Case Law Update: 2011-2014 Cumulative Edition

Holding: As an initial matter, since the appeal was filed, Juvenile has been released from court supervision, and hence, there is a question whether the appeal is moot. Because the appeal raises important issues of first impression that may otherwise evade appellate review, the appellate court will decide the case. Regarding the merits, this case is not one where Juvenile was charged with a “delinquency offense,” i.e., a criminal-type offense. Instead, he was ultimately charged with a “status offense.” A status offense is unique to juveniles and is an infraction that allows the juvenile court to take jurisdiction of a child alleged to be in need of care due to behavior injurious to welfare. Such status cases are fundamentally different from delinquency cases under Sec. 211.031.1(3), in which the juvenile is alleged to have violated a state law or municipal ordinance. Missouri law treats “status offenses” differently than “delinquency offenses.” How the offense is charged determines what rights will be accorded the juvenile. Here, the court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss or suspend proceedings while Juvenile was incompetent because Juvenile was charged with a “status offense.”
State v. Wilkerson, No. WD71314 (Mo. App. W.D. 2/1/11):

Even though Defendant refused to participate in mental health evaluation, where trial court had previously found reasonable cause to believe Defendant was incompetent and had ordered a mental health exam and report, Sec. 552.020 required that the trial court have a mental health report before proceeding to trial; expert could have tried to see Defendant again or used other sources to evaluate competency.

Facts: Defendant was charged with endangering a correctional officer. Defendant refused to meet with defense counsel before trial. At an initial trial, a mistrial was declared because Defendant was nonresponsive, spoke nonsense talk, and spit on defense counsel. The court then entered an order finding reasonable cause to believe Defendant had a mental disease or defect excluding fitness to proceed, and ordered a mental exam under Sec. 552.020.3. Defendant then refused to see the 552 examiner. The 552 examiner informed the court that he could not do a mental evaluation due to Defendant’s refusal. Defendant was then tried again. Again at trial he was nonresponsive and engaged in nonsense talk. Neither the court nor defense counsel raised the competency issue. After conviction, Defendant appealed.

Holding: The trial court plainly erred in proceeding to trial without a report on Defendant’s competency under 552. Once a court has sufficient facts to reasonably believe a defendant may be incompetent, the court is mandated to order a 552.020 mental exam. Here, the trial court ordered a 552.020 exam, but because of Defendant’s refusal to see the doctor, a report was never done. There is no precedent standing for the proposition that the mandatory requirements of 552.020.3 are rendered discretionary by a defendant’s single refusal to participate in the process. The doctor could have sought to see the Defendant again, or used other sources to evaluate competency such as records and witness interviews. As a remedy, it is not adequate to remand the case simply to determine if Defendant was competent at his 2009 trial. To protect his due process rights not to have been tried while incompetent, the conviction and sentence are reversed, and a new trial ordered.
* Kansas v. Cheever, ___ U.S. ___, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 353 (U.S. 12/11/13):

Holding: Where a defense expert who has examined the defendant testifies that the defendant lacked the requisite mental state to commit a crime, it does not violate the 5^th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination for the prosecution to offer evidence from a court-ordered evaluation for the limited purpose of rebutting the defendant’s evidence; here, after Defendant gave notice that he intended to present a defense based on lack of mental capacity, the prosecution requested and the court ordered an evaluation by the State; the Supreme Court held it did not violate the 5^th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination for the prosecution to use this at trial as rebuttal evidence to Defendant’s mental health defense; “where a defense expert who has examined the defendant testifies that the defendant lacked the requisite mental state to commit an offense, the prosecution may present psychiatric evidence in rebuttal.”
* Ryan v. Gonzales, 2013 WL 68690, ___ U.S.___ (U.S. 2013):

Holding: Federal habeas petitioners do not have a right to a stay of habeas proceedings under the 6^th Amendment right to counsel or statutory right to counsel even though the petitioners are incompetent during the proceedings.
U.S. v. Mahoney, 2013 WL 2382596 (1^st Cir. 2013):

Holding: Defendant’s challenge to an initial order of incompetency was not rendered moot by a later finding that there was not substantial likelihood he would regain competency, since Defendant continued to have an interest in the initial order since this triggered Defendant’s continuing confinement.
Carter v. Bradshaw, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 317 (6^th Cir. 5/26/11):

Holding: Petitioners have right to be mentally competent to assist counsel in federal habeas proceedings.
U.S. v. Grigsby, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 152 (6^th Cir. 4/11/13):

Holding: Gov’t failed to demonstrate sufficient interest in forcibly medicating Defendant to make him competent to stand trial where the Defendant’s civil commitment would likely exceed any jail time he might receive and the side effects of the drugs might interfere with his ability to assist counsel.
U.S. v. Ross, 2012 WL 6734087 (6^th Cir. 2012):

