Under the 995 rescue scheme, Bancomer sold 15. billion pesos worth of npls to the

Under the 1995 rescue scheme, Bancomer sold 15.6 billion pesos worth of NPLs to the
government. Nonetheless, Bancomer’s NPL stood at 9.2% in April 1996. Though much
lower than the average NPL for Mexican banks, it was very high by international standards.
The bank announced it had created extraordinary reserves (2.8 billion pesos) to provision
for the full amount of its bad loans. It was the first bank to do so, Bancomer slipped into
losses during the first quarter.38
As Table 10.1 shows, the cost to income ratio, a measure of efficiency, was not reported
until 1996. Bancomer’s rose from 1996 onwards, reaching a high of 74.4% in 1998 – a period
during which it was trying to cut costs. Between 1998 and 1999, this ratio was reduced by
12%, only to rise again in 2000, the year it was taken over. From 1993 onwards, the Basel
risk assets ratios for both Banamex and Bancomer were quite respectable, well above the
Basel minimum of 8% and in double digits. But in the takeover year, Bancomer’s dropped
by nearly 11%, to 7.8% in 2000.
As part of the reform of the banking system, it was announced that the banks were
to use US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) from 1997. The Bancomer announcement regarding its bad debts was in preparation for this, but it was not
enough – when GAAP was applied, NPLs rose to 18% of capital and net income (1996)
fell by nearly 70%. Bancomer and other banks would require a great deal more capital,
and looked to foreign banks to invest in them. In 1996, the Bank of Montreal had
purchased 16% of Bancomer, but the capital injection was not nearly enough to meet
its needs.
At the end of March 1999, Bancomer and Banamex announced they had entered
into talks about merging, and informed the competition authorities. This move reflected
the continued weak state of the banking sector, despite attempts to revive it postcrisis. The government had absorbed a total of $65 billion of bad debt from the banks’
balance sheets, and many weaker banks were taken over and/or restructured. From December 1998, foreign banks had been given the legal backing to take over the top three
banks – up to that time they were limited to a maximum of 20% of the bank. Merger
talks by the top two was a defensive action, based on the idea that being bigger
would in some way resolve their joint problems of insufficient capital.

1995 yildagi qutqaruv sxemasiga ko'ra, Bancomer 15,6 milliard peso qiymatidagi NPLlarni sotgan

hukumat. Shunga qaramay, Bancomerning NPL 1996 yil aprel oyida 9,2% ni tashkil etdi.
Meksika banklari uchun o'rtacha NPL ko'rsatkichidan past, bu xalqaro standartlar bo'yicha juda yuqori edi.Bank zaxira uchun favqulodda zaxiralar (2,8 milliard peso) yaratganini e'lon qildi
uning umidsiz kreditlarining to'liq miqdori uchun. Bu shunday qilgan birinchi bank edi, Bancomer kirib keldi birinchi chorakdagi yo'qotishlar.3810.1-jadvaldan ko'rinib turibdiki, samaradorlik o'lchovi bo'lgan xarajatlar va daromad nisbati haqida xabar berilmagan 1996 yilgacha. Bancomer's 1996 yildan boshlab ko'tarilib, 1998 yilda 74,4% ga yetdi - bir davr.bu vaqtda u xarajatlarni kamaytirishga harakat qildi. 1998-1999 yillar oralig'ida bu ko'rsatkich 100 ga kamaydi 12%, faqat 2000 yilda yana ko'tarildi, u qabul qilingan yil. 1993 yildan boshlab Bazel Banamex va Bancomer uchun risk aktivlari nisbati ancha yuqori edi Bazel kamida 8% va ikki raqamli. Ammo sotib olish yilida Bancomer tushib ketdi qariyb 11% ga, 2000 yilda 7,8% gacha. Bank tizimini isloh qilish doirasida banklar bo'lganligi e'lon qilindi1997 yildan beri AQShda umumiy qabul qilingan buxgalteriya tamoyillaridan (GAAP) foydalanish.etarli - GAAP qo'llanilganda, NPLlar kapital va sof daromadning 18% gacha ko'tarildi (1996)deyarli 70% ga kamaydi. Bancomer va boshqa banklar ko'proq kapital talab qiladi,va ularga sarmoya kiritish uchun xorijiy banklarga murojaat qildi. 1996 yilda Monreal banki bor edi.Bancomer-ning 16% ni sotib oldi, ammo kapital in'ektsiyasi qondirish uchun deyarli etarli emas edi uning ehtiyojlari.
