●
Security and risk information issued and communicated by governmental
agencies in the generating markets (in the form of travel advisories);
●
The global and local mass media;
●
Governmental tourism organizations in the affected receiving destination; and
●
The travel industry in the generating markets (Lepp and Gibson, 2003).
Following is an analysis of the way in which each information source functions and
its advantages and limitations in conveying accurate,
comprehensive, fair,
dynamic, and up-to-date security related information to tourists, travel agents, and
tour operators.
Travel Advisories
Governments in various generating markets issue travel warnings as part of their
policy to protect their citizens and to save them from exposure to any sort of risk
in their international travel. These travel warnings are issued to make potential
travelers aware of the possible consequences when traveling to an insecure desti-
nation (Beirman, 2003). Practically, the information
is compiled and communi-
cated either by a central government ministry such as a ministry of foreign affairs
or by embassies situated in an affected country. Travel warnings are in most cases
ranked on a scale from “precautions are needed” to “strictly no-go destinations.”
Most travel warning providers will communicate their information through the
mass media and by using the Internet. The security and risk information is dynam-
ically updated following frequent security reassessments and as security events
crop up. In most cases, travel warnings cannot legally prevent people from taking
the trip and should be regarded as recommendations only. However, in the past
decade they have practically become an important travel
filter since insurance
companies and large tour operators base their business policy on this mode of
governmental risk assessment.
There is no doubt of the legitimacy of issuing governmental travel warnings in
order to protect the life and health of a given country’s citizens. However, a few
researchers have raised some reservations regarding the accuracy and comprehen-
siveness of the security and risk information that is communicated to potential
travelers. In their mind, governments prefer to convince people to avoid affected
destinations altogether rather than deal with tourists trapped in the midst of some
kind of security situation in a foreign and not always friendly country. Such a risk
management strategy is more convenient from the government’s
perspective and
protects governments from possible future liability lawsuits. However, if this pre-
ferred policy is implemented, it requires “massaging” of the objective security
information and a certain level of distortion of the security reality on the ground.
While this is a common mode of conduct by the mass media, if implemented
by governments it could be perceived as violating the basic principles that drive
international tourism, that is, reciprocity and the freedom of movement (Cavlek,
2002; Beirman, 2003).
Indeed, the academic literature has documented various cases where travel advi-
sories caused an almost complete devastation of the local economy of the affected
destination (Beirman, 2003). Thus, for example, Sönmez and Graefe (1998a)
quoted Sharpley and Sharpley (1995) who investigated
the impact of the British
Foreign Office warnings to avoid any visit to Gambia. Apparently, the Gambian
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case is one of the worst examples, where travel warnings brought inbound tourist
flow to a standstill, hence causing a domino effect that adversely affected the entire
economy. However, researchers suggest that other countries have been badly affected
by these warnings too (e.g., Mansfeld, 1999; Cavlek, 2002; Beirman, 2003).
Convincing or instructing tourists not to go to security
affected destinations is
the official task of travel advisories. However, unintentionally, they might end up
functioning as catalysts for security upgrade and improvement in destinations hit
by terrorism or other security events. Beirman (2003) observed, for example, that
in the face of very explicit travel warnings issued by Western governments to avoid
Egypt after the 1997 Luxor terror attack, the Egyptian government was very anx-
ious to encourage their early revocation (Beirman, 2003, p. 81). Egypt immedi-
ately increased security measures in all major tourist attractions and invited foreign
diplomats to see how the security situation had improved. This
caused a quick
reaction by those governments who rescinded their warnings, allowing Egypt a
quick recovery from this crisis. This example supports Cavlek’s (2000) postulate
that travel advisories are perceived by affected countries as highly effective, and,
therefore, should not be ignored by the receiving tourist industry and governmen-
tal tourism agencies. However, bearing in mind their occasional use of partial,
biased, and/or intentionally blown-out-of-proportion information, the affected des-
tinations must react in two possible directions.
One is to provide tourists, travel
agents, and tour operators in the generating markets an alternative, parallel, accu-
rate, up-to-date, and genuine information platform of their security situation. The
second measure would be to “push” its security assessments and risk evaluations
proactively to those in charge of travel advisories in the generating markets. This
concerted effort might help in defusing the destructive potential of travel advi-
sories, while maintaining their reputation as a reliable risk-prevention mechanism
among the generating markets.
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