Case Law Update: 2011-2014 Cumulative Edition

Facts: Officer stopped Defendant for having one headlight out. Upon stopping Defendant, Officer found that Defendant was intoxicated. Defendant was charged with DWI. He moved to suppress all evidence after the stop because he contended there was not reasonable suspicion to stop since the police car video showed the headlight was on.

Holding: The trial court found that the police car video showed that the headlight was on. While Officer testified that the video was showing glare, the trial court was free to make a factual finding to the contrary. The trial court’s findings are entitled to deference on appeal even though the video is equally available to the appellate court. Nevertheless, the appellate court reviews the video and holds the trial court’s finding to be reasonable. Since the only justification for the stop was the headlight allegedly being out, there was no reasonable suspicion to stop the car. The State claims in the alternative that the Officer mistakenly thought the headlight was out. However, the Officer passed the car at a medium speed in good weather conditions. Officer’s mistaken belief that the headlight was out was not objectively reasonable. All evidence after the stop suppressed as fruit of poisonous tree.
* Heien v. North Carolina, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 530 (2014):

Holding: A reasonable mistake of law can support reasonable suspicion to uphold a seizure under the Fourth Amendment; thus, where law was ambiguous as to whether car had to have one or two working rear lights, and Officer stopped car with only one rear light, the stop was not invalid even though Officer was mistaken as to how many lights the law actually required, and drugs found during the stop need not be suppressed.
* Riley v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 2014 WL 2864483 (U.S. June 25, 2014):

Holding: 4^th Amendment generally requires that police obtain a search warrant before searching a cell phone, even where the phone is seized incident to an arrest. Here, one defendant’s phone was searched without a warrant after he was stopped for a traffic offense; the information on the phone was used to convict him of a prior shooting. The other defendant was arrested after police observed him selling drugs, seized him and searched his phone without a warrant; the information on his phone was used to find his house and obtain a search warrant for the house, at which drugs were found.
* Navarette v. California, 95 Crim. L. Rep. 89, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1683 (U.S. 4/22/14):

Holding: Even though 911 caller to police was anonymous, where caller reported nearly being run off the road by a specific vehicle, this provided reasonable suspicion for police to stop the vehicle for drunken driving; the single anonymous tip contained reasonable indicia of reliability because it described a specific vehicle and 911 technology safeguards against making false reports with impunity.

* Maryland v. King, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 325, ___ U.S. ___ (U.S. 6/3/13):

Holding: When Officers make an arrest supported by probable cause for a serious crime and detain Defendant in custody, the taking of a DNA sample is a reasonable booking procedure similar to photographing and fingerprinting does not violate the 4^th Amendment.
* Missouri v. McNeely, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 92, ___ U.S. ___ (U.S. 4/17/13):

Holding: In DWI cases, the natural dissipation of alcohol in Driver’s blood does not constitute an exigent circumstance in every case sufficient to justify a nonconsensual blood test without a search warrant.
* Florida v. Jardines, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 796, ___ U.S. ___ (U.S. 3/26/13):

Holding: Police who took a drug-sniffing dog onto homeowner’s front porch to investigate the contents of the home conducted a search within the meaning of the 4^th Amendment, because there is no customary invitation to enter the curtilage simply to conduct a search.
* Fernandez v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 599, 134 S.Ct. 1126 (U.S. 2/25/14):

Holding: Even though a resident objected to a warrantless police search of residence, where police arrested this resident for domestic assault and removed him from the scene, and a second resident consented to search the residence, the 4^th Amendment was not violated; a resident’s objections to a warrantless search dissipate once that resident is no longer present, and it does not matter if the police removed them due to their arrest.
* Bailey v. U.S., 92 Crim. L. Rep. 582, ___ U.S. ___ (U.S. 2/19/13):

Holding: The rule of Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), which allows officers executing a search warrant to detain occupants of the premises to ensure officer safety, prevent flight, and promote orderly search, does not allow them to detain former occupants who are no longer in the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched.
* Florida v. Harris, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 562, ___ U.S. ___ (U.S. 2/19/13):

Holding: Certification of dog by a bona fide organization is generally sufficient to establish that dog is reliable enough in its reactions to establish probable cause for a search.
* Florence v. Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington County, N.J., ___ U.S. ___, 91 Crim. L. Rep. 5 (U.S. 4/2/12):
Holding: Jails may conduct warrantless strip searches of persons admitted to the jail regardless of the seriousness of the crimes charged.
* Messerschmidt v. Millender, ___ U.S. ___, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 709 (U.S. 2/22/12):

Holding: Even though Officers executed a bad search warrant, they have qualified immunity from suit where they ran the warrant application past supervisory officers and the prosecutor before presenting it to the magistrate.
* U.S. v. Jones, ___ U.S. ___, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 537 (U.S. 1/23/12):

Holding: Placing a GPS monitoring device on vehicle and gathering its location information without a warrant violates 4^th Amendment.
* U.S. v. Jones, 2012 WL 171117 (U.S. 2012):

Holding: Use of GPS tracking device constituted a “search” under the Fourth Amendment because the Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.

