Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010

Soft Power Solves Heg

Soft power is key to sustain hegemony due to alliances and information sharing.

Nye 4 (Joseph S, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy”, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 261)

In the global information age, the attractiveness of the United States will be crucial to our ability to achieve the outcomes we want. Rather than having to put together pick-up coalitions of the willing for each new game, we will benefit if we are able to attract others into institutional alliances and eschew weak- ening those we have already created. NATO, for example, not only aggregates the capabilities of advanced nations, but its interminable committees, procedures, and exercises also allow these nations to train together and quickly be- come interoperable when a crisis occurs. As for alliances, if the United States is an attractive source of security and reassurance, other countries will set their expectations in directions that are conducive to our interests. Initially, for ex- ample, the U.S.-Japan security treaty was not very popular in Japan, but polls show that over the decades, it became more attractive to the Japanese public. Once that happened, Japanese politicians began to build it into their approaches to foreign policy. The United States benefits when it is regarded as a constant and trusted source of attraction so that other countries are not obliged continually to re-examine their options in an atmosphere of uncertain coalitions. In the Japan case, broad acceptance of the United States by the Japanese public "contributed to the maintenance of US hegemony" and "served as politi cal constraints compelling the ruling elites to continue cooperation with the United States.'"^ Popularity can contribute to stability. Finally, as the RAND Corporation's John Arquila and David Ronfeldt ar- gue, power in an information age will come not only from strong defenses but also from strong sharing. A traditional realpolitik mind-set makes it difficult to share with others. But in an information age, such sharing not only enhances the ability of others to cooperate with us but also increases their inclination to do so.'' As we share intelligence and capabilities with others, we develop common outlooks and approaches that improve our ability to deal with the new challenges. Power fiows from that attraction. Dismissing the importance of at- traction as merely ephemeral popularity ignores key insights from new theories of leadership as well as the new realities of the information age. We cannot afford that.
Soft power is key to hegemony – avoids backlash and provides staying power.

Nye 4 (Joseph S, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy”, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 261)

Ironically, however, the only way to achieve the type of transformation that the neoconservatives seek is by working with others and avoiding the backlash that arises when the United States appears on the world stage as an imperial power acting unilaterally. What is more, because democracy cannot be imposed by force and requires a considerable time to take root, the most likely way to obtain staying power from the American public is through developing interna- tional legitimacy and burden sharing with allies and institutions. For Jacksoni- ans like Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, this may not matter. They would pre- fer to punish the dictator and come home rather than engage in tedious nation building. For example, in September 2003, Rumsfeld said of Iraq, "I don't be- heve it's our job to reconstruct the country."^' But for serious neoconservatives, like Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, their impatience with institutions and allies may undercut their own objectives. They understand the importance of soft power but fail to appreciate all its dimensions and dynamics.

Soft Power Solves Proliferation

Soft power solves proliferation
Hassan 6 [Jawhar, Staff Writer, October 8, New Straits Times, Lexis]

These strategies have only served to compound the problem, not resolve it. They have helped militarise the situation further and forced North Korea down the nuclear path. Threats and sanctions have not worked. They have impoverished the people further, and forced greater diversion of scarce sources to the overwhelming imperative of maintaining and strengthening defence. Fifty years of relentless harassment and pressure have, not surprisingly, led to extreme paranoia. They have helped prop up a brutal totalitarian system, not weakened it. The failed strategies have left the US and the international community with few viable options to stop North Korea from going nuclear and inducing responses that could spiral out of control. What then, can be done? Put in a nutshell, the US should abandon its extreme posture and adopt the South Korean, Chinese and Russian approach to the problem. It should soften its hard line, eschew name-calling and desist from its demonisation of North Korea. It should cease talk of regime change and stop demanding economic and political reform. They will come eventually. In the absence of an external threat, the regime must either change or die. No rulers of a society where 37 per cent of its children are stunted, 23 per cent underweight, and seven per cent "wasted" (as the World Food Programme puts it), can survive for long without dramatically improving matters, unless they are propped up by an external threat. Instead, the US should go into direct negotiations, either independently or within the framework of the six-party talks. All parties should work without pre-conditions which have hitherto frozen progress. The package should contain generous economic and other inducements to North Korea to abandon its nuclear programme. They should not be viewed as appeasement, capitulation or "rewards" to North Korea for "bad behaviour". They should be viewed as pragmatic options to induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear programme. Above all, North Korea must be assured of its security. It will not abandon the quest for nuclear weapons unless it is given a firm assurance. This the US can easily provide through a bilateral or multilateral peace pact that includes countries like Japan, South Korea, China and Russia, to replace the 1953 armistice agreement. The peace pact must contain solemn undertakings for respect of sovereignty, non-interference, non- use of force or threat of force, and mutual non-aggression. In return, North Korea must abandon its nuclear weapons programme, re-join the non-proliferation regime and open itself to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. If a peace pact can be successfully inked, the US and its allies can terminate their annual military exercises off the Korean peninsula. As confidence returns and the environment for peace solidifies, there will also be less need for the US to station as many forces in the region. All this requires a radical, even revolutionary, transformation in American strategic culture and mindset. It can begin by the leaders shedding some of their self-perception of moral elitism because it breeds arrogance and intolerance. Though there is much to admire in some of America's values, its double standards abroad disqualify such notions. The US will also need to employ less coercion and more persuasion. There must be less militarism in foreign policy, and its postures be driven less by intolerant and extreme ideology and more by tolerant pragmatism. It must be less inflexible and more accommodating. It must engage more and retain lines of communication with foes, not sever them. Respect for international law and recourse to global institutions should be a norm rather than an option only when convenient. Such a radical change is not impossible. It may be unthinkable for the neo-conservatives and the Cheneys, Rumsfelds and Boltons, but not impossible for some of the State Department-types and the likes of Madeleine Albright and Colin Powell. The impending change in administration provides an opportunity for change. If the US is able to transform its strategies for peace, not only on the Korean peninsula but also in West Asia, South America and elsewhere, then it can regain some of its moral lustre, replenish its depleted soft power, and become a more humane and benevolent force for global good. A gentler, more even-handed and pragmatic America will be able to promote its national interest more effectively this way.