Thinking, Fast and Slow

30: Rare Events
wish to avoid it
: George F. Loewenstein, Elke U. Weber, Christopher K. Hsee, and Ned
Welch, “Risk as Feelings,” 
Psychological Bulletin
127 (2001): 267–86.
vividness in decision making
: Ibid. Cass R. Sunstein, “Probability Neglect: Emotions,
Worst Cases, and Law,” 
Yale Law Journal
112 (2002): 61–107. See notes to chapter 13:
Damasio, 
Descartes’ Error
. Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor, “The {r, n>: C. A
Affect Heuristic.”
Amos’s student
: Craig R. Fox, “Strength of Evidence, Judged Probability, and Choice
Under Uncertainty,” 
Cognitive Psychology
38 (1999): 167–89.
focal event and its
: Judgments of the probabilities of an event and its complement do not
always add up to 100%. When people are asked about a topic they know very little about
(“What is your probability that the temperature in Bangkok will exceed 100° tomorrow at
noon?”), the judged probabilities of the event and its complement add up to less than
100%.
receiving a dozen roses
: In cumulative prospect theory, decision weights for gains and
losses are not assumed to be equal, as they were in the original version of prospect theory
that I describe.
superficial processing
: The question about the two urns was invented by Dale T. Miller,
William Turnbull, and Cathy McFarland, “When a Coincidence Is Suspicious: The Role of
Mental Simulation,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
57 (1989): 581–89.
Seymour Epstein and his colleagues argued for an interpretation of it in terms of two
systems: Lee A. Kirkpatrick and Seymour Epstein, “Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory
and Subjective Probability: Evidence for Two Conceptual Systems,” 
Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology
63 (1992): 534–44.

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judged it as more dangerous
: Kimihiko Yamagishi, “When a 12.86% Mortality Is More
Dangerous Than 24.14%: Implications for Risk Communication,” 
Applied Cognitive
Psychology
11 (1997): 495–506.
forensic psychologists
: Slovic, Monahan, and MacGregor, “Violence Risk Assessment and
Risk Communication.”
“1 of 1,000 capital cases”
: Jonathan J. Koehler, “When Are People Persuaded by DNA
Match Statistics?” 
Law and Human Behavior
25 (2001): 493–513.
studies of
choice from experience: Ralph Hertwig, Greg Barron, Elke U. Weber, and Ido
Erev, “Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare Events in Risky Choice,”
Psychological Science
15 (2004): 534–39. Ralph Hertwig and Ido Erev, “The Description-
Experience Gap in Risky Choice,” 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
13 (2009): 517–23.
not yet settled
: Liat Hadar and Craig R. Fox, “Information Asymmetry in Decision from
Description Versus Decision from Experience,” 
Judgment and Decision Making
4 (2009):
317–25.
“chances of rare events”
: Hertwig and Erev, “The Description-Experience Gap.”