Case Law Update: 2011-2014 Cumulative Edition

Holding: Juvenile Petitioners made a prima facie showing that new constitutional rule banning juvenile LWOP was retroactive, so as to permit filing of second habeas petition.
U.S. v. Tyler, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 33, 2013 WL 5480709 (3d Cir. 10/3/13):

Holding: U.S. Supreme Court’s new interpretation of federal obstruction of justice statute set forth in Fowler v. U.S. (U.S. 2011), rendered petitioner “actually innocent” to overcome procedural bar for filing second habeas petition; here, the record failed to show that petitioner contemplated a particular federal proceeding, or that it is reasonably likely at least one of the murder victim’s communications with law enforcement would have been with a federal agent.
Grant v. Lockett, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 764 (3d Cir. 3/7/13):

Holding: State court unreasonably applied federal law in holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to discover that a key prosecution witness was on parole at time of his testimony because there was no formal deal for the witness to receive favorable treatment; “Poison lurks in the bias that can arise from the witness’s subjective state of mind, regardless of whether the witness’s belief arose from an actual agreement with, or representation of, the prosecutor.”
U.S. v. Thomas, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 61, 2013 WL 1442489 (3d Cir. 4/10/13):

Holding: Federal prisoners seeking habeas relief under 28 USC 2255 can receive requests to extend the limitations period for relief even before they have filed their substantive claims, unlike state prisoners seeking relief under 28 USC 2254 (2d Circuit has disagrees with this).
Ross v. Varano, 2013 WL 1363525 (3d Cir. 2013):

Holding: Petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling of time to file habeas where his direct appeal appellate attorney misled him as to the status of his appeal, the appellate court’s refusal to replace his attorney, and neglect by his attorney including refusal to accept petitioner’s calls and misstatements of law.
Johnson v. Folino, 2013 WL 163841 (3d Cir. 2013):

Holding: Remand of habeas case was required to determine materiality of prosecutor’s Brady violation in failing to disclose that State’s star witness was a suspect in multiple open police investigations.
Han Tak Lee v. Glunt, 2012 WL 247993 (3^rd Cir. 2012):

Holding: Federal habeas petitioner, convicted of first-degree murder and arson, satisfied the good cause standard for conducting discovery in that his petition relied upon scientific developments since his trial and that his expert’s independent analysis of the fire scene would invalidate the expert testimony from the trial.
Blystone v. Horn, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 511 (3d Cir. 12/22/11):

Holding: A motion to alter or amend a judgment denying habeas relief filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) does not have to satisfy the federal statute’s requirements for second or successive habeas petitions.
U.S. v. Orocio, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 620 (3d Cir. 6/29/11):

Holding: Padilla is retroactive to cases on collateral review.
Kindler v. Horn, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 185 (3d Cir. 4/29/11):

Holding: Even though Pennsylvania court applied that State’s “escape rule,” that rule does not bar federal habeas review.
MacDonald v. Moose, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 749 (4^th Cir. 3/12/13):

Holding: Virginia state court unreasonably applied federal law when it upheld conviction for adult who had oral sex with a minor under state statute that criminalizes oral sex since this violates Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which struck down an anti-sodomy law between consenting adults under due process clause; 4^th Circuit holds that although State can proscribe oral sex between adults and minors, it cannot convict petitioner/Defendant under a general, anti-oral sex law (not a “child sex” law), which it did here.
Wolfe v. Clarke, 2012 WL 3518481 (4^th Cir. 2012):

Holding: Petitioner succeeded in establishing cause and a prejudice for procedurally defaulted Brady claim by concurrently establishing the elements of the Brady claim.
Teleguz v. Pearson, 2012 WL 3125990 (4^th Cir. 2012):

Holding: District court judgment was vacated where several prosecution witnesses had recanted their testimony and it was unclear whether the district court had properly applied Schlup’s gateway actual innocence exception to procedurally defaulted habeas claims.
U.S. v. Akinsade, 2012 WL 3024723 (4^th Cir. 2012):

Holding: Defendant was entitled to writ of coram nobis alleging ineffective assistance of counsel where he was no longer in custody on his criminal case; had no reason to challenge his prior conviction until he was detained by immigration authorities; and the risk of deportation was an adverse consequence sufficient to create an Article III case or controversy.
Jackson v. Kelly, 2011 WL 1534571 (4^th Cir. 2011):

Holding: Even though petitioner submitted an oversized brief to the Virginia Supreme Court along with a motion to file extra pages, where the initial brief was not rejected but petitioner was directed to file a “corrected brief” with fewer pages, the initial filing was a “properly filed application” under AEDPA.
U.S. v. MacDonald, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 122 (4^th Cir. 4/19/11):