* Perry v. New Hampshire, ___ U.S. ___, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 500 (U.S. 1/11/12):

Holding: Even though an eyewitness identification may have been suggestive, it is not subject to suppression unless law enforcement engaged in improper conduct in orchestrating it; instead of suppression, defendants can rely on other safeguards such as cross-examination, expert testimony, jury instructions on the suspect reliability of eyewitness identification, the reasonable doubt standard, and the general rule that requires suppression of relevant evidence when it is more prejudicial than probative.
* Kentucky v. King, ___ U.S. ___, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 205, 2011 WL 1832821 (U.S. 5/16/11):

Holding: Police may rely on exigent circumstances exception to 4^th Amendment even when they had a role in creating the exigency, so long as they did not engage in or threaten to engage in conduct that violates the 4^th Amendment; hence, where police were in an apartment building, smelled marijuana outside a door, banged on the door and said “Police,” and heard noise that they thought was destruction of evidence, police could enter the apartment without a warrant to search for illegal drugs.
* Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, ___ U.S. ___, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 308 (U.S. 5/31/11):

Holding: (1) Policy initiated by Atty. General Ashcroft to detain suspected terrorists as material witnesses did not violate any clearly established 4^th Amendment right, and thus, Ashcroft was entitled to qualified immunity; and (2) an arrest warrant that is validly obtained under the material witness statute, 18 USC 3144, cannot be held unconstitutional on the basis of subjective intent.
* Davis v. U.S., ___ U.S. ___, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 461, 131 S.Ct. 2419 (U.S. 6/16/11):

Holding: “Good faith” exception to exclusionary rule allows admission of evidence obtained by police in an unconstitutional search that, at the time it was conducted, complied with binding judicial precedent that was later overturned; although Arizona v. Gant (U.S. 2009) is retroactive to cases pending on direct review when Gant was decided, whether the exclusionary rule applies is a separate issue; the exclusionary rule applies when necessary to deter police misconduct, but an officer who conducts a search in reliance on binding appellate precedent acts reasonably and the deterrent effect of such exclusion can only be to discourage the officer from doing his job.
U.S. v. Vazquez, 2013 WL 3752475 (1^st Cir. 2013):

Holding: Where FBI Agent told Defendant that they would conduct a warrantless search of her house if she didn’t consent, her acquiescence to the search was not valid consent.
U.S. v. Gifford, 2013 WL 4054496 (1^st Cir. 2013):

Holding: Even though confidential informant said that Defendant was growing marijuana in a house, the search warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause where electric records indicating lower electric usage at a much smaller home offered as a comparator did not show a suspiciously high electric use at Defendant’s home, thus corroborating the tip, and second home used as a comparator omitted certain facts that might explain higher usage at Defendant’s home, such as a horse breeding operation.
U.S. v. Gifford, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 669 (1^st Cir. 8/13/13):

Holding: (1) Probable cause for a search warrant was not provided by an unidentified informer’s statements to police that Defendant had a marijuana growing operation in his house, since there was nothing in the warrant affidavit indicating the informer’s basis for his knowledge or past reliability; and (2) the warrant affiant recklessly omitted fact from affidavit that a house used to compare electricity use with Defendant’s residence was not similar to Defendant’s house.
U.S. v. Vasquez, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 563 (1^st Cir. 7/18/13):

Holding: Resident’s consent to search of house was not valid where it was obtained by sincere, but erroneous representation by FBI agent that state parole officers were on the verge of executing a warrantless search regardless of whether resident consented; such consent were merely acquiescence; the touchstone of the 4^th Amendment is reasonableness, not subjective good faith; “otherwise, unreasonable but honest officers could parlay unlawful grounds for conducting searches into lawful searches merely be using the prospect of the unlawful search as a means of securing acquiescence.”
U.S. v. Wurie, 93 Crim. L. Re. 268, 2013 WL 2129119 (1^st Cir. 5/17/13):

Holding: 4^th Amendment’s exception to warrant requirement for searches incident to arrest does not allow searches of data on arrestee’s cellphones.
U.S. v. Dapolito, 2013 WL 1458733 (1^st Cir. 2013):

