death, and Abu Bakr (r. 632–634) became the first
caliph
(successor to the Prophet)
of the Muslim
community. This consensual understanding of
legitimate
aUthority
eventually became identified
with the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates, and
the Sunni branch of Islam.
In 656 Ali finally became the caliph after the
assassination of U
thman
ibn
a
FFan
(r. 644–656),
the third caliph, and he established his capital
in the city of Kufa in i
raq
. Ali’s legitimacy, how-
ever, was contested by his Meccan rivals. He
successfully defeated three of his major oppo-
nents—a
isha
(Muhammad’s widow) and Talha
and al-Zubayr (respected c
ompanions
oF
the
p
rophet
)—at the Battle of the Camel in southern
Iraq. He was then forced to confront Muawiya ibn
Abi Sufyan (d. 680), the leader of the Umayyad
clan of the q
Uraysh
. Ali and Muawiya fought until
the conflict was settled by arbitration at Siffin,
which left some of Ali’s supporters, known as the
k
haWariJ
(separatists), discontented. One of them
assassinated Ali in Kufa in 661. Ali’s son Hasan
agreed to recognize Muawiya as the next caliph,
and Muwawiya founded the U
mayyad
c
aliphate
with Damascus as its capital in 661. Consequently,
Ali’s second son, Husayn, launched a campaign
to win back the caliphate, but he was killed in
680, together with many of his supporters, by an
Umayyad army at k
arbala
while traveling to join
his supporters in Kufa.
The historical split between Sunnis and Shiis
can therefore be traced to what was originally a
political dispute over succession to leadership in
the Muslim community. However, much of what
scholars know about this period of Islamic history
is based on accounts told from Sunni points of
view that prevailed several centuries later. Scholars,
therefore, have an incomplete understanding of
Shiism’s development in the early period. During
the ninth century the Shia began to maintain that
Ali and his heirs, known as the Imams, had suf-
fered martyrdom at the hands of unjust and corrupt
Sunni Muslim rulers. The unfortunate outcome
of Shii political expectations and Shii belief in the
just cause of their Imams eventually evolved into
the distinctive Shii belief in sanctification through
the deaths of the infallible Imams and belief in a
messianic redeemer, known as the i
mam
m
ahdi
,
who would come in the endtimes. The shift in the
worldview of the Shii movement occurred gradu-
ally between the seventh and 10th centuries, and
it was probably influenced by Jewish and Christian
beliefs in
martyrdom
and messianic redemption
circulating in the Middle East at the time.
The fate of the Imams, coupled with a history
of periodic persecution, led many Shii groups to
develop a doctrine that allowed for pious conceal-
ment, known as taqiyya, of their true Shii identity
for self-protection. a
shUra
, the commemoration of
the death of Husayn
at Karbala during Muharram,
the first month in the Islamic lunar year, began to be
observed as the most important Shii holiday during
the 10th century, under the protection of the Shii
Buyid dynasty that ruled in the name of the Abbasid
caliph. In addition to belief in the return of a hidden
imam in the endtimes, most of the Shia also main-
tained that the Imams would intercede for the righ-
teous on J
Udgment
d
ay
. Another identifying trait of
Shiism that developed in this period was devotion
to Muhammad and his descendants through Ali and
Fatima, known as the People of the House (
ahl
al
-
bayt
). Sunnism also has held the prophet Muham-
mad’s family in high regard, but its understanding of
Islam has given greater importance to the
sharia
. In
the Sunni understanding of the sharia, it is Muham-
mad and his Companions who have precedence,
rather than his family per se.
An estimated 12 to 15 percent of the world’s
Muslim population today belongs to the Shii
branch of Islam, equal to between 156 and 195
million adherents (out of a total of around 1.3
billion Muslims). Almost all Shiis belong to one
of three major sects, basically distinguished from
each other according to which Imams they recog-
nize and which they do not. Each tradition has
also developed its own specific doctrines, rites,
and concepts of authority (for details, see entries
for each tradition). The largest tradition is known
as t
Welve
-i
mam
s
hiism
, and its followers are called
the Twelvers, the Ithnaashariyya, and the Imamis.
They recognize Musa al-Kazim (d. 799), the son
of J
aaFar
al
-s
adiq
(d. 765) as the seventh Imam,
K 624
Shiism
and they believe that the 12th Imam, m
Uham
-
mad
al
-m
Untazar
(b. 868), entered concealment
as a boy in 874. His concealment will end only
when God allows, just before Judgment Day. The
Twelve-Imam Shia follow their own legal tradi-
tion, which is divided into Akhbari (traditional-
ist) and Usuli (rationalist) Schools. They now
comprise an estimated 90 percent of the world’s
Shii population, and they are majorities in i
ran
(89 percent), Iraq (60 percent), Bahrain (70 per-
cent), and Azerbaijan (85 percent). There are also
Twelve-Imam Shii minority populations in Leba-
non, eastern Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United
Arab Emirates, a
Fghanistan
, Tajikistan, p
akistan
,
and i
ndia
, as well as sizeable immigrant commu-
nities in Europe and the United States.
The second sect Shii is known as i
smaili
s
hiism
(also called the Seveners and the Sabiyya). The
Ismailis recognize Ismail (d. 760), Jaafar al-Sadiq’s
first son, as the rightful seventh Imam instead of
Musa al-Kazim, as claimed by the Twelve-Imam
Shia. The F
atimid
dynasty
that ruled in North
Africa and Egypt from 909 to 1171 claimed to be
caliph-imams descended from Ismail, and they
gave rise to the two major Ismaili sects known as
the Mustalis and Nizaris. Fatimid missionaries,
known as dais, spread the doctrines of Ismaili Shi-
ism to y
emen
, Syria, Iran, and India. Because of
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