1999 yil mart oyining oxirida Bancomer va Banamex o'zlarining kirishganliklarini e'lon qilishdi
birlashish to'g'risida muzokaralar olib bordi va raqobat organlarini xabardor qildi. Bu harakat aks etdi inqirozdan keyin qayta tiklashga urinishlarga qaramay, bank sektorining zaif holati davom etmoqda. Hukumat banklardan jami 65 milliard dollarlik umidsiz qarzni o'zlashtirdi.
balanslari va ko'plab zaif banklar qabul qilindi va/yoki qayta tuzildi. 1998 yil dekabr oyidan boshlab xorijiy banklarga kuchli uchlikni egallash uchun qonuniy yordam berildi banklar - shu vaqtga qadar ular bankning maksimal 20% bilan cheklangan edi. Birlashish Yuqori ikki kishining muzokaralari kattaroq bo'lish g'oyasiga asoslangan mudofaa harakati edi kapital yetishmasligi bilan bog'liq qo'shma muammolarni qandaydir tarzda hal qiladi.

This, the banks argued, together with their large size, would give them greater access to capital
markets. However, if these two banks were to merge, they would have a 40% share
of the deposit market, creating concerns about lack of competition and rising inefficiency. The authority monitoring anti-competitive practices was seen as weak because
of the degree of monopoly power that had been allowed to prevail in other sectors of
the economy. This raised fears about more cartel-like behaviour, pushing up what were
already unusually high spreads, which were costly for both borrowers and savers. Furthermore, should this new large bank get into trouble, there would be serious systemic
problems, a cause for special concern in a country with a past history of financial/banking
crises. However, soon after the two banks declared their merger intentions, the head
of the Federal Competition Commission announced he would prevent any merger from
taking place.Despite the economic recovery between 1995 and 2000, the inability of the banks
to deal with their bad debt problems together with weak bankruptcy laws and the lack
of protection of creditor rights meant virtually no new credit was extended over this
period, Firms had to look elsewhere: through bond issues (if large enough), or seeking
foreign or domestic investors willing to inject capital or make loans. However, it was
clear Mexico needed a banking system willing to lend, prompting the government to take
the initiative.In 1998, the punto final was introduced, and was to be the last of a series of loan loss
sharing agreements between the banks and government. Creditors and debtors were given
a certain date to resolve their claims. If they did, creditors got up to two-thirds of the debt
they were owed, and debtors were given the last opportunity to receive government support
to pay off their debts. For example, there could be a write off of mortgages of up to 50%.
These generous terms resulted in over a million claims being settled, mainly individual
borrowers and small firms. Large debts remained outstanding – most banks thinking they
could recover more than what they would get from the state.
The extent of ongoing problems in Mexico’s banking sector, four years after the 1995
crisis, was made apparent when, in May 1999, the Institute for Protection of Bank Savings
(IPAB) was established with a remit to deal with banks with ongoing problems. It quickly
took control of Mexico’s third largest bank, Serfin Bank. It was estimated at the time that
the cost of supporting the troubled banking sector had reached $100 billion. The IPAB is
similar to a ‘‘bad bank’’, but has the power to take over whole banks. It is estimated to have
about $50bn of bad loans on its books, of which $12bn originate from Serfin. The IPAB
reported that it could take up to 20 years to deal with this bad debt. It also began to dismantle
the 100% deposit insurance scheme and instructed existing banks, including Bancomer,
to raise more capital. In December 1999, Bancomer complied and sold off its insurance
subsidiary. At the same time Bancomer announced the development of bancassurance, i.e.
that insurance products would be sold through its bank branches. Normally banks expand
into bankassurance after they acquire an insurance subsidiary or partner.
