Arabic philosophy

thus functions of the practical intellect’s success at governing the

body. To the extent that the practical intellect is able to control

and direct the lower appetites, the agent is virtuous, and to the

extent that it fails to dominate, the agent is vicious.38 Although the

practical intellect is thus essential to human morality, it is consistently

subordinated to the theoretical intellect in the Arabic tradition.

Nowhere is this attitude better captured than in Averroes’

Epitome of the “De Anima,” where he observes that human rationality

in most cases never reaches beyond the capacities of the practical

intellect: “This power is a power common to all people who

are not lacking in humanity, and people only differ in it by degrees.

As for the second power [the theoretical intellect], it is clear from

its nature that it is very divine and found only in some people,

who are the ones primarily intended by Divine Providence over this

species.”39

notes

1 For the Greek background, see Davidson [208], 3–43; Peters [61], 40–7.

2 For a theological critique of the philosophers, see al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı [111], 212–

29.

3 Aristotle, De Anima, II.1, 412a27–8; 412b4–6; 413a4–6. The Greek term

entelecheia, “actuality,” was rendered into Arabic as istikma¯ l, “perfection.”

4 For an excellent account of al-R¯az¯ı’s psychology, see Druart [209].

5 Al-R¯az¯ı’s works containing the myth are lost, and known only by the

reports of his critics. For a translation of one report, see Pines [198],

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324 deborah l. black

68–9. See further L. E. Goodman, “Razi’s Myth of the Fall of the Soul,”

in Hourani [25], 25–40.

6 Avicenna, Avicenna’s “De Anima”: Being the Psychological Part of

Kita¯b al-shifa¯ ’, ed. F. Rahman (Oxford: 1959), bk. 1, ch. 1, 5–11.

7 See Marmura [214] for a translation of the three versions of the argument.

8 Avicenna’s “De Anima,” bk. 1, ch. 1, 15–16.

9 Ibid., bk. 5, chs. 3–4. For an English translation of the shorter version of

these arguments in Avicenna’s al-Naja¯ t (The Salvation), see Avicenna

[205], chs. 12–13. On this topic see also Druart [89] and Druart [210].

10 De Anima, II.12, 424a17–19; cf. De Anima, III.4, 429a15–18.

11 See R. M. Frank, “Al-Ma‘na´ : Some Reflections on the Technical Meanings

of the Term in Kal¯am and its Use in the Physics of Mu‘ammar,”

Journal of the American Oriental Society 87 (1967), 248–59.

12 Avicenna, al-Shifa¯ ’: al-‘iba¯ ra (The Healing: On Interpretation), ed. M.

El-Khodeiri and I. Madkour (Cairo: 1970), 2–3.

13 A precursor to Avicenna’s notion of mental existence can be found in al-

F¯ar¯ab¯ı [211], §21, 17–18: “When [the intelligibles] become intelligibles

in actuality, they become, then, one of the things existing in the world,

and they are counted, insofar as they are intelligibles, among the totality

of existing things.” English trans. in Hyman and Walsh [26], 216.

14 Averroes [135], bk. 3, comment 5, 400–1; English trans. in Hyman and

Walsh [26], 327–8.

15 Avicenna’s “De Anima,” bk. 2, ch. 2, 58–67; English version inAvicenna

[205], ch. 7, 38–40.

16 See Wolfson [217], for a comprehensive though dated account.

17 Al-F¯ar¯ab¯ı’s most complete discussion of the imagination is in Walzer

[77], ch. 10, 162–3, and ch. 14, 210–27.

18 This example is given by al-F ¯ar¯ab¯ı in the Attainment of Happiness: see

Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, trans. M. Mahdi (Ithaca,

NY: 1962), 45.

19 On the topic of wahm see Black [207], and D. L. Black, “Estimation and

Imagination: Western Divergences from an Arabic Paradigm,” Topoi 19

(2000), 59–75.

