Understanding International Relations, Third Edition

Power, fear and insecurity
One of the defining features of realist accounts of international relations –
of state-centric accounts in general – is an emphasis on the inherently
dangerous nature of international relations. A level of watchfulness, if not
fearfulness, which would be regarded as paranoid in other circumstances
seems a necessary feature of international relations. A brief review of the
story so far will clarify why this is so.
First, it is a premise of state-centric accounts of international relations
that states determine their own aims and objectives in the international
system, and that primary amongst these aims and objectives will be a
concern for survival, both in the physical sense of a concern to preserve the
territorial integrity of the state, and, more intangibly, in terms of a concern
to preserve the capacity of the state to determine its own destiny, its way of
life. This premise emerges from the notion that the state is sovereign and
wishes to remain so, and the assumption holds independently of the nature
of the state – thus, Machtstaat or Rechtstaat, absolutist monarchy or liberal
democracy, it makes no difference; states wish to preserve their sovereignty,
come what may. Second, it is a premise of state-centric views of interna-
tional relations that, given the absence of world government – that is, of a
mechanism whereby interests can be pursued in the hope of achieving
authoritative decision – the pursuit of interests is conducted by attempting
to exercise power in the world, and power, in this sense, means the ability to
make threats and offer rewards. Moreover, coercive means are part of the
repertoire of positive and negative sanctions at the disposal of states in
their conduct of foreign affairs, and the decision to use coercion is one that
sovereign states reserve to themselves, with any commitment not to employ
coercive means being contingent on circumstances.
Taken together, these two premises – each of which is no more than an
elaboration of the implications of a system of sovereign states – ensure that
Power and Security
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insecurity and fear are permanent features of international relations.
The very bare bones of the basic situation point to this conclusion, and
the different ways in which flesh can be added to these bare bones may
make the situation more or less dangerous but they do not and cannot
produce the qualitative change that would be necessary to remove danger
altogether.
The traditional realist account of state-centric international relations
clearly makes life even more dangerous than the basic situation would sug-
gest, because it adds to the pot the assumption that human beings have
naturally aggressive tendencies that can only be constrained by the coercive
force of government. The aims and objectives of states will include a
desire to dominate not simply because this is a systemic imperative, but
because human beings are like that. Domination is what they do. It may be
that, as Carl Schmitt suggests, as between states the visceral hatreds of a
‘friend–foe’ relationship can be transformed into the political hostility of a
friend–enemy relationship, and the impersonal quality of this relationship
may mitigate some of the worst features of our primordial aggressiveness
(Schmitt 1932/1996). As against this, the very impersonality of modern
means of violence may undermine whatever natural restraints we have
inherited as part of our animal nature. In any event, for a classical realist,
aggression and violence are part of who we are, whether these features
are perceived in theological terms or as having socio-psychological or socio-
biological origins.
The neorealist emphasis on systemic imperatives as a source of conduct
removes this notion of aggressiveness from the equation. It is the basic situ-
ation that is dangerous, not the nature of the human beings who are obliged
to work within the international anarchy. Moreover, states are assumed
to be rational in their decision-making, and not liable to be overcome by
instinctual fears or hatreds. The neorealist state is a cold, impersonal entity,
with no friends, but also no enemies. On the other hand, the neorealist
account of the international system puts great stress on the dangers of the
basic situation in which states find themselves. States are enjoined to pay
constant attention to the relations of power that exist in the world; watch-
fulness is needed, because, in a Hobbesian sense, international relations is a
state of war. For Hobbes, life in the state of nature – a clear analogy to
the neorealist international system – is a state of war, not in the sense that
fighting is continual, but in the sense that it is an ever-present possibility
(Hobbes 1946).
The state-centric view of the English School theorists of international
society, and of constructivists such as Alexander Wendt, looks at first sight
to be offering a rather less fear-dominated account of the world. The
assumption here is that although states are sovereign and the basic situation
outlined above still holds, nonetheless they are in a social relationship with
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one another and there are some rules and practices that work to reduce the
fear and tension that otherwise might exist. The rules of international law
mandate non-aggression and non-intervention, and are taken seriously by
states. There are certain kinds of ‘settled norms’ in international relations
which regulate conduct. Such norms are settled not in the sense that every
state always obeys them, but in the sense that even when breaking them
states will pay allegiance to them; that is, they will attempt to show that
they are not really breaking them, or that they are doing so for wholly
exceptional reasons (Frost 1996: 105). These rules are backed by diplomacy –
an institution with a culture of its own oriented towards problem-solving
and negotiation rather than violence and coercion. States are sovereign, but
this does not stop them, most of the time, from obeying the rules; a degree
of watchfulness is justified, but not the extent of fearfulness full-blown
realist accounts suggest should be normal.
There are two problems with this, one fairly obvious, and one which may
need more elaboration. In the first place, no theorist of international society
ever suggested that all states all the time will play by the rules – the possibil-
ity that there will be dissatisfied customers in the international arena who will
be prepared to use their power to damage others cannot be discounted. But
there is a more serious problem here, which is that even with the best will in
the world, even assuming that all states are abiding by the rules – and do not
wish to employ violence and coercion in their relations with one another –
there is still the possibility that this fact will not be recognized, and that
insecurity will increase even if there is no ‘objective’ reason why it should.
This notion – the ‘security dilemma’ – is based on the complex relation-
ship between ‘intentions’ and ‘capabilities’, and the ways in which the
system of sovereign states encourages emphasis on the latter rather than the
former, with the result that a spiral of insecurity may emerge on the basis of
misperception. Thus, because there is a background level of possible inse-
curity even in an international order where the majority of states are unag-
gressive and broadly satisfied with life, states feel obliged to preserve the
means of self-defence and to do so in a cost-efficient but also effective way,
which sometimes involves enhancing this capacity. However, the capacity to
defend oneself is also, most of the time, a capacity to act offensively. On the
same chain of reasoning that leads the first, peaceful, state to preserve and
occasionally enhance the effectiveness of its armed forces, a second state
may see this as a potentially hostile act. The defensive intentions – which
cannot easily be demonstrated, much less proven – will be less important
than the offensive capabilities. If the second state reacts to these capabilities
by expanding its own coercive capacity this is likely to be perceived as
potentially hostile, and so the spiral sets in. The US debate over National
Missile Defense offers an interesting illustration of the reasoning here; a