Case Law Update: 2011-2014 Cumulative Edition

Facts: Officer received anonymous tip that that a Mr. Reed was driving while intoxicated on 5^th Street in a red Ford truck. Officer then saw a red Mazda truck on a different street and stopped it. Officer then recognized that the driver was not Mr. Reed, but instead Defendant. Because Officer new Defendant had a history of prior arrests, Officer then detained Defendant to check on current warrants, and found a current warrant for Defendant. Officer arrested Defendant and put him in patrol car. After Defendant was taken to jail, Officer found drugs in the back of the patrol car. Defendant was charged with possession of drugs, and filed motion to suppress.

Holding: The State claims this was a valid Terry stop. However, a Terry stop must be based on reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is taking place. Where a stop is based on an anonymous tip, there must be independent corroboration of the tip. Here, the Officer stopped a different make of truck in a different location and did not observe any evidence of intoxication before stopping the truck. Thus, there was no indication of criminal activity taking place. The stop was unjustified. Further, once Officer identified the driver as someone other than Mr. Reed, the stop should have ended. An investigative detention can last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Knowledge of a person’s criminal background is alone insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion, so there was no justification for detaining Defendant to run a warrant search. The discovery of drugs was not attenuated from the illegal stop because this happened close in time to the stop and the Officer’s conduct in conducting an illegal stop and detention is the type of conduct the exclusionary rule is designed to prevent. State v. Lamaster, 652 S.W.2d 885 (Mo. App. 1983), which is to the contrary, should no longer be followed. The inevitable discovery rule does not save the stop either because while the State may have properly arrested Defendant at some later date, it is not the arrest on the warrant but the possession of drugs found in the patrol car that was objected to here, and the State was put in a better position than it would have been if the illegal stop and detention had not occurred. Finally, there was no abandonment of the drugs because abandonment is only found where the item is abandoned voluntarily, and voluntary abandonment does not result from an illegal seizure. Motion to suppress should have been granted.
State v. Hastings, 2014 WL 6679395 (Mo. App. E.D. Nov. 25, 2014):

Even though Defendant retreated into his house when police came to the door, this did not provide exigent circumstances for police to enter the house without a warrant.

Facts: Police received a tip that a stolen car might be at a house. They went to the house and saw the car in the driveway. Police knocked on the door of the house. A woman answered. While police were talking to the woman, Defendant approached the door from inside the house, saw police, and “briskly” turned around and went further inside, out of view. Police entered the house and detained Defendant. They asked for identification. When Defendant opened his wallet, police saw and seized identification documents belonging to the owner of the stolen car. The trial court overruled a motion to suppress the documents and admitted them at trial.

Holding: Physical entry into the home is the primary evil against which the Fourth Amendment is directed. Here, the State claims the police were allowed an exception to the warrant requirement because exigent circumstances existed in that Defendant could flee or destroy evidence. However, police entry into the home was not necessary to prevent an escape. Other officers were at the house and were guarding the stolen car. Even when police entered the home, they didn’t handcuff Defendant or restrain him in any way until after he produced his wallet and they found the stolen identification documents. These circumstances do not suggest urgency attendant to imminent flight of a suspect. Defendant had a legal right not to talk to police, and to retreat into his home. The mere withdrawal of a suspect into their home does not create exigent circumstances because such an exception to the warrant requirement would swallow the Fourth Amendment’s protections. Even though police may have believed there was incriminating evidence inside the house, this does not by itself justify a belief that Defendant was trying to destroy it. The mere presence of contraband in a home does not create an exception to the warrant requirement. Police entry into the home violated Fourth Amendment. Evidence should have been suppressed.
State v. Spencer, 2014 WL 4085162 (Mo. App. E.D. Aug. 19, 2014):

Where trial court took motion to suppress “with the case” in a bench trial and at end of trial granted the motion and declared the proceedings to be concluded, the State’s interlocutory appeal must be dismissed because it violates Double Jeopardy.

Facts: Defendant, charged with drug possession, filed a motion to suppress, and waived a jury trial. The trial court held a bench trial, during which the motion was taken “with the case.” The State and defense made opening statements and the State presented police witnesses. Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of all evidence, and argued his motion to suppress. The trial court then stated, “Very well. I’m going to grant the motion to suppress the evidence, and that will conclude the matter….Court is in recess.” The State filed an interlocutory appeal regarding the motion to suppress.