20 De Anima, II.6, 418a20–5.

21 Avicenna’s basic account of the internal senses is given in Avicenna’s

“De anima,” bk. 1, ch. 5, 43–5, English version in Avicenna [205], 30–1.

The theory is developed in greater detail in bk. 4, chs. 1–3.

22 Averroes, Taha¯ fut al-taha¯ fut, ed. M. Bouyges (Beirut: 1930), 546–7;

English trans. at Averroes [140], vol. I, 336.

23 Talkh¯ıs.

kita¯b al-nafs (Epitome of the “De Anima”), ed. A. F. Al-Ahwani

(Cairo: 1950), 24; Talkh¯ıs.

kit ¯ ab al-h. iss wa al-mah.

su¯ s (Epitome of “On

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Psychology 325

Sense and Sense-Objects”), ed. H. Blumberg (Cambridge, MA: 1972),

23–24; Epitome of “Parva Naturalia,” trans. H. Blumberg (Cambridge,

MA: 1961), 15–16. For Talkh¯ıs.

kita¯b al-nafs see also A. Ivry, “Averroes’

Short Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima,” Documenti e studi sulla

tradizione filosofica medievale 8 (1997), 511–52.

24 Talkh¯ıs.

kita¯b al-h. iss, bk. 2, 29–35, and bk. 3, 42–3; Epitome of “Parva

Naturalia,” 18–21 and 26–7.

25 R. J. McCarthy, “Al-Kind¯ı’s Treatise on Intellect,” Islamic Studies 3

(1964), 119–49; al-F ¯ar¯ab¯ı [211].

26 For Avicenna’s version see Avicenna’s “De Anima,” bk. 1, ch. 5,

48–50; Avicenna’s Psychology, ch. 5, 33–5. The references are scattered

throughout Averroes’ various commentaries, for example, Talkh¯ıs.

kita¯b

al-nafs, 85–6, 89–90.

27 See McCarthy, “Al-Kind¯ı’s Treatise on Intellect,” 130–1, 142; Jolivet

[69], 12–13, for the textual difficulties surrounding the term “second

intellect.”

28 De Anima, III.5, 430a24–5.

29 Averroes [135], bk. 3, Comment 36, 481; Davidson [208], 70–3. See also

above, chapter 4.

30 Avicenna’s “De Anima,” bk. 5, ch. 5, 235. For an alternative interpretation

of Avicenna’s views on abstraction, see D. Hasse, “Avicenna on

Abstraction,” in Wisnovsky [104], 39–72.

31 Avicenna’s “De Anima,” bk. 5, ch. 6, 244–8.

32 Ibid., 248–50. On intuition see Gutas [93], 159–77, and the further

discussion in “Intuition and Thinking: The Evolving Structure

of Avicenna’s Epistemology,” in Wisnovsky [104], 1–38. On

prophecy in Avicenna see M. E. Marmura, “Avicenna’s Psychological

Proof of Prophecy,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 22 (1963),

49–56. See further F. Rahman, Prophecy in Islam (Oxford: 1958;

repr. Chicago: 1979).

33 For the evolution ofAverroes’ views, seeDavidson [208], 258–314. There

is some dispute as to the chronological relation between Averroes’ long

and middle commentaries. See H. A. Davidson, “The Relation between

Averroes’ Middle and Long Commentaries on the De Anima,” Arabic

Sciences and Philosophy 7 (1997), 139–51, and A. Ivry, “Averroes’

Three Commentaries on De Anima,” in Aertsen and Endress [134],

199–216, for the competing views.

34 Averroes, Talkh¯ıs.

kita¯b al-nafs, 86.

35 Averroes [135], bk. 3, Comment 5, 401–9; English trans. in Hyman and

Walsh [26], 324–34. See further D. L. Black, “Memory, Time and Individuals

in Averroes’s Psychology,” Medieval Theology and Philosophy

5 (1996), 161–87, and Hyman [143].