Despite the sale of the large insurance subsidiary and an earlier capital injection by the
Bank of Montreal in 1996, the bank was still under pressure to find a capital rich partner. In
March 2000, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) of Spain and Bancomer agreed that
BBVA would take a controlling interest (30%) in Bancomer.

Bu, banklarning ta'kidlashicha, katta hajmlari bilan birga ularga kapitalga kengroq kirish imkonini beradi bozorlar. Biroq, agar bu ikki bank birlashsa, ular 40% ulushga ega bo'lishadi depozit bozorining o'sishi, raqobatning yo'qligi va samarasizlikning kuchayishi haqida tashvish uyg'otadi. Raqobatga qarshi amaliyotlarni nazorat qiluvchi organ zaif deb qaraldi, chunki uning boshqa tarmoqlarida hukmronlik qilishga ruxsat etilgan monopol hokimiyat darajasi iqtisodiyot. Bu ko'proq kartelga o'xshash xatti-harakatlar haqida qo'rquvni oshirib, nima bo'lganini kuchaytirdi allaqachon g'ayrioddiy yuqori spredlar, bu ham qarz oluvchilar, ham tejamkorlar uchun qimmatga tushdi. Bundan tashqari, agar bu yangi yirik bank muammoga duch kelsa, jiddiy tizimli bo'ladi muammolar, o'tmishdagi moliyaviy/bank tarixiga ega bo'lgan mamlakatda alohida tashvish uyg'otadi inqirozlar. Biroq, ikki bank o'zlarining birlashish niyatlarini e'lon qilganidan ko'p o'tmay, bosh Federal raqobat komissiyasi har qanday qo'shilishning oldini olishini e'lon qildi 1995-2000-yillarda iqtisodiyotning tiklanishiga qaramay, banklarning qobiliyatsizligi. zaif bankrotlik qonunlari va etishmasligi bilan birga ularning yomon qarz muammolarini hal qilish kreditorlar huquqlarini himoya qilish buning uchun amalda yangi kredit berilmaganligini anglatardi davr, Firmalar boshqa joyga qarash kerak edi: obligatsiyalar chiqarish orqali (etarlicha katta bo'lsa), yoki izlash kapitalni kiritish yoki kredit berishga tayyor bo'lgan xorijiy yoki mahalliy investorlar. Biroq, shunday edi aniq Meksika kredit berishga tayyor bank tizimiga muhtoj bo'lib, hukumatni olishga undadi tashabbus. 1998 yilda punto final joriy etildi va u kredit yo'qotishlar seriyasining oxirgisi bo'lishi kerak edi.banklar va hukumat o'rtasidagi almashish shartnomalari. Kreditorlar va qarzdorlar berildi da'volarini hal qilish uchun ma'lum bir sana. Agar ular shunday qilgan bo'lsa, kreditorlar qarzning uchdan ikki qismini olishdi ular qarzdor bo'lib, qarzdorlarga davlat tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun oxirgi imkoniyat berildi qarzlarini to'lash uchun. Masalan, 50% gacha bo'lgan ipoteka kreditlari hisobdan chiqarilishi mumkin.Ushbu saxovatli shartlar milliondan ortiq da'volarni, asosan, individual tarzda ko'rib chiqishga olib keldi qarz oluvchilar va kichik firmalar. Katta qarzlar to'lanmaganligicha qoldi - aksariyat banklar shunday deb o'ylashadi davlatdan oladiganidan ko'ra ko'proq qaytarib olishlari mumkin edi.1995 yildan keyin to'rt yil o'tgach, Meksikaning bank sektorida davom etayotgan muammolar darajasi inqiroz, 1999 yil may oyida Bank jamg'armalarini himoya qilish instituti paydo bo'lganida yaqqol namoyon bo'ldi (IPAB) davom etayotgan muammolari bo'lgan banklar bilan ishlash uchun ruxsatnoma bilan tashkil etilgan. Tezda Meksikaning uchinchi yirik banki Serfin Bankni nazorat ostiga oldi. O'sha paytda taxmin qilingan muammoli bank sektorini qo‘llab-quvvatlash xarajatlari 100 milliard dollarga yetgan edi. IPAB bu "yomon bank" ga o'xshaydi, lekin butun banklarni egallash huquqiga ega. borligi taxmin qilinmoqda uning kitoblari bo'yicha 50 milliard dollarga yaqin umidsiz kreditlar, shundan 12 milliard dollari Serfindan keladi. IPAB bu yomon qarz bilan kurashish uchun 20 yilgacha vaqt ketishi mumkinligini xabar qildi. U ham demontaj qila boshladi depozitlarni 100% sug'urta qilish sxemasi va mavjud banklarga, shu jumladan Bancomerga ko'rsatma berdi, ko'proq kapital jalb qilish. 