40
Middle East & Africa
The Economist
September 5th 2020
2
anese live in poverty.
In years past Lebanon might have
turned to the Gulf for a bail-out. Saudi Ara-
bia was a longtime patron of Lebanon’s
Sunni community. But, frustrated with
Lebanon’s politics, in recent years the king-
dom has stepped back.
That has left an opening for Recep Tay-
yip Erdogan, Turkey’s president, who has
cultivated ties with Sunnis in neglected ar-
eas. Turkey’s foreign-aid agency has built
cultural centres and funded other projects.
Thousands of Lebanese have received
scholarships to study in Turkey. Thou-
sands more have gained citizenship based
on Turkish ancestry. Turkey’s vice-presi-
dent visited Beirut after the explosion and
offered to help rebuild the port.
Unlike the Saudis, Mr Erdogan has not
thrown his support behind a political
party. But he and his confidants have made
powerful friends. Hakan Fidan, the Turk-
ish spy chief, has built a relationship with
his influential Lebanese counterpart, Ab-
bas Ibrahim. Mr Hariri was a guest at the
wedding of Mr Erdogan’s daughter in 2016.
Turkey’s growing clout worries many.
The dying days of Ottoman rule were not a
pleasant chapter in Lebanon’s history: the
famine that began in 1915 killed half the
people in the mountainous heartland. Par-
ticularly nervous are members of the large
Armenian community, many descended
from refugees who fled the Ottoman-era
genocide in eastern Turkey a century ago,
which Lebanon is one of the few Arab states
to recognise.
There was a telling incident this sum-
mer, when Nishan Der Haroutounian, a
Lebanese-Armenian
tv
presenter, called
Mr Erdogan an “obnoxious Ottoman” on
air. Mr Der Haroutounian now faces prose-
cution. His words sparked protests outside
the studio and insults on social media from
Lebanese of Turkish origin. One member of
that community
proclaimed himself
“proud of the massacre that our Ottoman
ancestors carried out”.
At the moment, Lebanon is desperate
for help, regardless of its source. Mr Mac-
ron, who is planning a donors’ conference,
gave Mr Adib two months to enact reforms.
France is being “demanding, not interfer-
ing” and trying to “unblock” Lebanon’s pol-
itics rather than impose an alternative,
says Mr Macron. But things are rarely so
simple in Lebanon. Its politicians are loth
to reform, and their foreign patrons often
treat the country as a zero-sum struggle.
France and Turkey may find themselves
at odds as well. The two are already spar-
ring in the eastern Mediterranean. A great-
er Turkish role in Lebanon could draw in
the United Arab Emirates, a small but pow-
erful state that views Mr Erdogan’s brand of
political Islam as an existential threat. Leb-
anon’s next chapter may become a new
struggle between its old rulers.
7
A
ssembly-line
justice is nothing new
to Egypt. Since 2013, when Abdel-
Fattah al-Sisi led a coup against an elect-
ed government, judges have presided
over trials with enough defendants to fill
a jumbo jet. At a hearing in 2014 more
than 500 people were sentenced to death
for killing one policeman. But that exer-
cise is Lilliputian compared with the
latest labour of Egypt’s judiciary. On
August 26th the state referred 54m peo-
ple for prosecution over a single case.
The defence might rise here to object:
surely that number is in error. But Egypt
has indeed opened a case against more
than half its population, and fully 86% of
the electorate. Their crime—one rarely
punished—was failing to vote last month
in elections for the upper house of parlia-
ment. (Compulsory-voting laws are not
unique to Egypt: Australia, Belgium and
others have them too.)
A lawyer for the defence would surely
focus on mitigating factors. Sweltering
August is not a pleasant time to be queu-
ing outdoors, especially for the elderly or
infirm. Nor should people be gathering
amid a pandemic. Though far from their
June peak, covid-19 cases are rising;
officials warn of a second wave.
Most defendants would just plead
apathy. The upper house, formerly called
the Shura Council, was abolished after
the coup but reinstated in a referendum
last year. Rebranded as the Senate, it has
no legislative powers. A third of its 300
members are directly elected. Another
third are elected via party lists, of which
there was exactly one on offer: a pro-
government bloc. Mr Sisi appoints the
last third. Little about this stirred the
souls of Egyptian voters.
Arab autocrats have a touching at-
tachment to the trappings of democracy.
Some use elections as shows of power.
Saddam Hussein was re-elected with an
impressive 100% turnout and not a sin-
gle No vote in an up-or-down referen-
dum in 2002. Others use elections as
safety valves. Hosni Mubarak, who ruled
Egypt for 30 years, kept a firm grip on
parliament but allowed a measure of
competition and opposition.
Elections serve neither purpose for
Mr Sisi. The lower house has deteriorated
into a rubber stamp and the Senate will
be more feckless still. Paltry turnout
undermines his claims of popular sup-
port. Over half of Egyptians voted in the
parliamentary election of 2011-12, a genu-
inely democratic exercise. In 2015 turn-
out fell to 28%. Mr Sisi’s own election in
2014 was scheduled as a two-day affair.
When turnout looked low, officials
abruptly added a third day so they could
drag more bodies to the polls.
Mr Sisi may hope that the threat of
punishment spurs Egyptians to vote in
November, when the lower house is up
for grabs. Many citizens cannot afford to
pay the fine of up to 500 pounds ($32).
(Prosecuting 54m people could net the
state 27bn pounds, 1% of its annual bud-
get.) But threats only work if they are
credible. Egypt’s judiciary lacks the
resources for such an undertaking. A
better way to increase turnout would be
to hold elections that matter.
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