Holding: Sec. 547.200.2 allows the State an interlocutory appeal regarding a motion to suppress but not if “such an appeal would result in double jeopardy for the defendant.” Here, the State presented its entire case. Although the trial court did not enter a not guilty verdict or enter an order labeled a judgment, the appellate court looks at the practical effect of the actions. Here, the trial court did not continue the trial pending an interlocutory appeal. The trial was “concluded.” The practical effect is the trial court acquitted Defendant after the suppression of evidence. Double jeopardy applies as the State presented evidence, thus giving due deference to double jeopardy in bench trials. “While taking motions to suppress evidence with a bench trial may serve judicial economy, it is not good practice.”
State v. Nebbitt, 2014 WL 3729808 (Mo. App. E.D. July 29, 2014):

Trial court court erred in denying motion to suppress on grounds that it “cannot determine as a matter of law” whether certain facts were true, because trial court was required to make factual findings, and court failed to apply proper burden of proof which places the burden of proof and nonpersuasion on the State.

Facts: Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress, which turned on whether Officer could see certain evidence in plain view. After the motion to suppress hearing, the trial court ruled that it “cannot determine as a matter of law whether or not the officer could or could not see” the evidence allegedly in plain view, and that this issue was for the jury to determine. Defendant objected to the evidence at trial based on the motion to suppress, and was overruled. After conviction, Defendant appealed.

Holding: Under Sec. 542.296.6, the State bears the burden of producing evidence and burden of persuasion to convince a trial court by preponderance of the evidence that a motion to suppress should be overruled. The trial court’s duty is to resolve any issues of fact and credibility before ruling on the motion. Here, although the trial court characterized its actions as overruling the motion to suppress, the trial court actually failed to make the required factual and credibility findings. Further, the trial court failed to apply to the proper burden of proof and persuasion because if it was not convinced by the State’s evidence, it was required to sustain the motion. Case is remanded for supplemental hearing, if necessary, and for trial court to make required factual findings and apply correct burden of proof. If trial court determines the evidence was not in plain view, it must suppress the evidence and grant a new trial. If trial court determines the evidence was in plain view, it shall certify the issue for further appeal.
State v. Norfolk, No. ED95468 (Mo. App. E.D. 11/15/11):

Even though Officer saw Defendant adjust his pants in a way that made Officer think that Defendant had a gun and Defendant cussed at Officer, this was not reasonable suspicion to stop and search Defendant.

Facts: Officer was patrolling in an area where there had been several robberies in the past. Officer saw Defendant adjust his pants and believed that he had a gun because he had adjusted his pants from the back. Officer asked to speak with Defendant, and Defendant refused and cussed at Officer. Officer then said if you’re not doing anything wrong, you’ll speak to me. Officer then had Defendant place his hands on a wall, and checked for weapons. She found a gun and drugs. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, which was overruled. He was convicted at trial of unlawful use of a weapon and possession of drugs.

Holding: The evidence fails to support a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot when Officer stopped and searched Defendant. Officer was on a routine patrol in a high crime area and saw Defendant adjust his pants from the back. Officer believed this indicated that Defendant had a gun. However, this activity could be wholly innocent. Officer did not see any bulge or shape of a gun before searching Defendant, Officer had no knowledge of Defendant engaging in any criminal activity, and there was no report of an immediate crime in the area. The motion to suppress should have been granted due to the illegal stop. However, the appellate court does not reverse the conviction because this was harmless error since Defendant testified at trial that he possessed the gun and drugs; this confession at trial makes the evidence of guilt overwhelming and precludes any claim of relief from the motion to suppress on appeal.
State v. Ingram, No. ED94866 (Mo. App. E.D. 5/24/11):

(1) Even though State had Officer testify at motion to suppress hearing, where State failed to introduce the search warrant and affidavits that were the subject of the motion to suppress physical evidence, the State failed to meet its burden to show the search was based on probable cause because the validity of the search is determined only by a review of the warrant; and (2) taking motions to suppress “with the case” is “discouraged.”

Facts: Defendant filed a motion to suppress physical evidence and a motion to suppress statements. At the suppression hearing, the State had Officer who conducted the search testify. He did not testify about any information in the search warrant that was used to search Defendant’s house. The State did not admit into evidence the search warrant, the search warrant application or the supporting affidavits. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The trial court never ruled on the voluntariness of Defendant’s statements. Defendant appealed after he was convicted at trial of various drug offenses.

Holding: The trial procedures for motions to suppress physical evidence and statements are different. For a motion to suppress statements, the court is required to conduct a pretrial hearing or a hearing outside the jury’s presence to determine the voluntariness of the statements. A motion to suppress physical evidence may be taken “with the case” but this is “discouraged.” “This case illustrates the substantial problems associated with taking any motion to suppress with the case. It is a better practice to conduct an evidentiary hearing on any motion to suppress outside the presence of the jury prior to the start of trial.” In reviewing for probable cause to issue a warrant, the court may not look beyond the four corners of the warrant application and supporting affidavits. Under Sec. 542.296.6, the State had the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the court should overrule the motion to suppress. The State failed, however, to introduce the search warrant, the application and supporting affidavits. Hence, the court cannot determine if there was probable cause, and there was no evidence to overrule the motion to suppress. The State failed to meet its burdens of production and proof as to the validity of the search warrant. As a result, the court was required to suppress the physical evidence and statements. The statements were the fruit of an unlawful arrest stemming from a search warrant that was not supported by probable cause. However, Defendant is not entitled to discharge. Conviction reversed and case remanded. On remand, the State may choose not to retry the case; may proceed to retrial without the seized evidence and Defendant’s statements; or may proceed to retrial and seek to introduce the disputed evidence, after a hearing to determine the voluntariness of the statements, and by offering additional evidence sufficient to carry its burden to allow for admission of the physical evidence.
State v. Stone, 430 S.W.3d 288 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014):