Holding: Where record was unclear whether standby counsel had provided meaningful adversarial testing of Defendant’s competency, remand was required.; 6^th Amendment requires counsel at a competency hearing even where Defendant previously waived counsel.
Ata v. Scutt, 2011 WL 5903658 (6^th Cir. 2011):

Holding: Habeas petitioner was entitled to evidentiary hearing regarding whether his mental incompetence warranted tolling the habeas limitations period because his motion alleged specific enough facts to create a causal link between his untimely petition and his mental incompetence and his allegations were consistent with the record.
U.S. v. Gillenwater, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 444, 2013 WL 2930502 (9^th Cir. 6/17/13):

Holding: In a case of first impression in the federal circuits, 9^th Circuit holds that defendants have a constitutional right to testify at their own pretrial competency hearings, and only the defendants, not their lawyers, can waive that right; however, a defendant may be deemed to have waived the right if he sits mute when defense counsel elects not to call him as a witness. Constitutional right to testify stems from 6^th and 14^th Amendments’ right to testify at trial.
U.S. v. LKAV, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 48 (9^th Cir. 4/2/13):

Holding: Commitment of Juvenile for competency exam must be done under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, not the general criminal commitment statute.
U.S. v. Chavez, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 239, 734 F.3d 1247 (10^th Cir. 11/13/13):

Holding: A court order authorizing involuntary medication of non-dangerous Defendant to make him competent for trial must include the specific maximum dosages; “[g]ranting the government … unfettered discretion in determining which drugs will be administered to a defendant does not conform with the findings of Sells.”
U.S. v. Goodman, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 573, 2011 WL 258282 (10^th Cir. 1/28/11):

Holding: Trial court abused its discretion in NGRI case in limiting the defense to presenting lay witness testimony about Defendant’s mental condition only to the days immediately before and after the charged crime.
U.S. v. Diaz, 2011 WL 112495 (11^th Cir. 2011):

Holding: Gov’t has burden of proof in seeking involuntary medication of Defendant.
U.S. v. Dillon, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 443 (D.C. Cir. 12/24/13):

Holding: Appellate review of a trial court’s order to involuntarily medicate a defendant for competency is reviewed de novo for legal issues but under “clear error” standard regarding findings of fact.
U.S. v. Duncan, 2013 WL 4827742 (E.D. Va. 2013):

Holding: Gov’t lacked important governmental interest to forcibly medicate Defendant charged with unlawful possession of firearm to make him competent.
Porta v. State, 2013 WL 3070389 (Ark. 2013):

Holding: Even though forensic mental health examiner had warned Defendant about the nonconfidential nature of his competency exam, trial court erred in allowing his inculpatory statements made during the exam to be admitted at trial, because this violated his constitutional right not to incriminate himself and forced him to choose between one constitutional right in order to claim another.

People v. Mills, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 117 (Cal. 10/18/12):

Holding: Jury instruction in guilt phase that Defendant is presumed sane violates state law where competency will be resolved in a separate competency phase.
People v. Lightsey, 2012 WL 2685249 (Cal. 2012):

Holding: Trial court erred in allowing questionably competent Defendant to represent himself at a competency hearing; Faretta right to self-representation did not override Penal Code provision requiring appointment of counsel at competency hearing where trial court has reason to doubt Defendant’s competency.
State v. I.T., 94 Crim. L. Rep. 747 (Ind. 3/12/14):

Holding: Indiana Juvenile statute which bars statements made to a mental health evaluator “in the evaluator’s official capacity” from being used “as evidence against the child” on whether they committed a delinquent act provides both use immunity and derivative use immunity for Juvenile’s statements.
State v. Rodriguez, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 454 (Iowa 12/23/11):
Holding: Privilege against self-incrimination limits use of incriminating statements made during psychiatric examination to determine competency to waive Miranda rights.
Coleman v. State, 2013 WL 3067576 (Miss. 2013):

Holding: Defendant whose motion for mental exam was granted was entitled to a full hearing on his competency where he could challenge the conclusions of the examiner, and this was not harmless error.
Haraden v. State, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 301 (Me. 11/17/11):

Holding: Movant has right to be competent during PCR proceedings.
State v. Penado, 2011 WL 4635057 (Neb. 2011):

Holding: State’s petition for appeal of trial court’s finding that defendant was not competent to stand trial was denied because the finding of incompetency was not a final order, in that further action was required to completely dispose of the case.
State v. Tamayo, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 257 (Neb. 11/19/10):

Holding: Even though Defendant requested a mental exam to pursue NGRI defense, the time for the exam is not automatically excluded from the statutory speedy trial clock.
People v. Gonzalez, 94 Crim. L Rep. 585 (N.Y. 2/13/14):
Holding: Defendant is not required to give pretrial notice of a mental defense where he relies solely on the State’s evidence to request a jury instruction on the matter and does not present any evidence for the defense; the notice requirement is designed to prevent prosecutors from being surprised, and they cannot be surprised by their own evidence; also, it would be “impractical” to require such notice, before the prosecution has presented the evidence on which the defense is based.

