Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010

Democracy Solves War

Democratization decreases war

Ward and Gleditsch 98 [Michael D., Professor of Political Science, University of Washington, and Kristian S, graduate research trainee in the Globalization and Democratization Program, at University of Colorado, Boulder, March 1998, The American Political Science Review, Lexis]

As Figure 1 details, democratization-whether in mild or strong degrees-is accompanied by reduction, not increase, in the risk of war. Though we do not present graphs of the converse, changes toward autocracy and reversals of democratization are accompanied by increased risks of war involvement. These risks are proportionally greater than the decline or benefits of further democratization. Thus, there is strong evidence that democratization has a monadic effect: It reduces the probability that a country will be involved in a war. Although the probability of war involvement does not decrease linearly, it does decrease monotonically, so that over the entire range of democracy minus autocracy values, there is a reduction of about 50%. During the democratic transition, at every point along the way as well as at the end points, there is an attendant reduction in the probability of a polity being at war. We also find that reversals toward greater levels of autocracy (not shown) not only increase the probability of war involvement. Apparently, it is more dangerous to be at a given level of democracy if that represents an increase in the level of authoritarianism than it is to be at the same level of democracy if that represents a decrease in the authoritarian character of the regime. Stated differently, reversals are riskier than progress.ll It has been argued that institutional constraints are theoretically important in translating the effect of democracy into foreign policy (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992; Siverson 1995). If the idea of democracy is separated into its major components, then the degree of executive constraints empirically dominates the democracy and autocracy scales (Gleditsch and Ward 1997). Accordingly, we demonstrate that moving toward stronger executive constraints also yields a visible reduction in the risk of war.

Democracy prevents war- models prove
Ward and Gleditsch 98 [Michael D., Professor of Political Science, University of Washington, and Kristian S, graduate research trainee in the Globalization and Democratization Program, at University of Colorado, Boulder, March 1998, The American Political Science Review, Lexis]

Our results show that the process of democratization is accompanied by a decrease in the probability of a country being involved in a war, either as a target or as an initiator. These results were obtained with a more current (and corrected) database than was used in earlier work, and our analyses also focus more clearly on the process of transition. In comparison to studies that look only at the existence of change in authority characteristics, we examine the direction, magnitude, and smoothness of the transition process.
Democratization decreases the chance of war

Ward and Gleditsch 98 [Michael D., Professor of Political Science, University of Washington, and Kristian S, graduate research trainee in the Globalization and Democratization Program, at University of Colorado, Boulder, March 1998, The American Political Science Review, Lexis]

The argument that democratization can bring about war is a powerful critique suggesting limits to the linkage between democracy and peace. This research examines this claim. Our findings demonstrate that democratizing polities are substantially less war prone than previously argued. By focusing on the characteristics of the transition process, we show that as contemporary polities become more democratic they reduce their overall chances of being involved in war by approximately half. We also find that rocky or especially rapid transitions or reversals are associated with a countervailing effect; namely, they increase the risk of being involved in warfare. Both in the long term and while societies undergo democratic change, the risks of war are reduced by democratization and exacerbated by reversals in the democratization process. To reach these conclusions, we developed and applied a logit model linking authority characteristics and war involvement using Polity III and Correlates of War databases.

Democracy Solves Human Rights

Democratization is essential to the advance of human rights

Sharansky 4 [Nathan, Israel’s Minister for Jerusalem and Diaspora Affairs and former Soviet dissident, 2004, The Case for Democracy, p. 205, Google Books]

In the post 9/11 world, many democratic governments now have a better appreciation of how difficult it can be to find the appropriate balance between providing maximum security to your citizens and protecting human rights. In debating issues like the Patriot Act or the rights granted to prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Americans are confronting a dilemma that Israel has faced since the day it was established. Human rights violations can and do take place in democratic societies. But one of the things that sets democracies apart from fear societies is the way they respond to those violations. A fear society does not openly debate human rights issues. Its people do not protest. Its regime does not investigate. Its press does not expose. Its courts do not protect. In contrast, democratic societies are always engaged in self-examination. For example, look at how the United States dealt with the abuse and humiliation of Iraqi prisoners by American soldiers in Abu Ghraib prison. Even before the abuse became publicly known, the army had suspended those involved and was conducting a full investigation. And as soon as the disturbing pictures of the abuse were published, America’s democracy was shocked into action. The Congress, determined to find the culprits, immediately convened public hearings, and demanded a full account of what led to the abuse. Politicians and opinion makers insisted that the people responsible for the abuse be held accountable, including those at the very top of the chain of command. The media mulled over the details, pursuing every allegation, tracking down every lead. The American people openly discussed what the abuse said about their own country’s values, its image in the world, and how that image would affect the broader War on Terror. The U.S. president, for his part, apologized to the families of the victims and said that those responsible would be punished. But let’s not forget that the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib under Saddam was far worse than anything America was accused of. Yet were pictures distributed of Saddam’s soldiers murdering, raping, and torturing Iraqis? If they had been distributed, would Iraq’s parliament have conducted public hearings? Would the Iraqi media have reported it? Would anyone have publicly called for the resignation of Saddam’s defense minister, let alone Saddam himself? Would Saddam have denounced the brutality and apologized to the victims and their families? Far from showing that all societies are the same, the human rights abuses that sometimes occur in democracies often help illustrate the tremendous moral divide that separates free and fear societies. While I have not always agreed with the decisions made by my government on issues related to human rights, my experience has made me confident that these issues are thoroughly discussed and debated and that the need to protect human rights is never ignored. I suspect that in most other free societies the situation is much the same. Every democratic state will choose its own balance between protecting security and protecting human rights, but concern for human rights will always be part of the decisionmaking process. The free world is not perfect, but the way it responds to its imperfections is only further proof that human rights can only be protected in democratic societies.