Holding: (1) Petitioner can bring successive habeas petition by using “actual innocence” gateway and court should consider all previously presented evidence in considering claim; (2) once district court has jurisdiction to consider a successive petition, it has jurisdiction to consider a motion to amend that petition to add a claim.
U.S. v. Thomas, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 435 (4^th Cir. 12/29/10):

Holding: Watson v. U.S., 552 U.S. 74 (2007)(holding that a person does not “use” a firearm under 18 USC 924(c)(1)(A) when he receives it in trade for drugs) applies retroactively on collateral review.
U.S. v. Urias-Marrafo, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 705, 2014 WL 805455 (5^th Cir. 2/28/14):
Holding: (1) Court must consider Padilla claim even if presented in motion to withdraw guilty plea, rather than in post-conviction collateral attack action, because a court should address Padilla claims sooner rather than later; and (2) even though guilty plea judge gave some warnings about immigration consequences, this did not cure counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to warn of such consequences, because it is counsel’s duty, not the court’s, to give such warnings.
Higgins v. Cain, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 446 (5^th Cir. 6/18/13):

Holding: Even though federal courts are generally prohibited from hearing evidence outside the record of the state court proceeding, federal judges presented with claims of racial discrimination in jury selection may consider evidence that was not before the state court; here, the state postconviction court did not have before it the transcript of voir dire; the 5^th Circuit holds that the federal court can consider the transcript because it is not “new evidence” introduced in federal court “in the first instance.”
Smith v. Cain, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 576 (5^th Cir. 2/11/13):

Holding: Pinholster’s limitation on federal evidentiary hearings does not apply once a district court has determined that the state court unreasonably applied federal law.
Strickland v. Thayer, 2012 WL 5418369 (5^th Cir. 2012):
Holding: Where a federal habeas court had decided one claim and dismissed unexhausted claims without prejudice stating that Petitioner could return to state court on them, Petitioner’s new petition after exhausting the state claims was not a second or successive one.
Mark v. Thaler, 2011 WL 2627896 (5^th Cir. 2011):

Holding: Even though inmate voluntarily dismissed his direct appeal, the time for filing a federal habeas petition began to run at the end of the 30-day period in which inmate could have sought further direct review in State court, rather than on the dismissal date.
Martinez v. Caldwell, 2011 WL 2347708 (5^th Cir. 2011):

Holding: Pretrial detainee’s challenge to state court’s reversal of double jeopardy relief was subject to de novo review under AEDPA’s section proving general grant of habeas authority.
In re Sparks, 2011 WL 4137762 (5^th Cir. 2011):

Holding: Second habeas petition was authorized where Supreme Court issued new retroactive law that prohibited life without parole sentences for juveniles who did not commit homicides.
Sutton v. Carpenter, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 770 (6^th Cir. 3/19/14):

Holding: 6^th Circuit applies procedural default exception of Martinez v. Ryan to petitioners from Tennesee, because state’s procedures make it “highly unlikely” an ineffective counsel claim can be raised on direct appeal.


Jefferson v. U.S., 2013 WL 4838793 (6^th Cir. 2013):

Holding: AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations for claims that could have been discovered through “due diligence,” does not require a petitioner to repeatedly seek out evidence that the Gov’t had a constitutional duty to disclose; this is particularly so where Gov’t assured petitioner that it had fulfilled its disclosure obligations.
Ajan v. U.S., 94 Crim. L. Rep. 118 (6^th Cir. 10/3/13):

Holding: Where habeas Petitioner was granted some sentencing relief in the form of a new sentencing judgment under 28 USC 2255 (though Petitioner sought a new sentencing hearing), Petitioner need not obtain a certificate of appealability to appeal the relief granted, because it was not a “final order” in the 2255 proceeding but a new judgment that did not exist at the time the motion was brought.
Lovins v. Parker, 2013 WL 1235611 (6^th Cir. 2013):

Holding: State court unreasonably applied federal law in holding that Blakely, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)(regarding facts judges can or cannot find for sentencing purposes) did not apply to petitioner whose conviction and sentence were not yet final at time Blakely was decided.
McClellan v. Rapalje, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 423 (6^th Cir. 1/11/13):

Holding: Despite Harrington v. Richter (U.S. 2011) that a state court’s summary decision constitutes an adjudication on the merits requiring deference, a federal habeas court is not required to defer to a state appellate court decision where the state court did not have the trial record when it denied Petitioner’s claims.
Cleveland v. Bradshaw, 2012 WL 3890945 (6^th Cir. 2012):

