Arabic philosophy

in the formof divine knowledge from on high (‘ilm ladunn¯ı).37 Experience

is the ground for philosophy and philosophical discourse is a

means for making sense of that experience (Asfa¯ r IX, 108).38 In the

Four Journeys (Asfa¯ r III, 326), he says:

Our arguments are based upon direct experience and inner revelation and

not the blind following of the Law without proof, demonstration, or logical

inference. Mere inner revelation (muka¯ shafa) is insufficient on the path [to

truth] without demonstrations, just as mere discourse (bah.

th) without inner

revelation is a great flaw along the path.

Ibn ‘Arab¯ı had earlier derided the possibility of pure thought and discourse

to understand truth (Fut. II, 382.24–5, 389.6–7). Thought cannot

comprehend God, but constitutes a “veil,” since the affirmation

of one’s thought leads to an expression of one’s independence as

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232 sajjad h. rizvi

a being; hence one cannot appreciate the exclusivity and unity of

Reality (Fut. II, 85.7).Discourse blinds man and leads to discordwhile

contemplation and inner revelation are non-discursive and fail to

achieve accord (Fut. III, 82.15–16). But man must exercise his reason

since it is an instrument of divine grace and he has been commanded

in the Qur’ ¯an to use it (Fut. II, 319.13ff., III, 436.7, 250, inter alia).

Ibn ‘Arab¯ı even praises Plato as a true “sage (h.

ak¯ım) with mystical

tastes” and not as a “mere philosopher” (Fut. II, 523). True sagacity

results from inner revelation and is an expression of prophetic

wisdom.39 Elsewhere, he quotes approvingly the famous “doffing

metaphor” concerning the soul’s beatific experience of the One in

the intelligible world that originates in Plotinus’ Enneads, IV.8.1,

which was translated into Arabic as the Theology of Aristotle (see

above, chapter 2). However, it seems that both Ibn ‘Arab¯ı and the Illuminationist

tradition correctly recognized this as a Platonic doctrine.

Finally, philosophy is a disciplined and taught spiritual practice.

As an ethical mode of life in the world, it cannot be blind to the need

for moral perfection and normative practice. Philosophy delivers the

good life and the Good itself for man but only if he is guided and

develops a moral character. Mull¯a S. adr¯a says:

The perfection of man lies in the perception of universal realities and disposition

toward cognition of the divine and transcendence above material

matters and self-purification from the constraints of carnal and passionate

appetites. This can only be acquired through guidance, teaching, discipline,

and the formation of a righteous character.40

The S.

u¯ fı¯ tradition also upholds the importance of spiritual training

as a method for the intuitive disclosure of reality. As such, both Ibn

‘Arab¯ı and Mull¯a S. adr¯a posit a spiritual hierarchy depending on the

varying dispositions to accept truth that are found among people. In

¯ Iq¯ az.

al-na¯ ’imı¯n (The Awakening of the Dormant), a work heavily

influenced by the thought and terminologyof Ibn‘Arab¯ı, Mull¯a S. adr¯a

discusses five levels of humanity in descending order of their ability

to cognize reality:

On the first level are people of inner revelation who know the Truth by forsaking

themselves and negating their being . . . They constantly contemplate

His signs.

On the second are the excellent philosophers who perceive Him in

a purely rational sense . . . Their ratiocination creates images through

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Mysticism and philosophy 233

conjecture and their imagination produces forms appropriate to the most

subtle and noble rational forms [of things]. Yet they know that those rational

forms are above those conjectural and imaginative forms.

On the third are the common people of faith . . . The most that they are

capable of are conjectural conceptions [about the Truth].

On the fourth level are those who follow authority and are submissive.

They are not even capable of conjecture, let alone imagination.

On the fifth level are those who rely upon physical forms [to know] the

Truth.41

The hybrid discourse of Sadrian language is expressed in this hierarchy

that is in terms of levels of knowledge and insight, as well as

grace and disclosure, packed within the larger quest for truth and

recognition of God that is faith.

ontology: the grades of unitary reality

It is often said that the prime doctrine of rationalized mysticism

in Islam of the school of Ibn ‘Arab¯ı is that of the unity of Being

(wah.

da al-wuju¯ d): it underlies ontology, epistemology, and soteriology

(theory of salvation) in this tradition.42 This doctrine expresses

a desire for experiencing Being. The mystic’s quest is to discover and

experience God qua ultimate reality (h.

aqı¯qa al-h. aqa¯ ’iq) and in this

endeavor, he ultimately discovers and finds (wajada) the unity that

isGod. Ibn ‘Arabı¯ in hismagnumopus, al-Futu¯ h. a¯ t al-Makkiyya (The

Meccan Revelations), in chapter 237 on Being, says (Fut. II, 537.33–

538.4):

Being of the Ultimate Reality (wuju¯ d al-h. aqq) is identical to what is found

through my ecstasy,

And I was annihilated in Being and through Being

The rule of ecstasy is that everything is annihilated through it

Yet the eye of ecstasy cannot know the hidden reality.

