Case Law Update: 2011-2014 Cumulative Edition

Holding: Trial court’s limiting voir dire to 5 minutes per panel in complex felony trial denied fair opportunity to explore jurors’ qualifications.
People v. Hecker, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 284 (N.Y. 11/30/10):

Holding: Where trial judge erroneously disallowed Defendant’s strikes under Batson, this requires automatic reversal of conviction.
State v. Rogers, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 159 (Or. 10/11/12):

Holding: Even though counsel had access to jurors’ names, where the names were withheld from the defendant personally and the public, the jury was “anonymous” and this required special findings by the court.
State v. Sundberg, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 755, 2011 WL 537845 (Or. 2/17/11):

Holding: Trial court cannot impanel an anonymous jury without giving jurors a neutral explanation for withholding juror identifies; otherwise, jurors may assume that identities are being withheld because Defendant is dangerous and more likely to be guilty.
State v. Brown, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 73 (R.I. 4/5/13):

Holding: Even though there is a general rule that courts may not inquire into jury deliberations, this rule does not preclude inquiry about a claim of juror racial bias because such inquiry is necessary to the constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
State v. Giles, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 538 (S.C. 1/15/14):

Holding: Defendant’s claim that he struck 10 white jurors because they were “not right for the jury” was too nonspecific to rebut presumption of discrimination under Batson.
State v. Apodaca, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 550 (S.C. 1/10/12):

Holding: Once juror was excused for illness during trial, juror could not later be put back on the jury.
State v. Adams, 2013 WL 2102683 (Tenn. 2013):

Holding: Where a discharged alternate juror had improperly communicated with other jurors by leaving a note for the foreperson that the alternative thought Defendant was guilty, the trial court erred in allowing State to question foreman as to what role the note played in the jury’s thoughts or discussions (but error was harmless here).
State v. Sexton, 2012 WL 1918922 (Tenn. 2012):

Holding: Trial court improperly struck venirepersons based solely on their written responses to whether they would ever vote for the death penalty; actual voir dire questioning may have rehabilitated the venirepersons.
State v. Abdi, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 629 (Vt. 1/26/12):

Holding: A Somali Bantu immigrant convicted of sexual assault in a prosecution that involved arguments about culture and religion must receive a new trial where a juror researched Somali mores and beliefs on the internet and shared the results with fellow jurors.
State v. Saintcalle, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 643 (Wash. 8/1/13):

Holding: Criticizes Batson’s “purposeful discrimination” standard because “racism is often unintentional, institutional or unconscious”; advocates for adoption of a standard where a Batson challenge should be sustained where there is “a reasonable probability that race was a factor in the exercise of the peremptory” or “where the judge finds it is more likely than not that, but for the defendant’s race, the peremptory would not have been exercised.”
People v. Garcia, 2012 WL 918861 (Cal. App. 2012):

Holding: A trial court violated a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to trial by jury in accepting a partial verdict from eleven jurors after the court had already discharged and replaced one of the jurors who had purportedly voted in favor of the verdicts.
People v. Mata, 2012 WL 579864 (Cal. App. 2012):

Holding: A defendant’s waiver or consent to the trial court’s failure to dismiss the venire is a prerequisite to the use of alternative remedies or sanctions for a prosecutor’s racially motived peremptory challenge.
McGill v. Superior Court, 2011 WL 2120179 (Cal. App. 2011):

Holding: Where a perjury charge against Defendant for testifying falsely before a grand jury was heard by the same grand jury that heard the underlying case where the perjury occurred, the perjury charge was subject to dismissal.
People v. Khoa Khac Long, 2010 WL 4261441 (Cal. App. 2010):

Holding: Appellate court would not defer to trial court’s implicit finding that prosecutor’s strike of juror for “body language” was proper under Batson, where record was devoid of any mention or description of such “body language.”
People v. Wilson, 2012 WL 4829487 (Colo. App. 2012):

Holding: Prosecutor’s reasons for striking juror based on inability to consider DNA or eyewitness evidence were not race-neutral where they were refuted by the record since juror said he could consider scientific and other evidence.
People v. Harmon, 2011 WL 4837289 (Colo. App. 2011):

Holding: Trial court’s failure to take action in response to juror’s note indicating he had reached a conclusion prior to deliberations based on his misconception that defendant had conceded guilt in opening statement violated defendant’s right to a fair trial.
Chambers v. State, 2013 WL 1277731 (Ga. App. 2013):

Holding: Defendant was denied right to be present at all stages of trial and to be tried by a fair and impartial jury where juror performed Internet research and shared her findings with other jurors during deliberations, and State could not overcome presumption of prejudice even though it submitted affidavits from the other 11 jurors that this juror’s information did not influence their verdict.
Fuller v, State, 2012 WL 247854 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012):

