Understanding International Relations, Third Edition

Power and Security
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In any event, while power-as-influence is not directly based on the
resources a state has at its disposal, indirectly these resources remain
crucial. Influence rests on the ability to make threats in the event of non-
compliance, and/or offer rewards for compliance – that is, on positive and
negative sanctions or ‘sticks and carrots’ as the vernacular has it – and this
ability is clearly related to the attributes of power possessed by a state.
States that attempt to exert influence in the world, to alter the international
environment in their favour, solely on the basis of reasoned argument or by
relying on the skills of their representatives are likely to be disappointed.
This does not mean that all influence-attempts rest on explicit threats or
promises; the ability of a state to make effective threats/promises will
generally be known and taken into account by interested parties without
having to be made explicit. In fact, explicit threats – and even more so,
action to back up threats – tend to be made when it is unclear that the
message is getting across or when credibility is at stake. It should also be
noted that threats and rewards need not relate directly to tangible factors –
some states may have a degree of prestige such that other states wish to be
associated with them.
These propositions can be illustrated by reference to a number of recent
episodes in international relations. The negotiations in 1993 and 1994
which brought about real progress in relations between the Israeli govern-
ment and the Palestine Liberation Organization and the creation of limited
self-rule in some areas of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank were brokered
by the good offices of a number of parties, ranging from the government of
Egypt to private individuals in Norway. However, when an initial deal was
struck the signing ceremony took place on the White House lawn, because
it was deemed necessary by all parties that the power of the United States be
associated with the outcome. Only the United States possesses the ability to
reward progress and punish lack of progress – underwriting by Norway or
Egypt would not do. As the peace process has unfolded, this fact has
become if anything even more salient, as has the fact that the exercise of this
influence is crucially related to domestic politics in the US; there is a limit to
what any American politician seeking election or re-election can demand in
the way of concessions from Israel. In any event the efficacy of threats and
rewards offered by the US or anyone else will vary according to the issues at
stake; as time has passed and a Palestinian Authority has been established,
core values have come closer to the surface for both parties, and the ability
of outsiders to persuade them to compromise has diminished. The failure of
the Camp David talks in 2000, and the unwillingness of either side to
adhere to the various ‘road maps’ with which they have been presented by
third parties (such as the US, UK and EU) illustrates the point.
In the peace process in Bosnia which led in 1995 to the Dayton Accords,
the movement from implicit to explicit threats, and finally to overt action
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can be observed. In this case the United States had stayed in the background
of the process during 1993–5, but with the implicit threat that it would
become involved if the Bosnian Serbs refused to compromise. This had no
effect; eventually the US became involved and the threat became explicit.
This also had no effect, and it was not until a short bombing campaign by
the US and NATO forces in response to the fall of the town of Srebrenica
and the accompanying atrocities that the Bosnian Serb leadership finally,
grudgingly, moved towards a degree of compliance. Action was necessary
here perhaps because intentions had been misread – although it may also
have been the case that the Bosnian Serb leadership found it easier to justify
to their own people giving way to actual coercion than they would have
yielding even to an explicit threat. Such at least was believed by some NATO
analysts in 1999 when the campaign to end Serbian oppression of ethnic
Albanians in Kosovo commenced, although in the event it turned out that a
far more substantial military effort was necessary on this occasion before
Yugoslav policy was reversed. In both instances, a continuing American
presence is required – without the power of the United States at its disposal
it seems unlikely that the international force in Bosnia charged with imple-
menting the Dayton Accords could perform its mandate, even given the
involvement of the major European NATO members, and, similarly, K-FOR
in Kosovo can only act effectively because it is known that ultimately US
military power backs up the local commanders (Chapter 11 considers these
interventions in terms of their professed humanitarian goals).
Finally, it is worth noting the impact of a very different kind of power –
that associated with the great prestige of a particular figure, such as Nelson
Mandela of South Africa. Thus, the South African delegation played an
important role in bringing about the relatively successful outcome of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference of 1995, partly
through skilful diplomacy, but also because they were able to exploit the
unwillingness of other delegations to find themselves in opposition to South
Africa, and, for another example, the willingness of the Libyan government
to hand over for trial its nationals who were suspects in the Lockerbie
bombing owed something to the good offices of by then ex-President
Mandela. On both occasions the more conventional lobbying of the US
government was rather less successful – partly no doubt, because the US did
not have enough to offer on these particular issues. On the other hand, the
limits of this sort of power are also apparent, for example in the unwilling-
ness of the then military rulers of Nigeria to respond favourably to South
African pressure to grant a reprieve to condemned dissidents. The execution
of Ken Saro-Wiwa while the 1995 Commonwealth Heads of Government
Conference was under way suggests that the disapproval of Nelson
Mandela took second place in the minds of these rulers to the need to
preserve their power at home. Of course, the influence of individuals can