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326 deborah l. black

36 For Averroes on conjunction with the agent intellect, see A. Ivry, “Averroes

on Intellection and Conjunction,” Journal of the American Oriental

Society 86 (1966), 76–85, Black [206], and Averroes [204].

37 See, for example, Walzer [77], ch. 10, 165, 171–3, and ch. 13, 203–11.

38 Avicenna’s “De Anima,” bk. 1, ch. 5, 46–8; Avicenna [205], ch. 4, 32–3.

39 Talkh¯ıs.

kita¯b al-nafs, 69. See further A. Ivry, “TheWill of God and Practical

Intellect of Man in Averroes’ Philosophy,” Israel Oriental Studies

9 (1979), 377–91.

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th´er`ese-anne druart

16 Metaphysics

Metaphysics, first philosophy, or divine science has always been

a subject of controversy. Too often medieval Arabic metaphysics

is regarded as either simply a paraphrase of or a commentary on

Aristotle’s Metaphysics, or a curious and rather unsuccessful blend

of Aristotelian metaphysics and Neoplatonism. Cristina D’Ancona

has shown the superficiality of this latter approach by highlighting

how carefully and creatively the “fala¯ sifa” or Hellenizing philosophers

used the various Greek sources, such as the works of Aristotle,

the Plotiniana Arabica (a group of texts based on Plotinus and including

the so-called Aristotle’s Theology derived from Enneads IV–VI),

and the Liber de Causis, adapted from Proclus’ Theology and known

in Arabic as The Book of the Pure Good.1 Yet Greek sources are not

enough to explain some developments. In 1979 Richard Frank argued

that falsafa (the Arabic transliteration of the Greek term for philosophy,

highlighting its foreign origin) is not immune to the influence

of kala¯mor Islamic theology,which had elaborated an ontology of its

own.2 More recently, though controversially, he has argued that even

al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı, the famous author of the Incoherence of the Philosophers

and the staunch protector of orthodox Sunn¯ı Islam, is himself deeply

influenced by Avicenna.3

The fala¯ sifa, too, confused the issues, because some of them, al-

F¯ar¯ab¯ı, Ibn T.

ufayl, and Averroes in particular, claim that there is

one philosophical truth reflected in a plurality of simultaneously

true religions. “True religions” simply translate into symbolic and,

therefore, culturally determined languages what the philosophers

know through demonstrations. Such a claim, whether or not it is

purely rhetorical, implies that the great philosophers hold basically

the same philosophical tenets and that philosophy reached its peak

327

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328 th´er`ese-anne druart

with Aristotle. Al-F¯ar¯ab¯ı offers a striking example of this attitude in

his The Harmonization of the Two Opinions of the Two Sages: Plato

the Divine and Aristotle.4 This text illustrates the old Alexandrian

tradition that profoundly influenced the fala¯ sifa. Its introduction

states its aims:

I see most of the people of our time delving into and disputing over whether

the world is generated or eternal. They claim that there is disagreement

between the two eminent and distinguished sages, Plato and Aristotle, concerning

the proof [of the existence] of the first Creator; the causes existing

due to Him; the issue of the soul and the intellect; recompense for good

and evil actions; and many political, moral, and logical issues. So I want to

embark in this treatise of mine upon a harmonization of the two opinions

of both of them and an explanation of what the tenor of their arguments signifies

in order to make the agreement between the beliefs of both apparent,

to remove doubt and suspicion from the hearts of those who look into their

books, and to explain the places of uncertainty and the sources of doubt in

their treatises.5

Besides the confusion arising from this mix of Aristotelianism

and Neoplatonism, there is another source of problems. The fala¯ sifa

moved from identifying metaphysics solely with some kind of natural

theology and, therefore, as amore sophisticated formof kala¯m, to

taking into account ontology, i.e., metaphysics, as primarily a study

of being qua being. Dimitri Gutas and more recently Amos Bertolacci

have highlighted this turning point6 by a careful study of Avicenna’s

famous Autobiography.7 In it Avicenna explains that though he read

Aristotle’s Metaphysics forty times and knew it by heart, its content

baffled him so much that he gave it up. One day at the book

market, by a fluke he was offered at a discount a small treatise by

al-F ¯ar¯ab¯ı explaining the purpose of the Metaphysics. He bought it

and understood then that its main aim was not the study of God.