People v. Max, 2012 WL 6115635 (N.Y. 2012):

Holding: Where during guilty plea colloquy Defendant said he had been in a psychotic state and hearing voices at time of crime, plea court had a duty to inquire further as to Defendant’s possible assertion of an NGRI defense before accepting the plea.
State v. Berget, 2013 WL 28400 (S.D. 2013):

Holding: Sentencing court erred in using Defendant’s unwarned statements to a psychiatrist during a pretrial competency hearing to impose the death penalty, since this violated Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
State v. Prion, 91 Crim. L. Rep. 70 (Utah 3/20/12):

Holding: Double jeopardy prohibited an increase in Defendant’s sentence at a resentencing after he had been found “guilty [but] mentally ill.”
State v. Dang, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 208 (Wash. 10/31/13):

Holding: Where statute for revoking NGRI acquittees who have violated the terms of their release provided that “the issue to be determined is whether the conditionally released person did or did not adhere to the terms of conditions of his release, or whether the person presents a threat to public safety,” the only constitutional interpretation of the statute is that the acquittee’s failure to adhere to the terms of release is not sufficient by itself to support a revocation, but the court must also make a specific finding of dangerousness; under Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992), mental illness is not sufficient alone to restrict a person’s liberty, and there must also be evidence that the person poses a danger to others.
People v. Blackburn, 2013 WL 1736497 (Cal. App. 2013):

Holding: Where there is cause to doubt a mentally disordered offender-committee’s capacity to decide whether a bench trial or jury trial is in his best interests in a petition to extend his commitment, his counsel can make this decision even over committee’s objection.
People v. Cortes, 2011 WL 83732 (Cal. App. 2011):

Holding: Trial court abused discretion in limiting psychiatrist’s testimony about Defendant’s diminished capacity to abstract conditions and their effect on the general population, rather than discussing Defendant’s condition specifically as applied to Defendant.
Martin v. State, 2013 WL 646231 (Fla. App. 2013):

Holding: Evidence that Defendant, on account of his paranoid delirium, believed he was being threatened or attacked was admissible for purposes of supporting his self-defense claim for assault on officer, and supported a jury instruction on self-defense.
People v. Quin, 2012 WL 751561 (N.Y. Sup 2012):

Holding: No statutory or other legal basis existed to permit the prosecution to be present at, or videotape, the defendant’s competency hearing in an attempted assault prosecution.
State v. Handy, 2011 WL 3328794 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 2011):

Holding: Where Defendant wants to have a trial to force the State to prove his guilt, the State is not allowed to first require Defendant to have a trial on the issue of his sanity, which could lead to his indefinite commitment in mental institution.
State v. Singleton, 2011 WL 676976 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011):
Holding: NGRI Defendant who believed he killed victim as part of command from God was entitled to a jury instruction that insanity includes both “legal wrong” and “moral” wrong” in determining the right-wrong test.
Druery v. State, 2013 WL 5808182 (Tex. App. 2013):

Holding: Even though capital Defendant knew at least some of the time that he was scheduled for execution, where because of mental illness he did not believe he committed the murder and did not think he would be executed some of the time, this was a substantial showing of incompetency to be executed.
Staley v. State, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 764, 2013 WL 4820128 (Tex. App. 9/11/13):

Holding: State cannot execute inmate who was made competent through a trial court’s unauthorized forcible medication order.
Ex Parte Reinke, 2012 WL 2327840 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012):

Holding: Maximum period of commitment in mental health facility for Defendant found incompetent to stand trial was the un-enhanced maximum punishment for the underlying offense.

Presence at Trial
U.S. v. Salim, 2012 WL 3631159 (2d Cir. 2012):
Holding: Defendant’s wavier of his right to be present at resentencing was not voluntary where he said he was waiving his right to be present because he had previously been mistreated by jail guards.
U.S. v. Collins, 2012 WL 34044 (2d Cir. 2012):

Holding: During ex parte exchange which occurred without consultation with counsel, the trial court emphasized the importance of reaching a verdict to a dissenting juror, thereby depriving defendant of his right to be present, which was not harmless error.
U.S. v. Williams, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 211 (5^th Cir. 5/11/11):

Holding: Defendant cannot be forced to appear at sentencing only via videoconferencing; this violates Rule 43(a), which requires actual presence.
U.S. v. Williams, 2011 WL 1774516 (6^th Cir. 2011):

