Understanding International Relations, Third Edition

Understanding International Relations 

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of power are in some way ‘natural’ phenomena – as Martin Wight remarks,
the historical record shows a tendency towards the concentration of power
rather than towards its balanced distribution (Wight in Butterfield and
Wight 1966: 167). More generally, anyone who wishes to argue that bal-
ances of power always will emerge is obliged to provide some account of
agency, some explanation of how this automatic process gets translated into
state policy.
Two accounts of the balance of power which do meet, or successfully
avoid, this criterion are given by Bull and Waltz. Waltz’s theory as outlined
in Theory of International Politics was discussed briefly in Chapter 3. On
his account, the ‘balance of power’ is what will happen if states take notice
of their surroundings, adjust their policies to changes in the configuration of
power worldwide, and, a critical proviso, if the actual distribution of power
is such that a balance can emerge. Waltz does not argue that balances of
power will always emerge – for example, when discussing the bipolar
nature of the then current (1979) world he remarks that the most likely shift
away from bipolarity would be towards unipolarity (that is, an end to the
anarchical system) – if the Soviet Union were unable to remain in competi-
tion with the United States (Waltz 1979: 179). His point is, rather, that
other states would not want this to happen, and would do everything they
could in terms of realignment and enhancing their own capabilities to stop
it from happening – a point neorealists have repeated since the end of the
Cold War.
On Waltz’s account, the system influences agents via the imperatives of
rational choice. To act in such a way that balances of power emerge is to act
as a rational egoist in the face of a particular set of circumstances, namely
in response to changes in the distribution of power that might affect
adversely a state’s capacity for self-preservation. It should be stressed that
states do not wish to create balances of power, at least not as a first preference.
This is even true, perhaps especially true, of bipolar balances. Each party
would actually like the other to disappear, and would be prepared to take
steps to bring this about if it could do so without risk. But, of course, this is
not possible, and the ‘second best’ solution is to jointly manage a bipolar
balance. Again, generalizing the point, no state really wants to see a balance
of power emerge; balances of power are accepted because there is no better
game in town, no alternative source of security anywhere near as effective.
Waltz is clear that the balance of power is the theory of international
politics, but it should be stressed that other writers employing the same
general line of argument have come to different conclusions. One alternative
to balancing is ‘bandwagoning’ – that is to say, lining up behind a state that
is rising in power – and it has been argued quite cogently both that this
is sometimes a rational strategy to follow and that the historical record
suggests that states are actually every bit as likely to bandwagon as to balance
The Balance of Power and War
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(Walt 1987). Contemporary tendencies for states to bandwagon behind the
dominant US are examined in Chapter 12. However one judges the argu-
ment here, the central point is that it is not quite as obvious that states will
engage in balancing behaviour as Waltz assumes; there are other rational
responses they might have to the security dilemmas that face them.
Hedley Bull, in his The Anarchical Society, briefly considers the idea that
a balance of power might emerge, as he puts it, ‘fortuitously’, simply as an
unintended consequence of the actions of states (Bull 1977/1995/2002: 100).
However, having considered this possibility he rejects it on the grounds that
such fortuitous circumstances could not be expected to provide the basis for
any kind of medium- to long-term stability. States motivated only by rational
egoism would take the first chance to upset a balance. Instead, the burden
of his argument is that the balance of power is a necessary adjunct to any
kind of international order, that only when power is balanced have states any
real freedom in the world, and that balances of power will only emerge and
be sustained when states are aware that this is so and willing to act accord-
ingly. In other words, the balance of power is a kind of artefact, something
that states, or a significant proportion of states, are willing to see as a desir-
able end. If a balance of power is to work, states must want it to work, and
must be committed to the idea that the preservation of the system of states
is desirable. As always with theorists of international society, it is the nor-
mative basis of the relationship that is crucial. To return to the European
example outlined above, the balance of power was established initially in
1871 because Bismarck was committed to at least a version of these norms;
he wanted Germany to be the most powerful state in Europe, but he did not
want the system to be replaced with a German Empire – thus he was willing
to assist in the birth of a new balance of power, in contrast to at least one of
his successors, Hitler, and possibly also to the Emperor William II.
On this account the balance of power is an artefact, something made by
human beings; is it a cultural artefact? It might be thought that the motiva-
tion Bull seems to think is necessary could only come from a society which
is, to some degree, culturally homogeneous, and it might be doubted whether
the normative basis for the balance of power could work in the modern,
post-European world. Bull was clearly concerned about this as evidenced by
his last work on Justice in International Relations, and on the expansion of
the international system (Bull 1984; Bull and Watson 1984). On the other
hand, Frost has argued that the ‘settled norms’ of the modern system, norms
which have been tacitly accepted by almost all states, include a commitment
to the continuation of the system and that this entails the need to preserve
a balance of power – there is no need to assume that this is a specifically
European attitude (Frost 1996).
On Bull’s account we aim to preserve a balance of power in order to
preserve international ‘order’. Does this mean ‘peace’? Not necessarily.
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Understanding International Relations 

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Here, the third point raised by discussion of the post-1871 system can be
made. Post-1871 was also pre-1914; what does the outbreak of war in 1914
tell us about the balance of power system that preceded it? It might be
thought that it tells us that this system failed in 1914 – but it could equally
well be argued that in terms of the preservation of international order, the
1914–18 war and subsequent event amount to a vindication of the balance
of power. At a human level, this is a terrible conclusion, but one that is dif-
ficult to avoid if one accepts that preventing the dominance of the system by
any one power is a good, and if one acknowledges that, in some circum-
stances, this can only be achieved by violence and war. It may well be that,
generally, international order equates to peace, but this cannot be guaran-
teed; sometimes the price of peace will be too high. This is a view sanctioned
by the history of the last four centuries, which can easily be told in terms of
a series of bids for hegemony that were successfully resisted by a balance
of power politics that relied upon war as a possible tactic.
War plays an important role in maintaining a balance of power system, as
a concomitant to alliance politics and arms races – that is to say, these are
ways of maintaining a balance without war, but if they fail war may be nec-
essary. However, there is a further role for war in this kind of international
system. The balance of power is about stability, equilibrium, the prevention
of change, but, sometimes, the resolution of conflict requires change, change
that can only come via war. In this sense, war does not indicate the failure
of conflict resolution – rather, war is a means of conflict resolution. This is
a point that needs to be explored in some depth.