Iraq Aff Wave 1

A2 They are non-combat troops

Even if they aren’t engaged in combat missions, their presence sends a signal of reassurance to Iraqis

Ryan Crocker (dean and executive professor at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) June 22, 2010 “ Dreams of Babylon” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23546

In the post-surge climate of relative stability at the end of 2008 we were able to negotiate two historic bilateral accords, the Status of Forces Agreement and the Strategic Framework Agreement, which provided for a smooth handover from the Bush to the Obama administration. They are our road map for the future. Perhaps inevitably, most public attention has been on the first, which provides for the full withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2011. That agreement effectively ended the allegations in Iraq that America sought permanent occupation, as it did the debate in this country about our presence there. Although we are no longer involved in combat operations, the fact that our military is on the ground is an important reassurance to Iraqis. The Obama administration’s decision to reduce troop levels to fifty thousand by the end of August will require very careful management to ensure that Iraqis do not become less inclined to compromise as they wrestle with the hard decisions ahead of them. And if the new government in Baghdad approaches us about the possibility of extending our presence beyond 2011, I hope we will listen very carefully.

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Election crisis will not escalate

Gala Riani, (analyst for IHS Global Insight Middle East) April 30, 2010 “ Iraq Risks Post-Election Crisis “ Lexis

Earlier this month U.S. and Iraqi officials confirmed the death of two key al-Qaida leaders and the arrest of several more as a result of joint raids carried out in the country's northern provinces (seeIraq: 20 April 2010:). In turn, these operations come on the back of months of concerted targeting of key al-Qaida emirs in the north. The organisation has no doubt suffered a blow, but proved last week in deadly sectarian targeted attacks in Baghdad that it could still carry out damaging attacks. Searching for a fresh raison d'etre, the insurgency would certainly maximise the situation should Iraqqiya's position weaken and Sunnis begin to feel marginalised from the political process again. So far the Sunni insurgency has not been able to trigger counter-attacks from the dormant Shi'a militias which lay down their arms in 2008. However, as a result of last week's attacks in Baghdad against Shi'a targets Moqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Mehdi Army, proposed to put the hitherto quiet militia in charge of security in certain areas, offering the government "hundreds of faithful men to serve as soldiers in the Iraqi army or police and to protect Shi'a mosques, markets, houses, and cities". If the political delays drag on and sectarian attacks rise--as they have already been--it may become increasingly difficult to justify the quiescence of Shi'a militias in the face of continued Sunni insurgent attacks. For now, the political situation remains relatively under control and has not yet escalated into what could be called a serious crisis; a status which in any case is more related to the narrowing prospects of an inclusive government and/or acceptance of the poll results, rather than a delay in the formation of a government.

Iraqi government at a standstill now

Anthony Shadid (foreign correspondent for The New York Times based in Baghdad) June 14, 2010 “ Anger With Political Class Grows Among Iraqi Public” http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/world/middleeast/15iraq.html

Iraq’s politics have proved prone to deadlock and brinkmanship; the last government took six months to form. But Monday’s session stood as a microcosm of a tangled political process in which nearly every step, procedural or otherwise, is contested. Kurdish lawmakers insisted that the oath be read in both Arabic and Kurdish. (It was, eventually.) None of Iraq’s leaders spoke at the session because, politicians said, their opponents had demanded equal time. Loyalists of Mr. Sadr, whose militia twice fought the American military in 2004, threatened to walk out of the session if Christopher R. Hill, the American ambassador, attended. (In the end, they did not.) “You can expect anything at any time,” said Omar al-Mashhadani, a spokesman for the departing Parliament speaker, Ayad al-Samarrai, shaking his head. From Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki on down, politicians are defensive about the protracted negotiations, even as they acknowledge the public’s growing anger. Real issues are at stake, they say — namely, who will govern Iraq as the United States withdraws nearly 90,000 troops by the end of 2011. Whatever coalition eventually coalesces will help determine the formula by which the Shiite majority governs a country deeply divided by sect and ethnicity. The eventual prime minister will face attempts to shift power from his office to the cabinet and Parliament, delineating the state’s authority. The plethora of factions makes the process harder, too. Everyone is negotiating with everyone, with varying degrees of sincerity and hardly any success. “There is no real progress up to now, nothing real,” said Adel Abdul Mahdi, a vice president and candidate for prime minister. “We are still at a standstill.”

Iraqi formation of a new government will take a long time

Meghan L. O'Sullivan (Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations) March, 2010 “ After Iraq's Election, the Real Fight” http://www.cfr.org/publication/21612/after_iraqs_election_the_real_fight.html

There are several reasons that the process of forming a government is likely to be prolonged. The first is a positive development: the changing nature of Iraq's political parties. The once-dominant Shiite and Kurdish parties have fractured, and even Iraqis who prefer to vote for a party matching their sectarian or ethnic affiliation will have real choices on the ballot. This new fluidity bodes well for the emergence of non-sectarian politics, and it suggests that Sunday's vote will be split by a number of parties, all of which will want the chance to put forward the prime minister. A second and more troubling factor is likely confusion over the rules Iraqis must use to form their new government. As a political adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, I helped Iraqi leaders as they wrote their interim constitution in 2004, and I was struck by how vehemently they opposed the notion of designating particular jobs for members of particular sectarian or ethnic communities. Instead, in that document and in the permanent constitution, they created "transitional provisions" mandating that a three-person presidency council be elected by a two-thirds vote in parliament. This arrangement provided leverage to minorities and led to more moderate leaders. In practice, the presidency council and prime minister were put forward as a package -- the result of complicated negotiations involving multiple political parties. These complex provisions were the Iraqis' way of ensuring that all major groups were represented, without explicitly saddling the constitution with sectarian and ethnic politics.