Holding: Trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant a mistrial after juror initiated a conversation with the victim.
Kenerly v. State, 2011 WL 2623837 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011):

Holding: A “special purpose” grand jury convened to investigate acquisition of real property was not authorized to return bribery indictment.
People v. Brown, 2013 WL 1870082 (Ill. App. 2013):

Holding: Where trial judge allowed State to exercise another peremptory challenge of a juror after the trial had begun, this violated Defendants’s due process rights, even if the challenge was allowed as a sanction for Defendant’s violation of an evidentiary order; allowing the State to invade an impartial jury was not a proper sanction for violation of an evidentiary rule.
People v. Reimer, 2012 WL 1108312 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012):

Holding: An indictment alleged violations of the Illinois Home Repair Fraud Act would be dismissed without prejudice because the State misled the grand jury by misinforming it in regard to the intent element.
Cartwright v. State, 950 N.E.2d 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011):

Holding: Batson was violated where State’s reasons for strike were that juror had “health issues” but problems did not prevent him from serving, and juror said he would try to listen to evidence even though he also said he wasn’t a good listener.
Wright v. Com., 2013 WL 845020 (Ky. App. 2013):

Holding: Trial court abused discretion in allowing jury to take Prosecutor’s laptop into jury room to listen to audio recording; laptop likely contained inadmissible and irrelevant evidence, and jury was not instructed not to access other files on the laptop or internet.
State v. Pierce, 2013 WL 6516404 (La. App. 2013):

Holding: Where Defendant’s reasons for striking a white juror (that they had been a crime victim and voted for a defendant in a civil trial) were racially neutral, the trial court impermissibly shifted burden to Defendant in “reverse-Batson” claim when it rejected this explanation without requiring State to prove purposeful discrimination.
State v. Bender, 2013 WL 3753555 (La. App. 2013):

Holding: Prosecutor’s claim that he struck African-American juror because of his prior conviction was not race-neutral under Batson, where Prosecutor never revealed what the nature of the prior conviction was, and where defense counsel was precluded from asking juror if he had a conviction, and from asking other jurors if they had a similar conviction.
State v. Wilkins, 2012 WL 2434762 (La. App. 2012):

Holding: Batson was violated where State struck African-American jurors on grounds that they were African-American and might be offended by racially offensive language used by the crime’s victim; this explanation was not race-neutral.
State v. Pruitt, 2013 WL 1729222 (N.J. Super. 2013):

Holding: Prosecutor’s peremptory strike of only African-American on panel was sufficient to draw an inference of discrimination so as to require prosecutor to give race-neutral reasons.
People v. Cridelle, 976 N.Y.S.2d 713 (N.Y. App. 2013):

Holding: Where after receiving a note from jury, a juror repeatedly said she could not make a decision, court erred in failing to remove juror; further error occurred where the 11 other jurors continued deliberations while the court conducted a hearing on the indecisive juror, so that Defendant was deprived of his right to 12 jurors.
People v. Members, 2012 WL 5692597 (N.Y. App. 2012):

Holding: Court erred in accepting guilty verdict from 11 jurors, because Defendant had constitutional right to trial by a jury of 12.
People v. Wisdom, 2012 WL 2818248 (N.Y. App. 2012):

Holding: Where a grand jury witness was not administered an oath, and was later called back, given an oath and asked only if her prior testify was true, this did not cure the earlier failure to administer an oath.
People v. Lockley, 2011 WL 1733894 (N.Y. App. 2011):

Holding: Trial court’s procedure of reading jury notes in front of jury and immediately answering without giving defense an opportunity to be heard beforehand was inherently prejudicial.
People v. Lewis, 2010 WL 4237712 (N.Y. App. 2010):

Holding: Trial court’s failure to read into record a jury note and failure to give counsel notice of content of note warranted new trial.
Colyer v. State, 2013 WL 173772 (Tex App. 2013):

Holding: Where juror testified that during deliberations he spoke to a doctor who caused him to change his vote, court abused its discretion in denying new trial motion on basis of outside juror influence.
McQuarrie v. State, 2012 WL 4796001 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012):

Holding: Defendant should have been allowed a post-trial hearing on claim that juror conducted unauthorized internet research about case during trial.
State v. Bauer, 2013 WL 864843 (Wash. App. 2013):

Holding: Where Defendant was charged with assault for having left a gun on a dresser where a child got it and shot someone, the question of whether leaving the gun in the open was the proximate cause of the victim’s injury was a jury question.