Pure consciousness of Being in every facet,

Through a mystical state or not is from it [Being].

Know that Being, according to the initiates, is the pure consciousness of

the Ultimate Reality (wijda¯n al-h. aqq) through ecstasy (wajd). They [the

initiates] say that if you are not seized by ecstasy, and if, during this state,

you do not contemplate the Ultimate Reality, then you are not [really] in

ecstasy, because the fact of contemplating it should annihilate from you

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234 sajjad h. rizvi

your self-contemplation and the contemplation of that which is present to

you. [Thus] you are not seized by ecstasy if you have not “found” Ultimate

Reality in that state. Know that the Being of the Ultimate Reality

is not known (ma‘lu¯m) in ecstasy, because the ecstasy is coincidental and

what is coincidental is unknown and may have arisen through some other

state.

Since being and what is “found” through pure experience are the

same (and rendered by the same term in Arabic, wuju¯ d, which literally

means “what is found”), only God is worthy of the name “being”

(wuju¯ d). Ibn ‘Arabı¯ (Fut. I, 328.15 and III, 566.30, inter alia) carefully

articulates the view that “the ultimate reality is identical to

what is found (al-wuju¯ d).” Crucially, the method of finding must be

“ecstatic,” through a mystical experience, and this is made explicit

by linking the experience in the passage above to the S.

u¯ fı¯ institution

of sessions of “audition” (sama¯ ‘). True sama¯ ‘ involves ecstasy

and true ecstasy responds to sama¯ ‘ as humans respond to the speech

of God articulated in it (Fut. ch. 172 on the station of audition, II,

366.27–32). Thus mystical intuition and rationalization follow from

an appreciation of the meaning of revelation both through Scripture

and through “nature.” A key feature of his method is the Qur’ ¯anicity

of his rationalization. Ibn ‘Arab¯ı’s language is thickly Qur’ ¯anic and

he refers to Qur’ ¯an 24:39.

But two questions arise: in what sense is God identical to Being,

and does it follow that nothing else exists (including the very mystic

who is recognizing this reality)? These two questions are connected

through the idea that Being as such only refers to God insofar as he

is a pure, unconditioned, unqualified, and hidden Being. He is solitary

in being.43 Yet this does not mean plural phenomena are unreal,

but only that they are self-disclosures and theophanies of the single

Being. Existents (or things “found” in the universe, mawju¯ da¯ t),

therefore, to use the Avicennian language employed by Ibn ‘Arab¯ı,

are contingents that have no existence or Being in themselves but

exist through the grace of Being in which they participate. They are

thus manifestations of Being, differentiated from one another insofar

as they are either sensible (mah.

su¯ s) or intelligible (ma‘qu¯ l), and by

virtue of the varying “dispositions” that God has placedwithin them

to act as a mirror for his Being (Fut. II, 160.1–8).

The doctrine of the unity of being or monism has important repercussions

for the two other sets of doctrines: an apophatic mystical

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Mysticism and philosophy 235

theology (and resultant skepticism), and a soteriology or theory of

salvation. Firstly, then, the recognition that there is a single Being,

and that our phenomenal experience of pluralism is an illusory perception

of the manifest disclosures of that Being, results in a problem

of language. If only God is worthy of the title of Being, then there

is nothing else that we can use as an analogy to grasp Being. Thus

for us humans, being in itself is rendered meaningless, or at the very

least we cannot fully comprehend either what Being is or communicate

our “experience” of it. Our being is “not-being” (Fut. III, 362).

The second, soteriological result is that our state of ignorance and

“existential poverty” with respect to Being44 places us in a humbled

position inwhich the pride of saying “I exist” gives way to the uncertainty

of “I am not sure that I exist.” Mull¯a S. adr¯ a, while accepting

the doctrine of the unity of being with qualifications (see below),

appropriates this idea of existential poverty into his account of the

modality of contingency, of all that is made necessary by another

(al-wa¯ jib bi-al-ghayr) (i.e., by theNecessary Being). He uses the term

“contingency of poverty” (imka¯n faqrı¯). This follows from the tradition

stemming from Ibn ‘Arab¯ı that considers all existents that

depend on another, and “annex their existence from the other” (that

is, they have relational existence, al-wuj ¯ ud al-id.

a¯ fı¯), as being “essentially

privative.”45 Ibn ‘Arab¯ı himself draws upon Qur’ ¯an 35:15, “O

mankind! You are poor before God,” to articulate his theory of the

existential indigence of all that is not the divine essence. Further,

once one realizes that there is a single Being that is the goal (gha¯ya) of

every existent, then one knows that every existent, whether microcosmic

man or macrocosmic universe, is itself merely a “mirror”

of that Being. It is the ethical implication of this that restricts the

possible vice of pride that may result from ta’alluh (Fut. I, 196).