Even though trial court suppressed evidence and State filed an interlocutory appeal, where none of the arguments presented by the State on appeal were presented to the trial court, State failed to preserve anything for appeal.

Facts: The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The State filed an interlocutory appeal raising various legal arguments as to why the trial court erred. However, none of these arguments were presented to the trial court.

Holding: The State has failed to preserve anything for appeal by not presenting its arguments to the trial court. Motions to suppress typically involve complicated legal issues. Requiring arguments and claims to be presented to the trial court first in order to preserve them for appellate review allows the trial court to rule intelligently on, and fix, any errors itself. Here, the State did not give the trial court that opportunity. The trial court would have been free to reconsider its ruling on the motion to suppress, and to consider the State’s arguments, if the State had availed itself of that opportunity, but the State didn’t do so. Interlocutory order suppressing evidence affirmed.
State v. Beck, 2013 WL 5524826 (Mo. App. S.D. Oct. 7, 2013):

Merely crossing the fog line of road does not provide reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle for DWI.

Facts: Officer testified he observed Defendant’s vehicle cross the fog line separating the shoulder of the road from the driving lane, and stopped Defendant to investigate for DWI. Defendant then was arrested for DWI. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of the stop, and prevailed. The State appealed.

Holding: Erratic or unusual driving will provide reasonable suspicion for a stop to investigate DWI. But prior cases have held that merely crossing the fog line does not, by itself, provide such suspicion. The trial court granted the motion to suppress on the basis that Officer only saw vehicle cross the fog line. Even though the State argues that the Officer also saw the car weave in the lane, the trial court apparently did not accept this fact, and appellate court is required to defer to the trial court on factual findings.
State v. Flowers, 2013 WL 3027866 (Mo. App. S.D. June 18, 2013):

Where police received an anonymous tip that Defendant was threatening another man and a vehicle, but when they arrived at the location Defendant was sitting on an outside stairs and said only that he’d been in a fight with his girlfriend, the uncorroborated tip did not provide reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant, and drugs found after Defendant’s detention were suppressed.

Facts: Police received an anonymous call that Defendant was threatening another man and a vehicle. When police went to the location, they found Defendant sitting on some trailer steps next to some duffle bags. They asked him what happened, and he said he and his girlfriend had gotten into an argument, and he was moving out with his belongings. Meanwhile, another officer was let inside the trailer by a woman. This Officer observed a spoon with apparent drug residue. Meanwhile, another Officer detained Defendant, frisked him because he had put his hands in his pocket after being told not to do so, and eventually found a syringe in his pocket. Meanwhile, Officers saw the woman washing the spoon. Next, they saw drug paraphernalia around the stairs, which they had apparently overlooked earlier. Police then saw drug paraphernalia in an open duffle bag. They then searched the bags and found more drug evidence. Defendant moved to suppress the drug evidence.

Holding: An anonymous tip rarely provides reasonable suspicion that a person has committed a crime warranting a Terry stop absent corroboration of the tip. An accurate description of a subject’s readily observable location and appearance is reliable in a limited sense in that it correctly identifies the person whom the tipster accused. But such a tip does not show that the tipster had knowledge of concealed criminal activity. Here, the tipster stated that Defendant had threatened a male and a vehicle. But when police found Defendant, the only thing that they could corroborate was the Defendant was arguing with this girlfriend. This is not the same as the tip. At the time Officer detained and frisked Defendant, Officer was not aware of any evidence regarding a completely different kind of criminal activity than the tip – drug activity. Thus, Defendant was seized in violation of the 4^th Amendment without a warrant and without reasonable suspicion of specific, articulable facts that criminal activity was occurring or had occurred. The drug evidence at issue was the fruit of an unconstitutional stop, and no exception to the exclusionary rule applies. Evidence suppressed.
State v. Reed, 2013 WL 2285129 (Mo. App. S.D. May 24, 2013):

Even though (1) Officer thought Defendant-Driver’s action in not parking near Officer and waiting in car while waiting to pick someone up from an unrelated traffic stop was “unusual,” and (2) Officer was working on another traffic stop, where Officer failed to seek a search warrant before having a hospital draw Defendant-Driver’s blood, this violated the 4^th Amendment because the fact that alcohol dissipates in blood is not itself an exigent circumstance, and there were not special facts that excused failure to seek a warrant.

