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The Skagerrak Straits
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trol of the Strait of Otranto. The only other alternatives will be for Den
mark to seize the Skagerrak and Poland to invade Germany, and the Poles
will not be in a position to do that.
The Polish bloc will collide with the Turks in two places. One will be in
the Balkans, where the issue will be access to the Mediterranean. The other
will be in Russia itself, where Turkish influence will spread westward
through Ukraine while the bloc’s influence spreads eastward. This will not
be as explosive as the first issue, as there will be plenty of room, but it will be
a secondary issue of some importance. No one will have defined the spheres
of influence in Ukraine and southern Russia. And given Ukrainian hostility
to Poles—with whom they had a historical antagonism going back to the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—and to the Turks as well, each might
manipulate the situation in ways uncomfortable to the other.
The Poles will need the Americans badly at this juncture. Only the
Americans will have the weight to resist the Turks in the Mediterranean.
And the Americans will be increasingly inclined to do so, as they will not
want to see a new Eurasian power establish itself. While Turkey will be far
from reaching that goal, it will be moving in that direction. America’s strate
gies of disrupting Eurasian regional powers before they become too strong
and preventing the emergence of any other naval power will dictate that the
United States should try to block Turkey.
At the same time, U.S. policy will also require that, rather than take di
rect action, the United States should underwrite regional powers also inter
ested in resisting the Turks. The Polish bloc won’t be an immediate threat to
any American interests, unlike the Turks. The American strategy, therefore,
will be not to throw U.S. forces into the struggle, but to transfer technology
to the Polish bloc so that it can pursue the strategy on its own.
By around 2045 the Polish bloc will have secured Rijeka, absorbing both
Slovenia and Croatia. Both countries will seek protection from the bloc
against Balkan rivals like Serbia and Bosnia. The Polish bloc will have heav
ily fortified the frontier with both of these countries. Serbia will be excluded
from the bloc because the Poles and the others will not want to get bogged
down in Serbian politics. And using American technological strength, Poland
will proceed to rapidly integrate and develop naval and space capabilities
needed to confront the Turks in the Adriatic and Mediterranean. The rate of
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the Polish bloc’s development will be startling, and the Turks will begin to
realize that they face a challenge not only from the Polish bloc but from the
United States itself.
The Germans will watch this crisis anxiously from their nearby border,
obviously supporting the Turks. They won’t make a move on their own, but
the Germans will be sufficiently aware of the consequences if the Polish bloc
defeats Turkey. In that event, if they maintain their unity, the Polish bloc
will essentially be the reincarnation of the former Soviet Union, with most
of its European resources—added to which would be the Middle East. The
Germans will understand the Americans well enough to know that they
would move against the bloc in the event of victory of this magnitude, but
the Germans will also know that they would bear the brunt of the new con
frontation. If the Polish bloc were in this dominant position, the United
States would have to keep it from also dominating Western Europe, and
that would mean that Germany would, once again, become a potential bat
tlefield. The success of the Polish bloc would present short- and long- range
threats to Germany.
It will therefore be in the German interest to help the Turks in any way
possible, short of war. But the help that the Turks will need would be help
in strangling the Polish bloc. The key to this would be isolating it from the
United States and global trade. If the Turks were to isolate the Polish bloc in
the Adriatic, and the Germans could contrive a way to obstruct the Baltic,
the Polish bloc would be in serious trouble. But for Germany to do this, it
will have to be sure that the Turks will succeed—and for this it will need to
be sure that the Americans won’t come in with their full weight. Since Ger
many can’t be sure of either, it will play a waiting game.
The Americans will also play a waiting game around the globe. They will
arm the Polish bloc and encourage its confrontation with the Turks. They
will help increase the strength of the Indians in the Indian Ocean. They will
strengthen the Chinese and Koreans and build up American forces in the
Pacific and the Mediterranean. They will do everything they can to strangle
both Japan and Turkey without acting directly against them. And they will
pursue the policy well—too well in fact. Both Turkey and Japan, well aware
of the United States’ historic ability to arm and support its allies, will be led
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to the conclusion that they are facing disaster at the hands of American
proxies. And this will lead to massive escalation.
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