Though we speak here of monism, the doctrine of the unity of

being does not entail a hypostatic continuity and unity of God,

cosmos, and man. The three “realities” are not one person, a gross

misunderstanding of Ibn ‘Arab¯ı that Mull¯a S. adr¯a calls the doctrine of

the hypostatic unity of being (wah.

da al-wuj ¯ ud al-shakhs.

iyya).46 The

schools of Ibn ‘Arab¯ı and Mull¯a S. adr¯a make a distinction between

Being (wuju¯ d), which is solely applicable to God, and existence

(mawju¯ d), which applies to all that there is insofar as they are theophanies

of divine names and acts.God is existent (mawju¯ d) insofar as

he is disclosed to us, but Being insofar as he is unknown and unseen

(ghayb). There is a unity of Being but existence is not a singular

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236 sajjad h. rizvi

reality. It is our self-conceptualization as existing entities that assists

us in recognizing divine existence, since our awareness of our selves

is the basis for the central cosmological proof for God.47 Contingency

is an essential feature of the cosmos (Fut. III, 275, 443; Asfa¯ r

II, 318ff.). Using the language of philosophy, Ibn ‘Arab¯ı expresses it

thus (Fut. II, 69.3–4):

The existence attributed to each created thing is the existence of the Reality,

since the contingent does not possess being. However, the entities of

contingents are receptacles for the manifestation of Being.

We acquire existence from him, and the contingency of our existence

is the basis of both epistemology and ontology in this tradition.

Thus far, we discern a distinction between Being, the absolute

prerogative of the One, and existence, a derivative mode of being

that applies to contingent beings. Whilst this distinction may also

be articulated in terms of the Avicennian distinction between existence

and essence in contingent beings (the Necessary does not bear

this distinction), in our thinkers this distinction is not connected to

the notion of essence, because of the critical (Sadrian) doctrine of the

“ontological primacy of being” (as.a¯ la al-wuju¯ d). A major question

of post-Avicennian thought is whether, given Avicenna’s distinction

between existence and essence, it is existence or essence that is

actual and ontologically prior (see above, chapter 6). Since both of

our thinkers regard essences as inert, mental notions that are empty

(i.e., without reference in reality), existence or Being must be the

actual principle (Asfa¯ r I, 61–3).

Being is thus taken as primary, and phenomenal existence as the

arena of its unfolding. This is reflected in a doctrine of three levels

of unfolding Being, which expresses the God–cosmos relationship.

S.

adr¯a sees this doctrine also as a mystical explanation for his own

theory of metaphysical variance around a singular Being: the “modulation

of being” (tashkı¯k al-wuju¯ d). Beyond the three degrees of

existence is the unseen and ineffable essence that is the ultimate

mystery (al-dha¯ t, ghayb al-ghuyu¯ b), as he is the pure Being beyond

existence. God qua Absolute Being (al-wuju¯ d al-mut. laq) is utterly

unknowable (Fut. I, 118, inter alia). Yet the three degrees themselves

provide the basis for a more positive theory of theological discourse,

insofar as they are equated with the divine attributes. Corresponding

to the first degree are the intrinsic attributes, which refer to

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Mysticism and philosophy 237

the essence in which there is no duality (al-ah.

adiyya) and in which

the divine essence is emanated to the other attributes through the

Most Holy Emanation (al-fayd. al-aqdas). The second and third levels

correspond to two types of extrinsic attributes. The second level

consists in those manifestations of the divine in which God is said

to see, hear, and so forth. This level marks the onset of alterity and

duality (al-w¯ ah.

idiyya). The third and final level is the emanation of

the attributes through the Holy Emanation (al-fayd. al-muqaddas),

and the divine creative command and Breath of the Merciful (Nafas

al-Rah.

ma¯n). It is only at this third, lowest level that God is considered

as related to the world, as it is this level that explains the

coming into existence of the cosmos.

The Breath of the Merciful (Nafas al-Rah.

ma¯n)48 is the process by

which Being becomes manifest and things obtain their existence in

the cosmos according to the level of their “disposition” to receive the

manifestation of Being in themselves.49 It is also this creative breath

that issues and sustains the cosmos (Fut. II, 123.26). It is Being that is

spread out (munbasit.

