The structure of the global catastrophe

94. Curiosity can appear more strongly fear of death

At all any information on global risks is useful. For example, if we make a certain dangerous experiment and as a result we will survive, we learn, that this type of experiments is safe. But whether there is this knowledge of that risk to which we have subjected ourselves? Nevertheless, people can risk a life for the sake of knowledge or experiences. It is possible to recollect, that were a victim in crowd curious, observing storm of the white house in 93 year. And, I am assured, to many people it is curious, what "doomsday" will be. Someone can agree on dangerous experiments for the sake of curiosity.

95. System and the regulations

Global catastrophe, as well as any usual technogenic failure, can be not result of any one fatal error, and a consequence of casual fatal coincidence of ten insignificant errors. For smooth functioning of system it is necessary to allow to break regulations on trifles. And during any moment these infringements develop in the suitable image - not extinguished stub, the open tank, the simplified scheme of start - and lead to formation of a chain of events, the leader to catastrophe. There is a following further: « I had to take part in investigations (or to study materials) catastrophes and failures in the industry (not nuclear). By their results I for myself have drawn the following conclusion: practically never there are any "unique main" reasons and accordingly "the main thing guilty" (I mean not official conclusions of the commissions, and the actual party of business). As a rule, there is that I for myself conditionally name: ten small разгильдяйств. All these small sloppiness are made at all on a kind for many years successively and since separately each of them is not capable to lead to heavy consequences owing to it the attention to them does not address. But when all of them occur during one time, in one place and with one people is leads to tragical result. Well and when incident has a public resonance - then usually and appoint the main switchman by a principle: "who has not hidden, I am not guilty".

96. Effect of "switchman"

Instead of search of original causes of catastrophe search for the switchman therefore the original reasons are not eliminated, and it becomes possible once again. Concerning global catastrophe this can have that sense, that instead of finding out and eliminating общесистемные the laws conducting to it, struggle against private displays will be conducted. Общесистемными the laws conducting to global catastrophe, technical progress, basic impossibility of experimental check, superconfidence of people etc. are., whereas distribution of a genetic code of one taken virus - to private displays of these laws.

97. The minimum perceived risk

There is a minimum perceived risk, that is if the probability of event nobody a threshold less, human perceives it as zero. The assumption has been put forward, that it is caused by that human makes of the decision, proceeding not from real probabilities, possible variants of events p_i, and from the representations about them f (p_i). For example, a number of experiments shows, that human does not perceive probability less than 10^-5, despite very big possible damage. We above explained it recognising that such risk level is imperceptible against daily risk to which human is exposed.

98. Отвержение new ideas

People and scientists often reject new ideas as it would mean to recognise own wrongfulness. Dynamics of such process is depicted куном in its theory of scientific revolutions, and, unfortunately, discussions about new ideas are often painted by the same models of behaviour, as struggle for the power in flight of monkeys. Often preventions of new risks have not quite proved character. An example such отвержения, costing millions lives - long отвержение ideas of Hungarian doctor Ignatsa Phillip Zemmelvejsa (1818-1865) which asserted, that the maternity fever is connected by that doctors do not wash a hand after discovery of corpses.

99. Influence of emotional reaction of a shock

It is known, that catastrophes provoke certain sequence of psychological experiences, each of which influences objectivity of accepted decisions. In the book «Psychogeniuses in extreme conditions» it is told: «… psychological reactions at catastrophes are subdivided into four phases: heroism,« a honeymoon », disappointment and restoration» thus the period of negation, a panic or a paralysis during the first instants катстрофы can precede a heroism phase.

Each of these stages creates the kind of bias. If global catastrophe it will be so awful that will cause reaction of negation in the spirit of «begins cannot be», «it is any error» etc. For example, video shots about act of terrorism have apprehended on September, 11th many as shots from a new Hollywood film. Then there is a stage of superreaction which can create new dangers because of precipitate behaviour. For example, the pilots, taken off to patrol on September, 11th the sky over New York, have been assured, that war with Russian has begun. In the same spirit there was also a statement of the president Bush that «we declare war» this very day. Then at a stage of euphoria the feeling of danger becomes dull, though actually the dangerous situation yet has not ended. The despondency, on the contrary, is connected not with reduction of an estimation of risk, and with reduction of motivation with it to struggle, probably, connected with scales of losses and inevitability comprehension. Acceptance leads to that catastrophes is forgotten, and the risk is taken for granted. That is at this stage there is also a reduction of an estimation risks, and motivation reduction on its overcoming. Such description concerns experience of catastrophes which have begun and have ended, like earthquakes, and clinic of a sharp grief at death of relatives. However global catastrophe does not concern such events - more likely if its approach manages to be noticed, it will look as more and more accruing terrible process.