Let us, therefore, retrace some important steps in this development

focusing on the subject matter of metaphysics and on the explanation

of causal relationships that are at the core of, for example, the

famous dispute between most of the fala¯ sifa who claim that the

world is eternal, and the theologians who defend creation in time.

al-kind￣ı

In hisOnFirst Philosophy, ofwhich sadly only the first part is extant,

al-Kind¯ı spells out his conception of philosophy:

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Metaphysics 329

Indeed, the human art which is highest in degree and most noble in rank

is the art of philosophy, the definition of which is knowledge of the true

nature of things, insofar as is possible for man. The aim of the philosopher

is, as regards his knowledge, to attain the truth, and as regards his action, to

act truthfully . . . We do not find the truth we are seeking without finding a

cause; the cause of the existence and continuance of everything is the True

One, in that each thing which has being has truth. The True One exists

necessarily, and therefore beings exist.8

This passage clearly shows how al-Kind¯ı immediately moves from

philosophy as knowledge of the true nature of things to knowledge

of the cause of both the existence and the continuance of everything.

This cause is equated with the True One, i.e., God, since the “True”

is one of the Qur’ ¯anic beautiful names of God. Philosophy aims at

discovering the existence of God as cause and then at explaining

how he creates and maintains everything in existence. As al-Kind¯ı

claimsa few paragraphs later that Aristotle is the mosteminent of the

Greek philosophers, we may wonder how he derives his conception

of philosophy from Aristotle’s texts. Amos Bertolacci and Cristina

D’Ancona provide some clues toward an answer.9

Al-Kind¯ı only draws on book II and on book XII, chapters 6–10

of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which he supplements with references

to the Posterior Analytics and the Topics.10 Modern scholars have

neglected book II since it had been generally considered inauthentic,

and even if book II is authentic there are reasons not to consider it

part of the Metaphysics. In the Arabic tradition, book II is extremely

important because it was only much later that just part of book I

made it into Arabic and that part was located after book II. Book

II, therefore, becomes the official introduction to the whole book.

The end of its first chapter includes one of the very few references

in Aristotle to a cause of existence. Comparing it with the passage

of al-Kind¯ı I have just quoted shows how much book II influenced

al-Kind¯ı’s conception of philosophy:

It is right also that philosophy should be called knowledge of the truth. For

the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge

is action . . . Now we do not know a truth without its cause; and a thing

has quality in a higher degree than other things if in virtue of it the similar

quality belongs to the other things . . . so that that which causes derivative

truths to be true is most true. Therefore the principles of eternal things must

be always most true; for they are not merely sometimes true, nor is there

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330 th´er`ese-anne druart

any cause of their being, but they themselves are the cause of the being of

other things.11

Putting aside other differences, I want to emphasize that al-Kind¯ı

speaks of creation and maintenance in existence.12 For himGod does

not simply grant an initial existence that keeps subsisting for as

long as it can; he also maintains it in existence. Al-Kind¯ı envisions

continuous creation and the utter contingency of all that is created,

whereas human agents may build a house that will survive them. As

the second chapter of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, book II, argues against

an infinite regress in material, formal, efficient, and final causes as

well as against an infinite variety of kinds of causes, the issue of

causation assumes great importance.

The other passage of Aristotle’s Metaphysics that plays some role

in al-Kind¯ı’s On First Philosophy is book XII, chapters 6–10, which

establishes the existence and attributes of the Prime Mover, conceived

as a final cause. The conception of causation in those chapters

is much more limited than the one sketched in book II, and it is left

to philosophers in Islamic lands to resolve the differences.