Holding: Petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for his federal habeas petition where he alleged a credible actual innocence claim based on witness recantation, an expert which shortened the time period when the murder could have occurred, and evidence that Defendant could not have returned from another city to the place of the murder in time.
Amborse v. Booker, 2012 WL 2428803 (6^th Cir. 2012):

Holding: Petitioner showed cause for failure to raise jury selection issue earlier where unbeknownst to Petitioner, a computer glitch caused minorities to be underrepresented in the venire pool.
Perkins v. McQuiggin, 2012 WL 661782 (6^th Cir. 2012):

Holding: A habeas petitioner’s credible claim of actual innocence equitably tolled the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) statute of limitation, regardless of whether the petitioner pursued the writ with reasonable diligence.
Rashad v. Lafler, 91 Crim. L. Rep. 104 (6^th Cir. 4/5/12):

Holding: State court judgment was final for habeas purposes only after direct review of a resentencing that was ordered at the same time the conviction was affirmed.
Ata v. Scutt, 2011 WL 5903658 (6^th Cir. 2011):

Holding: Habeas petitioner was entitled to evidentiary hearing regarding whether his mental incompetence warranted tolling the habeas limitations period because his motion alleged specific enough facts to create a causal link between his untimely petition and his mental incompetence and his allegations were consistent with the record.
Black v. Bell, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 381 (6^th Cir. 12/15/11):

Holding: Habeas petitioners in Tenn. can seek Atkins relief for mental retardation on basis of new Tenn. caselaw, even if the state court had rejected the Atkins claim before the new caselaw.
Storey v. Vasbinder, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 16 (6^th Cir. 9/16/11):

Holding: Habeas petition that reinstated Defendant’s wrongfully denied direct appeal does not trigger bar on “successive or second” habeas petitions, even if claims could have been brought in the earlier petition.
D’Amrosio v. Bagley, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 800, 2011 WL 3795171 (6^th Cir. 8/29/11):

Holding: Federal court has jurisdiction to bar a state retrial of a habeas corpus petitioner when the state has failed to comply with a previous conditional habeas writ.
Carter v. Bradshaw, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 317 (6^th Cir. 5/26/11):

Holding: Petitioners have right to be mentally competent to assist counsel in federal habeas proceedings.
Hooper v. Ryan, 2013 WL 4779579 (7^th Cir. 2013):

Holding: Habeas petitioner was entitled to evidentiary hearing in federal court on Batson, where State court unreasonably concluded that striking all 7 African-American members of a venire did not make out a prima facie case of discrimination.
Weddington v. Zatecky, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 615 (7^th Cir. 8/1/13):

Holding: Federal habeas judge who had presided over a state trial when she was a state trial court judge must recuse herself from hearing the federal habeas case, since she effectively would be reviewing issues on which she had already passed judgment in state court.
Estremera v. U.S., 93 Crim. L. Rep. 647, 2013 WL 38890210 (7^th Cir. 7/30/13):

Holding: Federal time limit for filing federal habeas petition was tolled during time that petitioner was in ad-seg and had no access to law library, because Sec. 2255(f)(2) provides that prisoners who fail to timely file a petition due to a government-initiated “impediment” must be given one-year from time impediment was lifted to file.
Shaw v. Wilson, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 586 (7^th Cir. 7/24/13):

Holding: Even though state court postconviction court had suggested that claim that appellate counsel had failed to raise lacked merit, this was not entitled to deference in federal habeas because the relevant issue is not the state court’s determination of the merits of petitioner’s state law claim but the strength of that claim relative to the weaker claim that counsel chose to pursue; hence, the state court unreasonably applied federal law, and habeas relief is granted on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
U.S. v. Obeid, 2013 WL 646511 (7^th Cir. 2013):

Holding: Habeas petition was not prohibited second or successive petition where the factual predicate for the petition did not come into existence until after time had expired; Gov’t had promised to treat petitioner and co-defendant equally but later gave co-defendant a more favorable sentence.
Warren v. Baenen, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 72 (7^th Cir. 4/3/13):

Holding: State court decision rejecting ineffectiveness claim was not entitled to deference when the decision was based on a rationale that was different from the one the prisoner asserted in his federal habeas petition.
Woolley v. Rednour, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 359 (7^th Cir. 12/14/12):

Holding: SCOTUS decision in Harrington v. Richter (U.S. 2011) did not change usual rule that habeas court review of a state decision that rested on one prong of Strickland should be analyzed under the other prong de novo.
Purvis v. U.S., 90 Crim. L. Rep. 295 (7^th Cir. 11/28/11):