State v. Sellhausen, 2010 WL 4770622 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010):

Holding: Judges must sua sponte remove their immediate family members from a voir dire panel and not require defendant to strike them for cause or exercise a peremptory strike.
Juvenile
State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232 (Mo. banc 2013):

(1) Where Juvenile-Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole (LWOP) without the sentencer having considered mitigating factors, the sentence violates the 8^th Amendment and must be remanded for a new sentencing; (2) at the new sentencing, the sentencer must first determine whether a sentence of LWOP is appropriate considering mitigating factors; (3) if the sentencer determines LWOP is not appropriate, then the first degree murder statute is unconstitutional as applied to Defendant, and the court must enter a conviction for second degree murder and the sentencer then sentence for second degree murder; and (4) even though Defendant had waived his right to jury sentencing before his original trial, that waiver was not knowing because it was made without considering the new, qualitatively different decision a sentencer must make about mitigating circumstances after Miller v. Alabama.

Facts: Juvenile-Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and armed criminal action, and sentenced to LWOP and a concurrent term of 30 years. He waived jury sentencing before trial. While Juvenile’s direct appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), which forbids sentencing a juvenile to LWOP when there has been no consideration of mitigating circumstances.

Holding: Juvenile’s sentence of LWOP violates the 8^th Amendment after Miller because there was no consideration of mitigating circumstances prior to imposing LWOP under Sec. 565.020, since LWOP was the only sentence authorized for first degree murder. The question is what remedy must be given. Miller holds that an LWOP sentence is permissible as long as the sentencer determines it is just and appropriate given Juvenile’s age, maturity and other mitigating factors. On remand, the State must persuade the sentencer beyond a reasonable doubt that an LWOP sentence is just and appropriate under all the circumstances. As an initial matter, the State argues that the sentencer must be the judge here because Juvenile waived his right to jury sentencing before trial, so he was willing to have a judge determine the entire range of punishment, regardless of what offense he was ultimately convicted of. While the State’s waiver argument would usually be correct, here it is not because Juvenile’s decision to waive a jury was mistaken as to the role of the sentencer in light of Miller, which created a qualitatively new decision that the sentencer must make. Therefore, Juvenile’s jury waiver will not be enforced on remand. Regarding the procedure to follow, the jury must be properly instructed that it may not find LWOP unless it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that LWOP is just and appropriate under all the circumstances. However, the jury should not be given a choice of punishments for first degree murder because this would violate the separation of powers since the legislature, not courts, determines punishments for crimes. Therefore, the jury should be instructed that if it is not persuaded that LWOP is just and appropriate, additional instructions concerning additional punishments will be given. If the jury finds LWOP, the judge must impose that sentence. However, if the jury does not find LWOP, the judge must declare Sec. 565.020 void as applied to Juvenile on grounds that it fails to provide a constitutionally valid punishment. In that case, the judge must vacate the finding of guilt of first-degree murder, and enter a new finding of guilt of second-degree murder. In that case, the judge must also vacate the finding of armed criminal action based on having been found guilty of first degree murder, and enter a new finding of ACA in connection with second-degree murder. After the trial court enters those findings, the jury must then determine Juvenile’s sentences within the statutory ranges for those crimes. This procedure may require two separate submissions to the sentencer in a single penalty phase, but is required to carry out Miller without violating the legislature’s prerogative to decide which punishments are authorized for which crimes.
State v. Nathan, 404 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. banc 2013):

(1) Once a Juvenile is certified to stand trial in circuit court, the State is not limited to the charges alleged in the juvenile petition, and may bring whatever charges it believes are justified regardless of whether such charges or underlying facts were included in the juvenile petition; (2) where Defendant-Juvenile was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to LWOP without consideration of mitigating circumstances, such sentence violates the 8^th Amendment and the case is remanded for resentencing per the procedure set forth in State v. Hart, No. SC93153 (Mo. banc 7/30/13); but (3) even though Juvenile contends he must also be resentenced for various non-homicide offenses if he is ultimately resentenced for second-degree murder, Juvenile did not appeal these convictions or argue that the non-homicide sentences (individually or combined) are unlawful or unconstitutional so resentencing on those is not addressed, and his implication that the combined effect of such sentences may be unconstitutional is premature until after the resentencing procedure, and will be moot if Juvenile is sentenced to LWOP.

Facts: Defendant-Juvenile was convicted of first degree murder from a robbery and home invasion. He was sentenced to LWOP. He was also convicted of many other offenses stemming from the home invasion, and given multiple consecutive life sentences. While his appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), which forbids sentencing a juvenile to LWOP when there has been no consideration of mitigating circumstances. On appeal, Defendant challenged his LWOP sentence, and also challenged the certification procedure used in his case because he was ultimately allowed to be charged with and convicted of various crimes that were not alleged in the juvenile petition in juvenile court.