Facts: Defendant-Driver was called to pick up another person from an unrelated traffic stop. Defendant stopped and parked about 30 yards from the traffic stop and remained in his car. Officer thought this was “unusual.” Without Defendant’s consent or a warrant, Officer took Defendant to a hospital for a blood draw about two hours later. Defendant was then charged with DWI. He moved to suppress the blood draw.

Holding: The State argues that since alcohol dissipates in blood, this is an exigent circumstance that doesn’t require a warrant. The State also argues that the Officer was conducting another traffic stop and couldn’t get a warrant. However, Missouri v. McNeely, 81 USLW 4250, ___ U.S. ___ (U.S. April 17, 2013), held that the natural metabolism of alcohol does not per se create an exigent circumstance to justify not obtaining a warrant. The correct test is totality of circumstances. The thrust of the State’s case is that the Officer was too busy that night to get a warrant. However, the facts of this case indicate that this was a “routine” DWI case. There were no special facts or exigent circumstances justifying an exception to the warrant requirement. Blood-draw evidence suppressed.
State v. Foster, 2013 WL 1150035 (Mo. App. S.D. March 20, 2013):

Even though Officers observed Defendant’s left tires cross the centerline twice in less than a mile, where Defendant turned into his driveway and went in the garage, Officers did not have probable cause to enter the garage and arrest him, and exigent circumstances did not justify the warrantless entry.

Facts: Officers at night observed Defendant’s left tires cross centerline twice. As Defendant signaled to pull into his driveway, Officers activated emergency lights. Defendant pulled into his garage and parked. As the garage door was closing, one Officer got under the door and entered the garage. Officer asked Defendant to step outside. Defendant refused. Officer grabbed Defendant by the shoulder, took him outside and made him perform field sobriety tests. Officers then arrested Defendant for DWI and not driving on the right side of the road. The trial court suppressed all evidence obtained after the warrantless entry.

Holding: The State contends that the warrantless entry into the garage was justified by exigent circumstances and probable cause to arrest for DWI. A warrantless arrest within a home cannot be justified upon hot pursuit alone. A warrantless arrest in the home must be justified by exigent circumstances in addition to the pursuit. The State’s burden of proving exigent circumstances is especially heavy if the offense is relatively minor. A failure to drive on the right side of the road offense does not justify a warrantless entry. The State asserts that Officers had probable cause to arrest for DWI when they entered the garage, although the State concedes this case “is not the strongest case for probable cause or reasonable suspicion” and “seems to incorrectly suggest that one is as good as the other for arrest purposes.” There was not sufficient evidence to show probable cause here. Suppression affirmed.
State v. Emmett, 2011 WL 3610431 (Mo. App. S.D. 8/16/11):

Where (1) store clerk “assumed” Defendant had shoplifted; (2) Officer searched Defendant and her car and found drugs; (3) Defendant cross-examined witnesses at motion to suppress hearing; and (4) trial court suppressed the evidence, the State’s contention that the evidence was uncontested is wrong because Defendant cross-examined witnesses, and trial court was free to believe Defendant’s version of events and suppress evidence.

Facts: Although a store clerk did not see Defendant take anything from convenience store, clerk “assumed” Defendant took something and called police. Officer asked Defendant to empty her pockets and found pills. Officer then read Defendant her Miranda rights, and obtained her consent to search her car. Officer saw through the car window a bottle of oil that looked like one that was missing from the store. Officer searched car and found drug residue and other drug evidence. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, claiming that her arrest was unlawful because made without probable cause and the evidence in the car must be suppressed as a fruit of the poisonous tree. The trial court suppressed the evidence. The State appealed.

Holding: The State claims that the evidence was found during a search incident to a lawful arrest. The State begins its argument by saying that “the essential facts are not in dispute” and then treats all its witnesses’ testimony as true. However, nothing reveals that the facts were not disputed. Defendant cross-examined witnesses and elicited testimony such as “I don’t recall” and admissions that the clerk “assumed” Defendant had shoplifted. Facts may be contested by simple argument or cross-examination. Here, Defendant contested the facts, so we must view the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. The trial court was free to believe or disbelieve the State’s evidence, and evidently was not persuaded that the State legally seized Defendant, legally searched her pockets or legally arrested her. Motion to suppress affirmed.
State v. Bates, No. SD30701 (Mo. App. S.D. 5/13/11):

Where (1) bondsmen and sheriff’s deputies went to house to search for person who skipped bond; (2) in backyard of house deputy saw marijuana plant in a bucket; and (3) deputy then obtained a warrant to search house and found drugs in a shed, the drugs are suppressed because the backyard was within the curtilage of the house and should not have been searched without a warrant; the subsequent warrant was fruit of poisonous tree.