1999 yil dekabr oyida Bancomer o'z sug'urtasini sotdi sho'ba korxonasi. Shu bilan birga Bancomer bank sug'urtasining rivojlanishini e'lon qildi, ya'ni.sug'urta mahsulotlari uning bank filiallari orqali sotiladi. Odatda banklar kengayadi sug'urta sho''ba korxonasi yoki sherikni sotib olgandan keyin bank sug'urtasiga. Yirik sug'urta sho'ba korxonasi sotilganiga va avvalroq kapital qo'yilganiga qaramay 1996 yilda Monreal banki kapitalga boy sherik topish uchun hali ham bosim ostida edi. In 2000 yil mart oyida Ispaniyaning Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) va Bancomer kelishib oldilar.BBVA Bancomerning nazorat paketiga (30%) ega bo'ladi

The $1.2 billion deal would create the largest bank in Mexico. BBVA would also take responsibility for managing the bank, to be known as BBVA-Bancomer. BBVA had purchased Probursa Bank in 1995 at the height of the crisis, and it was intended to integrate the operations of BBVA-Probursa into BBVA-Bancomer. The first hostile bid in Mexican history came in May 2000 when Banacci, the parent of Banamex, announced its intention to purchase 65% of Bancomer, in a $2.4 billion bid.This came as a surprise, especially after the Federal Competition Commission had declared it would block any merger of these two banks. Now, in an apparent U-turn, the authorityannounced it might allow it to proceed if the banks agreed to sell off parts where they had a clear monopoly, including credit cards and private pensions. Within a month, however, the competition authority appeared to revert to it original position, expressing concern about

potential problems arising from too concentrated a banking industry.
Five weeks later, the Bancomer Board approved the BBVA bid, after it offered an
additional $1.4 billion in cash, bringing the total capital raised to $2.5 billion, which is exactly what Bancomer needed given its bad debt problems. The bid meant BBVA would
own 32% of the bank, which rose to 45% after buying up the Bank of Montreal’s holding
in April 2001, and again to 54% in November 2002. It intends to own up to 65% of
the bank.This friendly takeover of Bancomer was part of a trend of consolidation and increased
foreign ownership of Mexico’s largest banks. Spain’s largest bank, Santander Central Hispano (SCH), had bought 30% of Bital Bank, which boasted the largest retail branch network, and in 2001 ING took a 17.5% stake in Bital. In May 2000 the IPAB, having cleaned up the balance sheet of the troubled Serfin, sold it to Spain’s SCH for $1.5bn. The new bank was called Santander Mexicano. By 2001, Citigroup had taken control of Banamex. Mexico’s banking system was now owned and controlled by giant foreign players.Post-consolidation, it is hoped that two new banking laws will help ensure the stabilityof the banking system. In April 2000, a new bankruptcy code of practice was established, modelled after the US system of chapter 11 administration which gives the indebted firm\ an opportunity to restructure its loans for a specified period of time. The courts protect the firm from creditors in this period. A second law was enacted in 2000, which protects
creditors’ rights to collateral should a firm go bankrupt. In a judicial system which had
always favoured debtors (a common feature in the legal systems of many merging markets),
the two new laws went some way to redress the balance.