Holding: Even though Defendant in alcove of public square appeared to be intoxicated and lacked photo identification (although he did have a government benefit card with his name on it), this did not provide reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop and search where there was no evidence of any recent burglaries in area.
U.S. v. Camacho, 2011 WL 5865650 (1^st Cir. 2011):

Holding: Where the only thing associating defendant with a reported street fight was defendant’s proximity to the scene of the fight, police officers did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when they stopped the defendant.
U.S. v. D’Andrea, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 209 (1^st Cir. 5/10/11):

Holding: Where a private hacker surreptitiously figured out Defendant’s computer password and found evidence of sexual abuse of minors on the computer, the 4^th Amendment private search doctrine should not be applied; “just because a private party violates a person’s expectation of privacy does not mean that the expectation of privacy no longer exists or is not reasonable.”
U.S. v. Bailey, 2014 WL 657932 (2d Cir. 2014):

Holding: Even though Officer told Defendant he was not being arrested but only being detained while a search warrant was executed, where Defendant was handcuffed and made incriminating statements without being given Miranda warnings, the statements must be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment because the initial handcuffing of Defendant violated the reasonable bounds of a Terry stop.
U.S. v. Freeman, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 237 (2d Cir. 11/7/13):

Holding: Even though informers who call 911 emergency lines now have their phone numbers recorded by caller ID, this does not by itself make their tips sufficiently reliable to justify an investigative stop; there still must be additional indicia of reliability.
U.S. v. Galpin, 2013 WL 3185299 (2d Cir. 2013):

Holding: Warrant authorizing search for child pornography was overbroad and violated 4^th Amendment, where the only crime specified in the warrant was failure of a sex offender to register their Internet service provider account or online identity; this did not provide probable cause to believe Defendant possessed child pornography, even though there was probable cause to believe Defendant was communicating with and luring young males to his residence.
Winfield v. Trotter, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 730 (2d Cir. 3/6/13):

Holding: Even though Driver consented to search of her car, the search exceeded scope of consent where Officer opened and read text of Driver’s mail; a person who consents to search of their car for contraband would not reasonably expect that they were consenting for Officer to read personal papers.
Swartz v. Insogna, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 431 (2d Cir. 1/3/13):

Holding: “Giving the finger” to police does not justify a traffic stop under 4^th Amendment.
U.S. v. Voustianiouk, 2012 WL 2849655 (2d Cir. 2012):

Holding: Where search warrant explicitly authorized search of a building’s first-floor apartment, the “good faith” exception to warrant requirement did not justify Officers’ search of the second-floor apartment.
U.S. v. Simmons, 2011 WL 5067098 (2d Cir. 2011):

Holding: Exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless search of defendant’s bedroom did not exist where defendant was roused from bed, placed outside his bedroom, was clad only in his underwear and had been searched for weapons, and was closely monitored.
U.S. v. Clark, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 754, 2011 WL 781597 (2d Cir. 3/8/11):

Holding: 4^th Amendment’s particularity provision requires a warrant that authorizes search of the entirety of multi-unit apartment building be supported by probable cause to believe the object of the search can be found in each unit of the building.
U.S. v. Hassock, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 573 (2d Cir. 1/28/11):

Holding: Where Officers knocked on door and a woman gave permission to enter to see who else was in the house, Officers’ search under a bed (where they found a gun) could not be justified as a “protective sweep.”
U.S. v. Katzin, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 140, 732 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 10/22/13):

Holding: (1) 4^th Amendment requires a search warrant for police to place GPS tracker on car; and (2) “good faith” exception to exclusionary rule based on reliance on (now) bad case law doesn’t apply unless the case law was binding on the officers in that jurisdiction; “any … officer who acts primarily in reliance on the 4^th Amendment proclamation of our sister circuits does so at his own peril for purposes of the exclusionary rule.”
U.S. v. Pavulak, 2012 WL 5870742 (3d Cir. 2012):

Holding: Even though Defendant had prior child sex convictions, probable cause for a search warrant to search for child pornography required more than a conclusory statement that sought-after images were child pornography.
Virgin Islands v. John, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 774, 2011 WL 3559933 (3d Cir. 8/15/11):

Holding: Where Defendant was charged with child molestation, a warrant for his home to search for child pornography was invalid where the search warrant did not allege any connection between child molestation and child pornography, even assuming such a connection exists.
Ray v. Township of Warren, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 290 (3d Cir. 11/23/10):