The group of translators who worked around al-Kind¯ı produced

and were influenced by the Plotiniana Arabica. This influence

explains why al-Kind¯ı abandons much of Aristotle’s conception

of the Prime Mover, giving less importance to the second part of

book XII than to book II. God is uncaused and without accident or

substrate. He is eternal, incorruptible, and immutable. Chapter 3

establishes the existence of a first cause after complex disquisitions

on unity and plurality. The first cause totally transcends any formof

plurality and is perfectly one and simple. It is, therefore, neither soul

nor intellect. Aristotle’s Prime Mover was an intellect, but al-Kind¯ı,

following Plotinus, posits that the One is beyond soul and intellect.

It is also beyond the categories, and therefore cannot be said to be a

substance.

This insistence on God’s oneness is another way to link philosophy

to Islamic theology, since the latter is known not only as kala¯m,

but also as the “Science of Unification” (‘ilm al-tawh. ¯ıd), i.e., the

proclamation of God’s oneness, emphasizing monotheism and rejection

of any Trinitarian conception. In the introduction of On First

Philosophy al-Kind¯ı defends falsafa against some religious people,

insisting that truth should be accepted wherever it comes from. He

clearly means some theologians whose ignorance of logic does not

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Metaphysics 331

allow them proper understanding of the Greek heritage. Al-Kind¯ı is

scathing:

[They are strangers to the truth] also due to the dirty envy which controls

their animal souls and which, by darkening its veils, obscures their thought’s

perception from the light of truth; and due to their considering those with

human virtue – in attainment ofwhich they are deficient, being on its remote

fringes – as audacious, harmful opponents; thereby defending their spurious

thrones which they installed undeservedly for the purpose of gaining leadership

and traffic in religion, though they are devoid of religion. For one who

trades in something sells it, and he who sells something does not have it.

Thus one who trades in religion does not have religion, and it is right that

one who resists the acquisition of knowledge of the real nature of things and

calls it unbelief be divested of [the offices of] religion. (Arabic 15, English

trans. 58–9)

As Adamson has shown, despite the vehemence of the attack, al-

Kind¯ı articulates his positions on divine attributes, creation, and

freedom through a creative adaptation or reaction to the main tenets

of one school of theology, the Mu‘tazilites.13 For instance, al-Kind¯ı

defends creation in time against the Aristotelian tenet of its eternity

not only in using arguments from the Christian Aristotelian commentator

John Philoponus, but also in stating the kala¯m view that

even non-being is a “thing.”14

In another text, the very brief The Agent in the Proper Sense,

Being First and Perfect, and the Agent in the Metaphorical Sense,

Being Imperfect, al-Kind¯ı tries to spell out how God’s agency transcends

that of creatures. True agency implies bringing into existence

from utter non-being, and this alone belongs to God. Besides, any

other so-called agent is acting under the influence of a superior agent.

Only God is a pure agent and a creature can only be called an agent

metaphorically, since it cannot bring existence from nothing and

depends on a superior cause for the exercise of its own causation.

There are two types of such metaphorical agency: (1) the cause is

simultaneous with its effect, for example, walking; (2) the effect

subsists after the cause ceases to produce the effect, for example, the

products of crafts, such as house building.15 Al-Ghaz¯ al¯ıwill adopt the

view that only God is an agent and Avicenna will use the distinction

between the two types of metaphorical agency in order to differentiate

physical causes from metaphysical ones.

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332 th´er`ese-anne druart

al-ra￣ zı￣

Al-R¯az¯ı, who is sometimes better known as a physician than as a

philosopher, shows that falsafa included a great diversity of views.

An independent thinker, he holds the religiously unorthodox view

that revelation is impossible, because it is always addressed to a particular

people at a particular time and, therefore, incompatible with

God’s justice since it excludes other peoples and other times. His

metaphysics is strikingly different from that of other fala¯ sifa. First,

he is very critical of Aristotle and in particular rejects his conception

of nature, which he finds anthropomorphic. He therefore abandons