Thus important that emotions influences behaviour of people irrespective of, they want it, or not even if they know about this influence, and wish it to avoid. Advertising action is based on it. Besides, if global catastrophe, for example, general epidemic at almost everyone there will be the close people who are dying as a result of it or being in a zone of raised risk begins. In the Hollywood films it is represented usually in that spirit, that the protagonist has time to rescue also the country, and to liberate the beloved from blockages. But on that it and the fairy tale, that so will not be. All people, both making decisions, and executors, in case of global catastrophe will think not only of destinies of a planet, but also about rescue close (and also the countries, native cities and others общностей with which they are connected), and owing to it their choice will be неоптимален. Even if they will make decision to offer the relatives and entirely to concentrate on catastrophe prevention, the emotional stress from such decision will harm to their objectivity and working capacity. Actually, they will be in a condition of a sharp grief or a shock. G.G.Malinetsky writes: «a Number of experts in risk psychology consider, that a share of the heads capable adequately to operate in the conditions of ЧС, does not exceed 0,5 %».

100. Problems of selection of experts

As on each separate question we are compelled to rely on opinion of the most competent people in this area, the effective way of selection of such people - or their books is necessary to us. Techniques of selection of experts are usually that: first, their regalia - a citing index, scientific ranks, posts etc. matter. Secondly, it is possible to believe on number of the come true forecasts to define probability of their correctness. The third way consists in to trusting anybody, and to recheck most all another's calculations. At last, it is possible to select people on that, how much they share your belief - whether they trust in Singularity, Peak Хубберта, liberal model of economy etc. - it is obvious, that in this case we do not learn anything new, besides, as so it was meant by our selection. And it is obvious, that all the ways long selection of experts contain the reefs. For example, concerning global catastrophes there can not be come true forecasts.

101. Fault and responsibility as factors of prevention of risks

Our mind can to try define the one who exactly is guilty in this or that catastrophe. The fault leans against concepts of a free will, responsibility and the subsequent punishment. However in case of global catastrophe it loses any sense as there will be no neither investigations, nor a punishment, neither advantage of this punishment, nor fear of punishment. On the other hand, concentration on search of the guilty distracts from vision of a complete picture of catastrophe. Actually, we think, that if we will define guilty and we will replace them with more effective executors following time of catastrophe will not be, and to all slovens there will be a good lesson and discipline on manufacture will raise. Obviously, however, that punishment of the guilty is useless, when it is a question of global catastrophes. Probably, it was meaningful «to judge winners» - that is people who have admitted a certain global risk even if catastrophes as a result have not occurred. It is thus important to enhance the responsibility people for world preservation in which they live.

102. Underestimation of forces of inertia as factor of stability of systems

Besides the general reasons about complexity and the feedback mechanisms doing system steady, it is possible to use formula Готта (indirect ways of an estimation of risks see the head) for an estimation of future time of existence of system, proceeding from last time of its existence. She allows математически to express that fact, that if, for example, the bus was not about an hour it is improbable, that it will come the next minute. That is last time of existence of system creates, so to say, «time inertia». When it appears, that a certain system is steadier, than it seemed to us, proceeding from our theories, we start to doubt our theories which can be as a matter of fact correct, but be mistaken in dating of events. Thus, stability underestimation conducts to underestimation of risks.

103. The opinions caused by outlook

The error essence consists in the assumption volume that there are the true statements which have been not caused by outlook. All discussions about risks of global catastrophe occur on a platform of certain scientific, cultural and historical outlook which is so obvious to us that seems transparent and is imperceptible. However it is possible, that the representative of other culture and religion will argue essentially in another way and bias of our reasonings also will be obvious to it.

104. Struggle for a scientific priority

For example, concerning global warming there are some the different terms which have been put forward by different authors on purpose to fix the priority on this concept: «planetary catastrophe» at It is scarlet. Mountain, «hotbed catastrophe» at A.V.Karnauhova, «runaway global warming» in other foreign literature. It leads to that search in one of synonyms does not give out results on another. Besides, it is important to note those difficulties, which are tested by a science with the certificate of unique events, which had final number of observers (in the spirit of the decision of the French academy of sciences that stones from the sky cannot fall.)

