account for the ongoing
interdependence between
the state and civil society. The institutions, associ-
ations, organizations, gathering places, and social
movements on the terrain of civil society act as a
kind of schoolhouse for
democracy
or as a dress
rehearsal for more traditional forms of politi-
cal participation. While authoritarian regimes
routinely attempt to “depoliticize” or “privatize”
relations within society, the modern state finds
it difficult to implement this divide-to-conquer
strategy. It does not have the capacity to become
truly totalitarian, to manipulate and control the
entire spectrum of activities and dialogue consti-
tutive of the various “publics” in civil society.
The moral, political, and cultural capacities of
actors in civil society are based on norms of trust,
reciprocity, friendship, commitment, and the like
that are metaphorically termed “social capital.”
The strength and circulation of this social capital
signals both the desire and potential for democra-
tization and may be the very locus of “democracy”
in societies with governments that suffer from
democracy deficits.
In the Middle East, civil society consists of
“a mélange of associations, clubs, guilds, syn-
dicates, federations, unions, parties and groups
[that] come together to provide a buffer between
state and citizen.” (Norton, 1:7). Professional
associations of doctors, lawyers, engineers, and
teachers are particularly strong in e
gypt
, t
Unisia
,
m
orocco
, s
Udan
, and among the Palestinians.
These syndicates are often the leading edge of
civil society owing to the high level of education,
political awareness, and financial resources of
their members. In Egypt, members of the m
Uslim
b
rotherhood
are elected majorities on the boards
of most of these associations.
Among the Arab g
UlF
s
tates
, Kuwait’s civil
society deserves mention, with its fairly free
press, professional associations, and cultural
clubs. In particular, the reception areas (diwani-
yyah) in peoples’ homes function as gathering
places where men socialize and discuss a variety
of topics, political and otherwise. Kuwaiti women
have started their own diwaniyyahs, and it was
the diwaniyyah that gave birth to the country’s
prodemocracy movement in the 1990s. While
Kuwait’s constitution provides the framework for
its civil society, the state has never recognized
independent voluntary organizations. t
Urkey
,
with its secular state, has a yet more energetic
civil society, much of it Islamic. Still, its Islamist
members possess “contradictory motivations and
goals and sometimes radically differing interpre-
tations of fundamental religious principles and
political platforms” (White, 6). When the Turk-
ish military regime crushed the left in the early
1980s, Muslim activists filled the void; they con-
ducted charitable, humanitarian, and educational
projects while agitating for economic and social
justice. The electoral success of the Islamic Jus-
tice and Development Party provides evidence of
the ability of Muslims to effectively organize and
mobilize others in civil society.
Finally, note should be made of the attraction
of militant Islamist groups such as h
izbUllah
and
h
amas
. These groups draw young recruits and
galvanize popular support for several reasons, not
the least of which is their “provision of substan-
tial social services and charitable activities, from
education to housing and financial support of the
members of families killed, wounded, or detained
by authorities.” (Esposito and Burgat, 76)
See also
aUthority
;
constitUtion
.
Patrick O’Donnell
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