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Stanford Journal of International Law
, 1996, p. 255, and R. McCorquodale, ‘Self-
Determination: A Human Rights Approach’, 43 ICLQ, 1994, p. 857.
140
See above, chapter 5, p. 251.
141
See further below, p. 372.
290
i n t e r nat i o na l l aw
political, economic, social and cultural development’. Article 20 of the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981
142
stipulates that
‘all peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unques-
tionable and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely de-
termine their political status and shall pursue their economic and social
development according to the policy they have chosen.’ The 1970 Declara-
tion on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
143
referred to the colonial situation and noted that subjection of peoples to
alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constituted a violation of
the principle. A number of UN resolutions have discussed the relevance
of self-determination also to situations of alien occupation where the use
of force has been involved.
144
The International Law Commission in 1988
expressed its view that the principle of self-determination was of universal
application,
145
while the practice of the UN Human Rights Committee has
been of particular significance.
Before this is briefly noted, reference must be made to the crucial im-
portance of the principle of territorial integrity.
146
This norm protects
the territorial framework of independent states and is part of the over-
all concept of the sovereignty of states. In terms of the concept of the
freezing of territorial boundaries as at the moment of independence (save
by mutual consent), the norm is referred to as
uti possidetis juris
.
147
This
posits that boundaries established and existing at the moment of inde-
pendence cannot be altered unless the relevant parties consent to change.
It is supported by international instruments
148
and by judicial pronounce-
ment. In the
Burkina Faso/Mali
case,
149
the Chamber of the International
Court of Justice emphasised that
uti possidetis
constituted a general prin-
ciple, whose purpose was to prevent the independence and stability of
142
See further below, p. 391.
143
General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV).
144
See, for an examination of state practice, e.g. Cassese,
Self-Determination
, pp. 90–9.
145
Yearbook of the ILC
, 1988, vol. II, Part 2, p. 64.
146
General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) 1960 (the Colonial Declaration) underlines that
‘any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial
integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of
the UN’, while resolution 2625 (XXV) 1970 (the Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations) emphasises that ‘nothing in the foregoing paragraphs
shall be construed as authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign or
independent states’. See further below, chapter 10, p. 522.
147
See further below, chapter 10, p. 525.
148
See e.g. General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV) and Organisation of
African Unity resolution 16 (I) 1964.
149
ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 554, 566–7; 80 ILR, pp. 440, 470–1.
t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f h u m a n r i g h t s
291
new states from being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by
the challenging of frontiers. This essential requirement of stability had
induced newly independent states to consent to the respecting of colonial
borders ‘and to take account of it in the interpretation of the princi-
ple of self-determination of peoples’. The Arbitration Commission of the
European Conference on Yugoslavia emphasised in Opinion No. 2
150
that
‘it is well established that, whatever the circumstances, the right to self-
determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time
of independence (
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