105. The error connected with conscious and unconscious unwillingness of people to recognise the fault and scale of catastrophe

And following from this wrong informing of the heads on a situation. Conscious - when, for example, military men hide a certain failure that them have not punished, wishing will consult by own strength. When people do not cause firemen, extinguishing a fire until it does not become too extensive. Unconscious - when people trust in that description which reduces scale of failure and their fault. In чернобыле the organizer of tests of woodpeckers believed, that the reactor, and a tank with cooling water has blown up not - and continued to submit commands on a nonexistent reactor. Possibly, such unwillingness can operate and forward in time, forcing people not to take up responsibility for the future global catastrophes.

106. The regular error connected with эгоцентричностью

It consists that people attribute to themselves большее influence on results of collective actions, than actually. Sometimes people exaggerate negative influence (мегаломания). According to Michael Anisimov, for this reason people exaggerate value of own death and underestimate death of all civilisation.

107. The regular error arising in connection with presence or absence of the obvious reason of events

People can concern more tolerantly the events occurring naturally (for example, death from an old age), than to the events having the obvious reason (death from illness), and especially - to the events connected with malice aforethought (murder). In a case with global risks at the moment there is no object or human whom we could accuse that the human civilisation will die out. Michael Anisimov writes: «As on horizon it is not visible the bad guy that with it to struggle, people do not test such enthusiasm which they, for example, tested, I protest against Bush».

107. Dependence of reaction on speed of change of size

Human can react more strongly to suddenly arisen threats, than on threats of the same force, but developed gradually. It is scarlet Mountains in the film about global warming results as an example experience with a frog. If a frog to throw in hot water, it there and then will jump out but if to place it in a vessel with cold water and to heat up, it will sit in it, not to cook yet. In the same way and inhabitants of Easter island so slowly reduced trees, that for each generation the problem was not appreciable.

Chapter 4. The Obshchelogichesky errors, able to be shown in reasonings on global risks

1. Mess between probability, as a measure of variability of object, and confidence degree, as a measure of the information on object

The first concerns likelihood process, for example, to radioactive disintegration, and the second to unknown process - for example, to card guessing. However global risks concern the phenomena, estimating which we are compelled to state likelihood judgements about processes, which simultaneously both likelihood, and unknown humans. Here we start to speak about degree of confidence of this or that probability. In this case the probability and confidence degree are multiplied.

2. Substitution of the analysis of possibilities by the analysis of the purposes

For example, reasonings like «terrorists never will want to use the bacteriological weapon because it will put blow and on they protect what interests». The structure of the purposes can be is very difficult or to comprise errors simply.

3. The incorrect use of inductive logic of a following kind: time something very much did not occur for a long time, it will not occur still very long

This statement works only in the event that we unitary observed something during the casual moment of time and probability is in that case described by formula Готта. It gives chance of end for any event in 50 percent in an interval from 1/3T to 3T, where T - age of object at the moment of its casual detection. However if we very long observe a certain process it evidently, comes nearer to the end. For example, if we take the casual human it, most likely, will be middle age. However if to take the casual human and then very long to observe, we will unequivocally receive the very old man who can die at any moment. (My article «Natural catastrophes and Antropic principle» more in detail see.)

4. The thinking caused by desire something to prove

Depending on that human wishes to prove, it will select those or other arguments, is frequent неосознанно. Other name for this model - "rationalisation", that is selection of pseudo-rational arguments under certain initially irrational statement.

5. The logic error arising at attempts to prove that it is necessary to do, proceeding only from the description of the facts

If in the first and second parcel of conclusion the facts and in a conclusion there can be only facts contain only. Any reasoning on the purposes should lean against certain representations about the values, set is axiomatic. However it means randomness of such purposes, and their understanding can differ at different researchers of global risks that can conduct to different definitions of catastrophe and representations that will be from it an exit. Besides, any system of axioms allows to formulate indemonstrable statements (as has shown Гёдель in the theorem of incompleteness), and concerning obligations it is easy to be convinced of it: almost any system of base values easily allows to create in itself contradictions that is the basic maintenance of many literary works where the hero a choice between, let us assume, love to a family and to the native land (should make that else the existential choice is called). It is not known, whether the consistent system of values as it will look is possible in general, and whether will be applicable in practice. However work on consistent system of values is important, as it will need to be enclosed in the future cars possessing an artificial intellect.

6. The errors connected with substitution of the analysis of risks by the analysis of those commercial motives who speaks about them

It is possible to argue as follows: if human investigates risks free of charge it the unemployed and маргинал if he wishes to receive for it money it parasitizes on public fears if it its direct official duties, to trust it is impossible because it the agent of the state and powders brains to the population. From here it is visible, that the direct communication between money and the analysis of risks is not present, though in some cases it is possible. The explanation through simplification is called «редукционизмом» and allows to explain everything, everything.