Holding: (1) Regarding the certification procedure, Juvenile argues that some of the offenses of which he was convicted had not been “certified” by the juvenile court, and thus, could not be brought or tried in circuit court. The flaw in this argument, however, is that the certification procedure created in Section 211.071 pertains to individuals, not to specific conduct or crimes or charges. The statute speaks in terms of “transfer[ing] a child” to circuit court for prosecution. The focus in a certification proceeding is on the juvenile, not the conduct alleged in the petition. The petition serves only to invoke the juvenile court’s exclusive jurisdiction by identifying the individual as being younger than 17 and alleging the juvenile has engaged in conduct that would be a crime if committed by an adult. Under 211.017, the juvenile court may dismiss the petition and “transfer the child” to circuit court. When that occurs, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the child is terminated unless the child is found not guilty in circuit court. Nothing in 211.071 allows a juvenile court to retain jurisdiction over the juvenile for some parts of a petition but not others. If a juvenile court relinquishes its exclusive jurisdiction by transferring a child to circuit court, the state is not bound solely to the factual allegations raised or violations of law asserted in the juvenile petition, but may bring whatever charges it believes are justified, regardless of whether those charges or the underlying facts were included in the petition. (2) For the reasons discussed in State v. Hart, No. SC93153 (Mo. banc 7/30/13), Juvenile must be resentenced pursuant to the procedures there. Juvenile argues that if he is ultimately found guilty of second degree murder, he must be resentenced on his multiple non-homicide offenses, too. However, he has not argued that any of those sentences or the combined effect thereof is unlawful or unconstitutional. Because this claim is not preserved or presented, it will not be addressed here. To the extent that Juvenile is trying to assert a claim that the combined effect of the sentences is unconstitutional, such a claim is premature until after resentencing, and will be moot if Juvenile is sentenced to LWOP.
In the Interest of J.N.C.B. v. Juvenile Officer, No. WD75299 (Mo. App. W.D. 6/28/18):

Mere entry into a building with valuables in it, without more, is not sufficient to prove an intent to steal necessary for conviction for burglary.

Facts: In response to an alarm at 7:00 p.m., police were called to a former school building which contained various property. When they arrived, they found the door propped open, and Defendant-juvenile and several other juveniles in the building laughing and talking. One of the juveniles had a broom from the building, although police did not think they intended to steal the broom. Defendant was ultimately convicted at trial of second degree burglary. He appealed.

Holding: A person commits second degree burglary if he knowingly enters unlawfully in a building for the purpose of committing a crime therein. The parties agree that Defendant entered the building unlawfully (which is first degree trespassing), but Defendant argues the evidence is insufficient to prove that he intended to commit a crime therein. The State argues that intent to steal is presumed when there are items of value in a building, and that the mere presence of valuables alone, with no other indicia of intent to steal, is sufficient to prove intent to steal beyond a reasonable doubt. Although cases often cite this inference, it has always been in connection with additional supportive facts and inferences, such as forced entry, flight, weapons, burglary tools, confessions, or movement of valuables. Here, there are none of these additional facts, except possession of the broom, but police testified they didn’t believe anyone intended to steal the broom. Where a permissible inference is the sole basis for a finding of guilt, due process requires that the conviction may not rest entirely on that inference unless other proven facts are sufficient to support the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The State is required to prove Defendant’s intent beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence here is insufficient to do that. The State also argues that since Defendant did not offer any other reasons for being in the building other than to steal, this proves his intent, but the 5^th Amendment requires the State to bear the burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Conviction reversed.
State v. Olivas, 2014 WL 2190897 (Mo. App. W.D. May 27, 2014):

Holding: (1) Where 16-year-old Juvenile-Defendant was convicted of first degree murder as an adult and given a mandatory sentence of life in prison without parole, Juvenile’s sentence violates Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), because there was no consideration of individualized circumstances in his case, and he must be re-sentenced pursuant to the procedures set forth in State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232 (Mo. banc 2013); and (2) even though Juvenile-Defendant waived jury sentencing, such waiver will not be enforced on remand because Juvenile’s waiver was made prior to Miller, and he is entitled to be able to choose jury sentencing under Hart.
State v. Williams, 2014 WL 705429 (Mo. App. W.D. Feb. 25, 2014):

Where (1) Juvenile-Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to LWOP, and (2) while direct appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Miller that a mandatory sentence of LWOP for juveniles without considering mitigating circumstances and the possibility of a lesser sentence violated the 8^th Amendment, case must be remanded for further proceedings to determine sentence pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court’s direction in State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232 (Mo. banc 2013).