Understanding International Relations, Third Edition

alliance policy, or by some combination of the two.
To illustrate these points in more concrete terms, consider a highly
simplified account of the international system in Europe after 1871. First, in
1871, the system is more or less in equilibrium, following Prussia’s victories
over Austria–Hungary (1866) and France (1870–1), and, crucially, follow-
ing Bismarck’s decision not to use these victories to create a Greater
Germany by incorporating parts of the Dual Monarchy in the new German
Empire. There were tensions in the system, and loose, temporary alliances
between states, but, on the whole, the system was in equilibrium. However,
on one reading, in the late nineteenth century, German power increased as
a result of German industrialism and population growth, to the point that
a German superpower began to emerge, contrary to Bismarck’s intentions.
This industrial strength transmitted itself into an active German foreign pol-
icy via such measures as a larger army, and the growth of a navy virtually
from scratch. The response of the other European powers was first, to
attempt to enhance their own power (by, for example, in France, extending
periods of military training, and in Britain, engaging in naval building) and,
second, to re-align, creating new military alliances. France and Russia
ignored ideological differences and signed a formal alliance in 1892, Britain
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disregarded imperial rivalries and set aside a long policy of peacetime 
non-entanglement to become effectively associated with these two countries
in 1904 and 1907 respectively. In short, both the methods identified above
to deal with incipient disequilibrium were attempted.
There are three interesting points about this story, two of which can be
made here, the third being held over to the end of this section. The first is
that the flexibility of the system decreases as alliances become firmly estab-
lished, because then the system begins to look bipolar, and in a bipolar system,
by definition, disturbances to stability can only be met by internal changes,
and not by the construction of alliances. This is one of the reasons why
classical balance of power theorists say that the ideal number of states in a bal-
ance is five – because this allows for three versus two formations which can
be adapted as becomes appropriate, as opposed to bipolar systems which
are inherently inflexible. However, Kenneth Waltz argues that in a bipolar
system power management is easier as two parties can negotiate their way
to stability more easily than is the case with any larger number.
This first observation is somewhat arcane; more significant is the second
point, the difficulty of thinking about the balance of power while using the-
oretically sophisticated notions of ‘power’. Balance of power theorists tend
to see power as an attribute of states – Claude, for example, defines power
in military terms throughout his work – and thus tend to be committed
to a ‘basic force’ model of influence. However, as was shown in Chapter 5,
basic force models are either wrong or tautological. If, on the other hand,
we try to work with power-as-influence as our starting-point, the simple
stories advocates of balance of power relate become incredibly complex
narratives. For example, returning to the post-1871 narrative offered
above, the idea that German power was the major disruptive influence rests
on a basic force model of power; once we look at influence as revealed in
outcomes, things look very difficult. We find that in most of the diplomatic
crises of the period the German government was on the losing side, quite
unable to convert its undoubted physical strength into favourable results at
the conference table. This was why the German political elite in the years up
to 1914 had such a strong sense that the rest of the world was against them;
they were conscious of their lack of influence, while others were conscious
of their superabundance of power.
How do balances of power become established? Morgenthau argues that
when states pursue their national interests and seek power in the world,
a balance will emerge, ‘of necessity’ – but this is a very dubious argument,
since he is well aware that sometimes balances of power do not emerge
(Morgenthau 1948: 161). If he were not so aware, his advocacy of balance
of power policies would be hard to explain; one does not need to prosely-
tize on behalf of something that is really going to happen ‘of necessity’.
Moreover, the historical record gives little support to the idea that balances
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