Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010

Iraq Instability Turns Sunni-Shia Conflict

Iraq instability promotes Sunni-Shia violence and nuclear conflict in the Middle East
Williams and Simpson 9 [Dr. Paul, Professor Law and International Relations at American University, Matthew T, Peace Fellow with the Public International Law & Policy Group, 24 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 191, Lexis]

A look at the Sunni dominated areas suggests that ethno-sectarian division would only increase the dominance of Sunni Islamist extremist groups over the Sunni insurgents and average Iraqis. n118 If average Iraqi Sunnis are left without oil money (a foreseeable consequence of the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq), Arab Sunni [*215] states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, would likely feel the need to lend support, to help prevent Islamist extremists from taking over the Sunni area of Iraq. n119 Turning to the south, the creation of a nine-province Shi'a region would expose it to significant Iranian influence. n120 Although some Shi'a leaders may be receptive to Iranian influence, many other Shi'a are hostile to Iran as they view themselves as Arabs, not Persians, and maintain the allegiances that led them to fight with the regime of Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war. n121 In addition to the increased role Saudi Arabia may play in a Sunni region, the Saudis object strongly to the idea of a Shi'a region in the south. n122 Saudi Arabia's adherence to the "ultra-strict" Wahhabi Sunni school of Islam has led to strained relations with Shiite Iran and even its own Shi'a population. n123 Saudi Arabia thus has serious reservations about another Shi'a dominated region next door. n124 In the end, the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq could permeate throughout the Middle East and the Arab world, "creating a risk of local conflicts and the kind of religious tension that feeds Islamist extremism." n125 In the words of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, "Iraq's disintegration will be a bomb that will blow up the Middle East." n126

Iraq instability fuels ethnic wars and marginalization- Sunni-Shia-Kurdish violence
Williams and Simpson 9 [Dr. Paul, Professor Law and International Relations at American University, Matthew T, Peace Fellow with the Public International Law & Policy Group, 24 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 191, Lexis]

The ethno-sectarian division of Iraq may condemn residual minorities to discrimination and second-class citizenship and possibly instigate violent instability. n103 One empirical work studied the relationship between ethnicity and political violence and concluded that the highest propensity for ethnic violence exists at extreme polarization; i.e. the highest risk zone for violent conflict exists "when an ethnic bloc may be sufficient in size to permanently exclude others from the exercises of power." n104 Robert Jervis has [*213] also noted that in most modern civil conflicts both security and predatory motives exist. n105 The ethno-sectarian division of Iraq may thus exacerbate the predatory motives of majority populations against residual minorities. n106 If areas were formed around Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurdish populations, the minority populations located within those newly formed areas may have to conform to the ethnic and cultural persuasions of the area. The ethno-sectarian division of Iraq would prove even more problematic for nomadic minority groups or those dispersed across multiple areas. n107

Central Asian Instability Turns Nuclear War

Central Asian instability goes nuclear
Friedman and Winsbush 8 [Richard E. Professor of Jewish Studies at the University of Georgia S. Enders, Director of the Center for Future Security Strategies December 24, http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume1/March-May1996/CENTRALASIAANDTHEWEST.pdf]

Importantly, Central Asia is the only region in the world where the impact of five nuclear powers comes into play: Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, and India. The West's interest in containing nuclear proliferation and in preventing military conflict between or among Central Asian actors is self-evident. With more independent actors and fewer restraints on independent action, Central Asia faces the prospect of greater political instability than at any time since the Soviet takeover. The interests and ambitions of most Asian states, and many Western ones, in some way meet in Central Asia.