Holding: 4^th Amendment “community caretaking doctrine” never justifies warrantless search of a home.
U.S. v. Robertson, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 336 (4^th Cir. 12/3/13):

Holding: Where (1) Defendant and others were at a bus shelter when 4 or 5 police sought to search them, and (2) police blocked the exit, asked accusatory questions about whether Defendant had anything illegal, and never said the people were free to leave, Defendant’s “begrudging submission” to a search when he raised his hands and let Officers search him in response to a request to search was not voluntary consent to search; Officers initial accusatory questioning, combined with a police dominated atmosphere, clearly communicated to Defendant that he was not free to leave or refuse the request to search.
U.S. v. Fisher, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 43 (4^th Cir. 4/1/13):

Holding: Officer’s lies on a search warrant rendered the Defendant’s guilty plea involuntary, where defense lawyer testified that she advised Defendant to plead guilty because there were no grounds to challenge the warrant (but there would have been if the lies had been known).
U.S. v. Yengel, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 623, 2013 WL 563529 (4^th Cir. 2/15/13):

Holding: Even though police were called to an armed domestic dispute and arrested a suspect there, they were not justified under the exigent circumstances exception to search a locked closet in the residence without a warrant.
U.S. v. Black, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 701, 707 F.3d 531 (4^th Cir. 2013):

Holding: Police department’s “rule of two” which instructs Officers to search for a second weapon whenever they find a first weapon at a scene does not justify detaining and frisking all bystanders when a gun is found on a person; such a rule would lead to absurd results, such as searching all priests in a monastery if a person carrying a gun happened to walk on the premises.
U.S. v. Watson, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 384 (4^th Cir. 1/2/13):

Holding: Even though police had probable cause to search a building for drugs, they were not permitted to detain the occupants of the building until they got a warrant where they had no probable cause to believe that the occupants were connected to the drug activity.
U.S. v. Sowards, 2012 WL 2386605 (4^th Cir. 2012):

Holding: Officer’s uncorroborated visual speed estimate that Defendant was driving 75 mph in a 70 mph zone did not provide reasonably trustworthy information to provide probable cause to stop the car; while Officer may have been able to stop car if there was a greater differential between the posted speed limit and Officer’s estimate, Officer’s naked-eye estimate that car was traveling only slightly faster than speed limit requires additional indicia of reliability to support probable cause.
U.S. v. Gaines, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 627 (4^th Cir. 1/17/12):

Holding: A defendant’s resistance of a lawful arrest following an illegal traffic stop will not always break the chain of causation between the stop and the arresting officers’ seizure of evidence.
U.S. v. Gaines, 2012 WL 247991 (4^th Cir. 2012):

Holding: Where discovery of a firearm was the product of an unlawful search, defendant’s subsequent and independent act of assault was not an intervening event for the purpose of determining whether the “taint” of the unlawful search was purged.
U.S. v. Powell, 2011 WL 5517347 (4^th Cir. 2011):

Holding: Police officers lacked reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous where the only information they possessed was that defendant had “priors” for armed robbery and his driver’s license had been suspended.
U.S. v. Hill, 2011 WL 3626788 (4^th Cir. 2011):

Holding: Even though police heard unresponsive noise coming from a house, where they had an arrest warrant for a particular person and did not believe that person was in the house, police could not enter the house.
U.S. v. Edwards, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 510 (4^th Cir. 12/29/11):

Holding: Police officers violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights when they searched his underwear subsequent to arrest on a public street and removed a baggie that was tied to his penis because the search was unreasonably intrusive.



U.S. v. Massenburg, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 766 (4^th Cir. 8/15/11):

Holding: 4^th Amendment “collective knowledge” doctrine cannot justify a search where one officer knew information but never communicated it to anyone else; doctrine is limited to situations where one officer directs another officer to do a search and does not authorize a reviewing judge to aggregate the individual knowledge of all officers to justify cause to search.
U.S. v. Digiovanni, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 741 (4^th Cir. 8/2/11):

Holding: Officer violated 4^th Amendment during traffic stop by prolonging the stop in order to ask questions about drugs and consent to search.
U.S. v. Foster, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 751, 2011 WL 711858 (4^th Cir. 3/2/11):

Holding: Even though (1) Officer knew Defendant had a prior marijuana offense; (2) Defendant sat up in parked car after seeing Officer; and (3) Defendant made “frenzied arm movements,” this did not provide reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop; 4^th Circuit expresses concern that prosecution in these search and seizure appeals always spins innocent facts into a “web of deception” to justify the police conduct.
Bellotte v. Edwards, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 548 (4^th Cir. 1/11/11):