The Next 100 Years

Arabian
Arabian
Sea
Sea
Strait of
Strait of
Hormuz
Hormuz
Mediterranean
Mediterranean
Sea
Sea
Red
Red
Sea
Sea
Suez Canal
Suez Canal
Gulf of
Gulf of
Oman
Oman
Persian
Persian
Gulf
Gulf
U.A.E.
U.A.E.
QATAR
QATAR
JORDAN
JORDAN
ISRAEL
ISRAEL
SYRIA
SYRIA
OMAN
OMAN
ERITREA
ERITREA
DJIBOUTI
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIA
SOMALIA
KUWAIT
KUWAIT
Arabian
Sea
Mediterranean
Sea
Red
Sea
Suez Canal
Gulf of
Oman
Strait of
Hormuz
Persian
Gulf
EGYPT
JORDAN
ISRAEL
SYRIA
SUDAN
ETHIOPIA
YEMEN
SAUDI
ARABIA
IRAQ
IRAN
OMAN
ERITREA
DJIBOUTI
SOMALIA
KUWAIT
U.A.E.
QATAR
Middle East Sea Lanes
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Both countries also will have an interest in maintaining sea lanes from the 
Strait of Hormuz to the Strait of Malacca. So there will be a comfortable 
convergence of interests with few friction points. 
Obviously the emergence of Turkey in the region and as a maritime 
power will be alarming to the United States, particularly as it will happen at 
the same time that Japan is surging. And the low- key cooperation between 
Turkey and Japan in the Indian Ocean will be particularly disconcerting. 
Turkish power will now be overwhelming in the Persian Gulf—as will be 
Japanese naval power in the northwest Pacific. The United States will still be 
the dominant power in the Indian Ocean, but as with the Pacific, the trend 
won’t be moving in its direction. 
Equally disturbing will be the way in which Turkey gathers up the rem­
nants of the previous generation’s Islamists, adding ideological and moral 
weight to its emerging preeminence in the region. As its influence spreads, it 
will be about more than military power. This obviously will be unsettling to 
the United States, as well as to India. 
The United States will have had a long relationship with India, dating 
back to the U.S.–jihadist war of the early twenty- first century. While India, 
internally divided, will not have managed to become a global economic 
power, it will be a regional power of some importance. India will be dis­
turbed by the entry of Muslim Turks into the Arabian Sea, and will fear fur­
ther Turkish expansion into the Indian Ocean itself. India’s interests will 
align with those of the Americans, and so the United States will find itself in 
the same position in the Indian Ocean as in the Pacific. It will be aligned 
with a vast, populated country on the mainland, against smaller, more dy­
namic maritime powers. 
As this process intensifies, the power of Japan and Turkey—on opposite 
ends of Asia—will become substantial. Each will be expanding its interests 
in mainland Asia and therefore shifting its naval assets to support them. In 
addition, each will be enhancing its space- based operations, launching 
manned and unmanned systems. There will also be a degree of technical co­
operation in space; Japan will be ahead of Turkey in technology, but access 
to Turkish launch facilities will give Japan added security against an Ameri­
can strike. This cooperation will be yet another source of discomfort for the 
United States. 

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By the middle of the century, Turkey’s influence will extend deep into 
Russia and the Balkans, where it will collide with Poland and the rest of the 
Eastern European coalition. It will also become a major Mediterranean 
power, controlling the Suez Canal and projecting its strength into the Per­
sian Gulf. Turkey will frighten the Poles, the Indians, the Israelis, and above 
all the United States.