1,2 milliard dollarlik bitim bo'ladi Meksikadagi eng yirik bankni yaratish. BBVA, shuningdek, boshqaruv uchun mas'uliyatni o'z zimmasiga oladi bank, BBVA-Bancomer sifatida tanilgan. BBVA 1995 yilda Probursa Bankni sotib olgan edi inqiroz balandligi va u BBVA-Probursa operatsiyalarini birlashtirish uchun mo'ljallangan edi BBVA-Bancomerga. Meksika tarixidagi birinchi dushmanlik taklifi 2000 yil may oyida ota-onasi Banacci bo'lganida edi Banamex kompaniyasi Bancomerning 65 foizini 2,4 milliard dollarga sotib olish niyatini e'lon qildi. Bu, ayniqsa, Federal Raqobat Komissiyasi e'lon qilganidan keyin ajablanib bo'ldibu ikki bankning har qanday birlashuviga to'sqinlik qiladi. Endi, yaqqol aylanib, hokimiyat Agar banklar o'zlarida mavjud bo'lgan qismlarni sotishga rozi bo'lsa, uni davom ettirishga ruxsat berishini e'lon qildi aniq monopoliya, shu jumladan kredit kartalari va shaxsiy pensiyalar. Biroq, bir oy ichida raqobat organi xavotir bildirgan holda o'zining dastlabki pozitsiyasiga qaytgandek tuyuldi bank sanoatining haddan tashqari konsentratsiyasidan kelib chiqadigan mumkin bo'lgan muammolar. Besh hafta o'tgach, Bancomer kengashi BBVA taklifini ma'qulladi, u taklif qilganidan keyin qo'shimcha 1,4 milliard dollar naqd pul, jami kapitalni 2,5 milliard dollarga yetkazdi, ya'ni Bancomer yomon qarz muammolarini hisobga olgan holda aynan nimaga muhtoj edi. Taklif BBVAni anglatadi Bank of Monreal xoldingini sotib olgandan keyin 45% gacha ko'tarilgan bankning 32% ga egalik qiladi. 2001 yil aprelda va 2002 yil noyabrda yana 54% gacha. U 65% gacha egalik qilmoqchi.Bank Bancomer-ni do'stona tarzda egallash konsolidatsiya tendentsiyasining bir qismi edi va ortdi Meksikaning eng yirik banklariga xorijiy mulk. Ispaniyaning eng yirik banki Santander Central Hispano (SCH) Bital Bankning 30 foizini sotib oldi, u eng yirik chakana filiali bilan maqtandi. tarmog'i va 2001 yilda ING Bitalning 17,5% ulushini oldi. 2000 yil may oyida IPAB muammoli Serfin balansini tozalab, uni Ispaniyaning SCHga sotdi.$1,5 mlrd. Yangi bank Santander Mexicano deb nomlangan. 2001 yilga kelib Citigroup egalladi Banamex nazorati. Meksikaning bank tizimi endi gigantga tegishli edi va nazorat qilindi xorijiy futbolchilar.Konsolidatsiyadan keyin ikkita yangi bank qonuni barqarorlikni ta'minlashga yordam beradi, degan umiddamiz bank tizimi. 2000 yil aprel oyida bankrotlik to'g'risidagi yangi kodeks tuzildi.qarzdor firmani beradi 11-bob ma'muriyatining AQSh tizimidan keyin modellashtirilgan ma'lum muddatga o'z kreditlarini qayta tuzish imkoniyati. Sudlar himoya qiladi davrda kreditorlardan firma. 2000 yilda ikkinchi qonun qabul qilindi, u himoya qiladi agar firma bankrot bo'lsa, kreditorlarning garovga bo'lgan huquqlari. Bo'lgan sud tizimida har doim imtiyozli qarzdorlar (ko'plab birlashuvchi bozorlarning huquqiy tizimlarida umumiy xususiyat), ikkita yangi qonun muvozanatni tiklash uchun qandaydir yo'l bo'ldi.