Holding: Where federal defendant seeks to attack a state conviction underlying a federal recidivist state, federal court can use “stay and abbey” procedure.
Vitrano v. U.S., 89 Crim. L. Rep. 545 (7^th Cir. 6/21/11):

Holding: A motion to amend a habeas petition under 28 USC 2255 was not a successive petition, but was actually a second petition filed after petitioner had abandoned the petition he wanted to amend.
Coleman v. Hardy, 2010 WL 4670206 (7^th Cir. 2010):

Holding: Defendant was entitled to hearing on actual innocence where his habeas petition alleged new evidence of innocence, including a co-defendant affidavit saying Defendant had nothing to do with crime, and affidavits of alibi witnesses.
Sasser v. Hobbs, 735 F.3d 833 (8^th Cir. 2013):

Holding: (1) Because Arkansas does not as a matter of course provide new counsel for a Defendant on direct appeal but has trial counsel conduct the appeal, the Arkansas system violates Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911 (2013), because it does not “as a matter of its structure, design [or] operation” allow a “meaningful opportunity to present a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.” This is especially true because in Trevino, Texas provided new counsel on direct appeal, but the Supreme Court still found Texas’ procedure to be insufficient; and (2) Because Arkansas did not allow for a meaningful opportunity to raise ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, Arkansas’ postconviction proceeding was the first opportunity to raise ineffective assistance, and Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), creates an exception to the Coleman rule that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel does not provide cause to excuse procedural default for failure to raise postconviction claims. Thus, under Trevino and Martinez, postconviction counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness establishes “cause” for any procedural default Defendant may have had in not presenting his claims to the Arkansas courts in the first instance.
U.S. v. Daily, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 465, 2013 WL 149809 (8^th Cir. 1/15/13):

Holding: Even though the one-year deadline for a habeas petition expired under 28 USC 2255, a court can still fix a sentencing error, sua sponte, similar to plain error.
Paulson v. Newton Correctional Facility Warden, 2013 WL 105652 (8^th Cir. 2013):

Holding: Remand of habeas case was required to determine whether State court’s application of Strickland was contrary to clearly established federal law; state court had used a “preponderance of evidence” standard but Strickland uses a “reasonable probability” standard.
Blake v. Baker, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 748 (9^th Cir. 3/14/14):

Holding: Petitioner who shows that postconviction counsel was ineffective under Martinez v. Ryan can also obtain a stay to exhaust a claim in State court.
Clabourne v. Ryan, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 706 (9^th Cir. 3/5/14):
Holding: Under Martinez v. Ryan, Petitioner must show “cause” for default, i.e., his post-conviction counsel was ineffective under Strickland, and that there was a reasonable probability the result of the postconviction proceeding would have been different, and must show Coleman “prejudice,” i.e., that the trial-level ineffectiveness claim was “substantial” or had “some merit;” here, Petitioner claimed his capital re-sentencing counsel was ineffective in failing to object to a confession which had been admissible at the time of the original trial, but which became inadmissible as a result of new case law before the re-sentencing; the 9^th Circuit remands to the district court to make Martinez findings in the first instance.
Vosigien v. Persson, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 580 (9^th Cir. 2/13/14):

Holding: Even though Defendant pleaded guilty to offense, he can use “actual innocence” gateway to later present an otherwise-untimely habeas petition on the offense for which he was innocent, without making a showing that he was also innocent of other the offenses to which he also pleaded guilty; here, Defendant was legally innocent of some counts due to change in interpretation of statute under which he was convicted.
Nguyen v. Curry, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 330, 2013 WL 6246285 (9^th Cir. 12/4/13):
Holding: Martinez applies to overcome default in federal habeas where State postconviction counsel failed to raise ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel (disagreeing with 8^th and 10^th Circuits).
Smith v. Ore. Bd. of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 94 Crim. L. Rep. (9^th Cir. 11/26/13):

Holding: A constitutional claim that a habeas Petitioner failed to raise at his state trial is not barred from federal habeas review if the state courts summarily denied the claim without expressly stating that they were relying on the default.
Lujan v. Garcia, 2013 WL 5788761 (9^th Cir. 2013):

Holding: State court holding that Defendant’s inculpatory trial testimony could be considered as evidence of guilt even though his confession had been improperly admitted in the Prosecutor’s case-in-chief violated 5^th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and warranted habeas relief.
James v. Ryan, 2013 WL 5763203 (9^th Cir. 2013):

Holding: Federal court was not required to defer to state court findings of no ineffective assistance where the state courts never discussed or analyzed the merits of the claim, denied it on procedural grounds, and merely concluded that no evidentiary hearing was necessary.
Detrich v. Ryan, 2013 WL 4712729 (9^th Cir. 2013):