) and manifest. It is identical to the primordial

cloud of being (al-‘ama¯ ’), the “dust” (al-haba¯ ’), primematter, and the

primal element discussed in Presocratic thought (Fut. II, 431–2, 310,

390; Asfa¯ r II, 329, 331.9, 333.17). Prime matter as the foundational

substrate is an uncaused cause of all things that we perceive in phenomenal

reality.50 The breath is the exoteric and subaltern aspect

of divine Being: it is the reality that is created and creates (al-h. aqq

al-makhlu¯ q bi-hi) (Asfa¯ r II, 328.10).51 It is identical to the reality of

realities (h.

aqı¯qa al-h. aqa¯ ’iq) that bestows “reality” to each existent

in the cosmos (Fut. II, 432–3, IV, 311). As such it is known as the

“universal reality” (al-h. aq¯ıqa al-kulliyya) (Fut. I, 119, III, 199). This

level of Being unfolding is the key source for existence in this world

and the variety of names given to it reflects an attempt to reconcile

different creation myths and accounts of the primordial substance

and source of existence. With respect to its principle, it is a passive

substance, an inert potency requiring divine Being to actualize it; but

with respect to its objects, it is that which creates. As an intermediary,

it links divine Beingwith existents in this world whilst retaining

an ontological distinction between the two. The recipients of the

breath and its loci are described by Mulla¯ S. adra¯ (Asfa¯ r II, 328.4–5)

in terms characteristic not only of the Ibn ‘Arab¯ı school but also

the Illuminationists: they are the “temples of contingency” (haya¯kil

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238 sajjad h. rizvi

al-mumkin¯ at) and “tablets of quiddities” (alw¯ ah.

al-ma¯hiyya¯ t). It is

the Breath of the Merciful that gives existence to things that we

experience in this world. It seems that Mull¯a S. adr¯a wishes to modify

his monism whilst retaining a link between the three levels of

being, descending from the One, through its first level of manifestation,

through to the secondary manifestation in existents in this

world. In an Avicennian system, arguably the work of the Breath is

carried out by essences before they are actualized in this world, but

Mull¯a S. adr¯a’s insistence upon the unreality of essences necessitates

the substitution of some mode of being which he finds in Ibn ‘Arab¯ı’s

notion of the Breath of the Merciful.

But we still have the problem of the reality of existents in this

world. They do not possess existence in themselves but may be conceptualized

as existent by grasping them throughuniversals. In Fus.

¯ us.

al-h. ikam Ibn ‘Arab¯ı writes:

Know that universal entities, even though they do not possess existence

in themselves, are intelligible and knowable insofar as one can ascribe

existence to them. They can be considered to exist in themselves but [in

themselves] they can be neither divisible nor differentiated. They exist in

themselves through every individual of a species that is ascribed to them,

such as individual humans in relation to humanity, but they neither differentiate

nor are multiplied by multiple individuals, remaining intelligible

[only]. (Fus.

¯ us.

I, 52.15–53.4)

Phenomenal existence insofar as it is multiple and conceptual is not

true Being, but rather it is granted its existence through true Being.

This is a corollary of the idea that essences in themselves do not exist

in concrete reality but are merely notional and intentional. So, contrary

to what one might expect, the distinction between (necessary)

Being and (contingent) existence is not provided by the existence–

essence distinction as articulated by Avicenna. For the Avicennian

distinction in the later tradition was read as a purely notional/mental

distinction. Ibn ‘Arabı¯ says in Insha¯ ’ al-dawa¯ ’ir, in perpetuation of

this Averroist reading of the Avicennian doctrine:

Know that existence and nonexistence are not added to an existent or a

nonexistent, but are identical to the existent and the nonexistent. It is only

estimation that imagines that existence and nonexistence are attributes that

refer to an existent and a nonexistent . . . Existence and nonexistence are

merely expressions for the affirmation and the negation of a thing.52

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Mysticism and philosophy 239

What is actual and is found exists. Existence is thus neither an accident

nor a mere property of an entity. Mull¯a S. adr¯a similarly has

little use for the Avicennian distinction, but takes from Ibn ‘Arab¯ı

the importance of the foundational reality of existence, the notion

of as.a¯ la al-wuju¯ d that we encountered above, in opposition to the

Illuminationist rejection of existence (expressed by Suhraward¯ı: see

chapter 10) as a mere concept that has no basis in what is actual.53

Mull¯a S. adr¯a considers that the term “existence” applied to the cosmos

and other than God is meaningful only because the concept

has grades of sense and reference, a point whose ontology has been

expressed above in the notion of degrees of reality (Asfa¯ r I, 37–8).

While the ground of Being remains God qua the Ultimate Reality, all

that exists manifests Being in grades of manifestation, distinguished

through a logic of “intensification” (ishtida¯d). As Mulla¯ S. adra¯ says