***INDO-PAK***

Indo-Pak Stability Solves Econ

Stability in Southeast Asia is key to economic prosperity
Glardon 5 (Thomas L., Lt. Colonel for USAF, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil12.pdf) GAT

As well, stability in these two states will provide a basis for future stability in such neighboring states as Afghanistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. In economic prosperity, India has the world’s 12th largest economy with a growth rate of 8% xli (compared to 3.6% for the U.S. in 2003xlii). As mentioned above, this growth is unequal across the country which fosters unrest due to perceived imbalanced 6 development (such as between the more developed South and the less-developed North and East). As a growing economic power, India will prove to be a major economic force in the future, as well as a regional power, if the development can be more equitably distributed. This profound growth provides substantial investment opportunities to the U.S. and a potentially powerful trading partner.

Indo-Pak War Turns Terror

Solving the Kashmir tension is crucial to winning the War on Terror
Koshy 9 (Nina, former Director of International Affairs, Mainstream Weekly, Vol 42, No 11, http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1199.html) GAT

THE war on terror has refashioned conflict situations in the region. Two of the most prominent conflict situations may be examined: Kashmir and Sri Lanka. M.K. Narayanan, currently the National Security Adviser, in an article written less than a month after the terror attacks in the USA (in Asian Age online) argued that there was “a connection between the September 11 attacks in the US” and “the ongoing conflict in Jammu and Kashmir”. He concluded that a war against terrorism must address the violence in Kashmir well as in Afghanistan. “Something drastic needs to be done to curb Islamist outfits currently engaged in cascading violence in J&K. ..The Alliance for the Battle Against Terrorism must gear itself to deal with a situation which is fraught with dangerous possibilities.” The dynamics of the Kashmir conflict underwent a drastic change since 9/11 due to dramatic changes wrought by the US war on terror in the region. Three competing perspectives emanated from Islamabad, New Delhi and Washington. Pakistan continued to describe the happenings in Kashmir as ‘liberation struggle’ and insisted Washington should solve the Kashmir problem so that Pakistan can fully participate in the war on terror. India’s support to the war on terror proceeded on the assumption that the US would have to accept that the happenings in Kashmir are due to ‘cross-border terrorism’. India thus tried to combine the issues of war on terror and Kashmir so as to draw the maximum benefit from the changed international opinion in favour of fighting terrorism lock, stock and barrel. India strongly challenged Pakistan’s credentials to be partner of the US in the war on terror and repeatedly urged on the US to include Kashmir in its war on terror. The US, which needed both Pakistan and India in the war on terror, did not do so. A recent statement by David Miliband, the British Foreign Secretary, gave rise to high level of moral indignation in New Delhi. He said in an article in The Guardian: “Although I understand the current difficulties, resolution of the dispute over Kashmir would help deny extremists in the region one of their main calls to arms.”. Actually this statement did not warrant the kind of reaction that came from New Delhi. It only reinforced the impression that when it comes to Kashmir, our rulers adopt a denial mode—that there is no dispute and that if at all there is any problem we know how to deal with it. Indian sensitivities on the Kashmir issue are understandable. India can legitimately take credit for the apparently new political climate in J&K. But to treat the Kashmir problem as solely or primarily due to “international terrorism” is to invite the kind of international intervention which India says it does not want. In spite of the present rupture in relationship between India and Pakistan, diplomacy and peace are the only options.


Terrorism would break out if there was conflict between India and Pakistan
Glardon 5 (Thomas L., Lt. Colonel for USAF, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil12.pdf) GAT

India and Pakistan suffer internal terrorism and harbor foreign terrorists. Internal terrorism provides more than just a destabilizing influence; it can spark war and threaten such distant nations as the U.S. The 2001 crisis between India and Pakistan began when radical Islamist terrorists (based out of Pakistan) attacked the Indian Parliament in New Delhi.xvi Of greater international threat, though, is the refuge that foreign terrorists find in the remoter areas of both states. The Maoists plaguing Nepal have found sanctuary across the Indian border.xvii In the 1980s, the Tamil Tigers attacking Sri Lanka found refuge and support in India. The greatest threat to the U.S. is the continued presence of the Al-Qaida in Pakistan, whose global activities threatens stability of all nations.xvii