7. Use so-called «authoritative knowledge»

«The authoritative knowledge» was the basic source of data on the world in the Middle Ages when for true searched in Aristotle's works; have then invented an empirical method. References to opinions of great people should not form the sufficient basis to recognise something safe. Only regularly repeated calculations can specify in it.

8. Wrong application of idea that the theory should be considered true, only if it is proved

If to consider a scientific method, as a way of reception of the most authentic knowledge this methodology is true. However from the point of view of safety maintenance the opposite approach is necessary: a certain assumption should be considered dangerous until it is not denied. For example, the new model of the plane is considered dangerous, until then will not be proved yet, by theoretical calculations and test flights in all modes, that it is safe; the same principle underlies clinical testing of new medicines. Not clearly the same as to apply a principle фальсифицируемости concerning theories about those or other global catastrophes.

9. Perception of the new information through a prism of the old

In the course of perception human only a part of the information a beret from an external world, and the rest completes on the basis of the memory, expectations and associations. Alas, the same is true and for texts, including on global risks. Reading to the review of different people of the same text, it is not difficult to be convinced, that they have apprehended it absolutely differently. Hardly it is connected by that one people were essentially cleverer than others - more likely, that they applied different filters of perception. Moreover, if human has started to adhere to a certain point of view he subscribes for those editions and chooses those articles which confirm it. Thus, at it illusion is created, that the statistics on the data confirming its point of view, grows. It even more strengthens both its filter, and its confidence of these data.

10. An error in a choice of a neutral position

Each human understands in due course, that it is not quite objective, and its point of view has some tendentiousness. To compensate this deviation, he can choose a certain neutral source of the information. The error consists that the people adhering to opposite sights, will choose different neutral points, each of which will be closer to a position of the one who has chosen it. We described a similar error above when resulted results of experiences in which examinees have been warned about a possible error and did on it the amendment - and, nevertheless, all the same underestimated. Possibly, it was necessary to give the amendment not only to key parametre, but also to the amendment.

11. Confidence as a source of errors

The more human doubts the point of view, the is more often it changes it under the influence of the new facts, and the it is more than chances, that it will get to more authentic knowledge. If human is too assured of the opinion, it is difficult to it to change it. If it too изменчив it does not come nearer to true, and goes on a circle.

12. Use completely the erroneous logic

Alas, the situation when human in the reasonings makes mistakes «in each line» is possible. In this case it could not find the errors even if would like. It can be or one repeating regular error, or such density of different errors which does impossible a faultless reasoning. Even I now do not know for certain, whether I do any regular logic errors at the moment. It can occur more often, than we think - the analysis of scientific texts has shown, that usually people use the reduced conclusions and heuristics receptions - and do not realise it.

13. Prescience and pseudo science mixture

While the hypothesis is in process of a formulation, it yet has not acquired all scientific device and is, more likely, a product of brain storm on a certain theme, probably, carried out collectively by an exchange of opinions in printing editions. And during this moment it is a prescience - however it is aimed at becoming a science part, that is to pass corresponding selection and to be accepted or rejected. The pseudo science can simulate all attributes of scientific character - ranks, references, a mathematical apparatus, - nevertheless, its purpose - not search of authentic knowledge, and visibility of reliability. All statements about global risks are hypotheses which we almost never can check up. However we should not reject them on early phases of maturing. In other words, the phase of brain storm and a phase of critical elimination should not mix up - though both should be present.

14. The error connected with wrong definition of the status «универсалий»

The reality problem универсалий (that is generalisations) was the basic in medieval philosophy, and it consisted in a question, what objects actually really exists. Whether there are, for example, birds in general, or there are only separate copies of birds, and all kinds, sorts and families of birds - no more than a conditional invention of human reason? One of possible answers is that objectively there is our ability to distinguish birds and not-birds. Moreover, each bird too possesses this quality, and owing to it универсалAI exist objectively. In reasonings on risks the ambiguity apropos универсалий creeps as follows: properties of one object are transferred on a certain class as though this class was object. Then there are reasonings like «America wants …» or «it is peculiar to Russian …» whereas behind these concepts there is not a uniform object, and the set, which exact definition depends on the observer. Any discussions about the politician are poisoned by such shift. Arguing on an artificial intellect it is easy to make such mistake as it is not clear, whether there is a speech about one device or about a class of objects.