! However, finding that answer is not such a simple matter when
we deal with complex organizations, such as failing educational or correctional
systems, corrupt megacorporations, or the system that was created at Abu
Ghraib Prison.
System Power involves authorization or institutionalized permission to be-
have in prescribed ways or to forbid and punish actions that are contrary to them.
It provides the "higher authority" that gives validation to playing new roles, fol-
lowing new rules, and taking actions that would ordinarily be constrained by pre-
existing laws, norms, morals, and ethics. Such validation usually comes cloaked
in the mantle of ideology. Ideology is a slogan or proposition that usually legiti-
mizes whatever means are necessary to attain an ultimate goal. Ideology is the
"Big Kahuna," which is not challenged or even questioned because it is so appar-
ently "right" for the majority in a particular time and place. Those in authority
present the program as good and virtuous, as a highly valuable moral imperative.
The programs, policies, and standard operating procedures that are devel-
oped to support an ideology become an essential component of the System. The
System's procedures are considered reasonable and appropriate as the ideology
comes to be accepted as sacred.
During the era when fascist military juntas governed around the world from
the Mediterranean to Latin America, from the 1 9 6 0 s to 1 9 7 0 s , dictators always
sounded their call to arms as the necessary defense against a "threat to national
security" allegedly posed by socialists or Communists. Eliminating that threat ne-
cessitated state-sanctioned torture by the military and civil police. It also legiti-
mized assassination by death squads of all suspected "enemies of the state."
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