Holding: Conducting sentencing hearing by videoconference violated Defendant’s right to be present at sentencing.
U.S. v. Lewis, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 381 (8^th Cir. 5/27/11):

Holding: Plea agreement which provided that Defendant, his attorney or the Gov’t can make whatever comment they deem appropriate at sentencing gave Defendant the right to be present when his sentence was reduced pursuant to Rule 35(b).
Morehart v. Barton, 2011 WL 1599648 (Ariz. 2011):

Holding: Murder victim’s family had no right to attend ex parte hearing on defense mitigation investigation.
Ward v. State, 2011 WL 680213 (Ga. 2011):

Holding: Trial court’s removal of juror after closing argument without Defendant’s presence violated Defendant’s right to be present at trial.
State v. Kaulia, 2013 WL 68332 (Haw. 2013):

Holding: Trial court was required to advise Defendant of rights he was losing by absenting himself from trial.
People v. Phillips, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 75 (Ill. 3/24/11):

Holding: Even though a bail bond paper advised defendants that if they failed to appear for trial the trial could proceed in their absence, the written advisory did not satisfy state law that a judge presiding at arraignment personally advise a defendant of this.
State v. Irby, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 544, 2011 WL 241971 (Wash. 1/27/11):

Holding: Where judge and counsel conducted discussions about specific venirepersons via email without any involvement of Defendant, this violated Defendant’s right to be present during voir dire.
Privileges
State ex rel. Nothum v. Walsh, No. SC92268 (Mo. banc 7/31/12):

Even though Prosecutor had granted use immunity to Debtors under Sec. 513.380.2, Debtors could still assert their 5^th Amendment privilege not to testify since use immunity is more limited than the constitutional privilege.

Facts: Creditors sought to compel Debtors to testify about various assets. Prosecutor had granted use immunity to Debtors under Sec. 513.380.2. Debtors asserted their 5^th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify. Trial court held Debtors in contempt. Debtors sought writ of prohibition.

Holding: To supplant the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the scope of immunity granted must be co-extensive with the scope of the constitutional privilege, which includes both “use immunity” and “derivative use immunity.” Here, Debtors received immunity pursuant to Sec. 513.380.2, which authorizes a prosecutor only to provide “use immunity” to a judgment debtor. A prosecutor has no inherent authority to provide immunity beyond the authority granted by Missouri statutes. The issue of whether a trial judge has inherent authority to grant immunity has not been addressed in Missouri and is not presented here. Here, the only immunity granted was “use immunity.” Such immunity did not include “derivative use immunity” and so it was not co-extensive with the 5^th Amendment privilege. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in compelling Debtors to testify. Writ of prohibition granted.
State ex rel. Nothum v. Kintz, No. ED95280 (Mo. App. E.D. 2/2/11):

Holding: Where judgment-debtors invoked their 5^th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to answer interrogatories or give testimony about their property, the trial court could not compel them to testify absent a finding that, as a matter of law, the witness’ response to the questions could not possibly intend to incriminate them. Here, the trial court failed to make such a finding. Writ of prohibition granted to preclude trial court from holding judgment-debtors in contempt.
U.S. v. Treacy, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 818, 2011 WL 799781 (2d Cir. 3/9/11):

Holding: The standard for civil cases also applies to criminal cases for overcoming the journalist’s privilege against the disclosure of nonconfidential information; movant is entitled to discovery if he can demonstrate that the material at issue is of likely relevance to a significant issue in the case and not reasonably available from other sources.
U.S. v. Nelson, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 114 (5^th Cir. 10/14/13):

Holding: Although a prior defense counsel can be called by the Gov’t to testify about some matters which occurred at a proffer after Defendant backed out of the plea deal (such as the voluntariness of Defendant’s signature on documents), Defendant’s attorney-client privilege was violated where Gov’t called prior defense counsel to testify at trial that Defendant “understood” and “agreed with” the criminal charge against her.
Lampton v. Diaz, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 123 (5^th Cir. 4/18/11):

Holding: Absolute prosecutorial immunity does not apply to a U.S. attorney who after trial gave private federal tax records to a state ethics commission; immunity does not extend to “post-trial conduct relating to a new action before a new tribunal.”
U.S. v. Gonzalez, 2012 WL 206266 (9^th Cir. 2012):

Holding: Defendants’ filing of motion to vacate does not unilaterally waive joint defense privilege.
U.S. v. Martoma, 2013 WL 4502829 (S.D. N.Y. 2013):

Holding: Gov’t lacked standing to assert attorney-client privilege on behalf of a cooperating witness from whom Defendant was seeking documents via a motion to compel; Witness did not authorize the Gov’t to assert his rights and moved to assert them himself.
People v. Gonzales, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 787 (Cal. 3/18/13):